Abraugh v. Altimus

• Decision Date: 14 February 2022
• Docket Number: No. 21-30205,21-30205
• Citation: 26 F.4th 298
• Parties: Karen ABRAUGH, individually and on behalf of M.A. and as Administrator, on behalf of Randall Abraugh Estate; Kelsey Rice Abraugh; Reashelle Morrow, on behalf of M.A., Plaintiffs—Appellants, v. Bill ALTIMUS, individually and in his official capacity; James Cochran, individually and in his official capacity; Julian C. Whittington, individually and in his official capacity; Rodney Boyer, individually and in his official capacity; Susan C. Tucker, individually and in her official capacity; Cynthia Holley, individually and in her official capacity; Anita Flye, individually and in her official capacity; Russell W. Roberts, individually and in his official capacity; Jessica Farrington, individually and in her official capacity; Bradley Vassar, individually and in his official capacity; State of Louisiana Office of Risk Management; John Doe #1, Correctional Employee; John Doe #2, M.D.; John Doe #3, Mental Health Professional; Louisiana State University Agricultural & Mechanical College Board of Supervisors; Police Jury Bossier Parish; Parish of Bossier, Defendants—Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

26 F.4th 298

Karen ABRAUGH, individually and on behalf of M.A. and as Administrator, on behalf of Randall Abraugh Estate; Kelsey Rice Abraugh; Reashelle Morrow, on behalf of M.A., Plaintiffs—Appellants,

v.Bill ALTIMUS, individually and in his official capacity; James Cochran, individually and in his official capacity; Julian C. Whittington, individually and in his official capacity; Rodney Boyer, individually and in his official capacity; Susan C. Tucker, individually and in her official capacity; Cynthia Holley, individually and in her official capacity; Anita Flye, individually and in her official capacity; Russell W. Roberts, individually and in his official capacity; Jessica Farrington, individually and in her official capacity; Bradley Vassar, individually and in his official capacity; State of Louisiana Office of Risk Management; John Doe #1, Correctional Employee; John Doe #2, M.D.; John Doe #3, Mental Health Professional; Louisiana State University Agricultural & Mechanical College Board of Supervisors; Police Jury Bossier Parish; Parish of Bossier, Defendants—Appellees.

No. 21-30205

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

FILED February 14, 2022

Amy Gardner Day, Nichole Marie Buckle, Carmouche, Bokenfohr, Buckle & Day, P.L.L.C., Shreveport, LA, Paul J. James, James & Carter, P.L.C., Little Rock, AR, for Plaintiffs—Appellants.

Robert Kennedy, Jr., Attorney, James Ashby Davis, Cook, Yancey, King & Galloway, A.P.L.C., Shreveport, LA, for Defendants—Appellees Bill Altimus, James Cochran, Cynthia Holley, Jessica Farrington, Police Jury Bossier Parish, and Parish of Bossier.

Glenn L. Langley, Esq., Langley & Parks, L.L.C., Shreveport, LA, for Defendants—Appellees Julian C. Whittington, and Rodney Boyer.

Carl E. Hellmers, III, Esq., Stephanie D. O'Brien, Attorney, Frilot, L.L.C., New Orleans, LA, for Defendants—Appellees Susan C. Tucker, Anita Flye, and Russell W. Roberts.

Andre' Charles Castaing, Louisiana Department of Justice, Litigation Division, Baton Rouge, LA, Daniel Robert Ewing, Amanda Brotherton Todd, Esq., Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Louisiana, Shreveport, LA, for Defendants—Appellees State of Louisiana Office of Risk Management, Louisiana State University Agricultural & Mechanical College Board of Supervisors, and Russell W. Roberts.

Before Wiener, Graves, and Ho, Circuit Judges.

James C. Ho, Circuit Judge:^*

Some words have multiple meanings. The right meaning may vary dramatically depending on context. And determining which usage applies to a given situation can have significant consequences under our legal system.

A few examples will suffice to show how things can go awry if you get the usage wrong. "Sanction" can mean official approval—or official penalty. "Natural born" often refers to an attribute possessed at birth (as in "natural born citizen" or "natural born athlete")—but it could also refer to the method of one's delivery into the world. "Discrimination" might mean disfavoring one group of individuals over another—or it might just mean differentiating among people based on a group trait. See also Charles P. Pierce, Goat vs. G.O.A.T.: The History Behind Sports's Antithetical Animal Analogy , SPORTS ILLUSTRATED , July 23, 2018 (depending on context, "goat" can mean "an athlete who failed, garishly, hilariously, and at the worst possible time"—or the "greatest of all time").

Judges and lawyers are only human. At times we may be imprecise in our use of terminology. And that imprecision can lead to legal error. In particular, courts and judges are sometimes "less than meticulous" when it comes to the term "jurisdiction." That's what the Supreme Court observed in Arbaugh v. Y&H Corporation , 546 U.S. 500, 511, 126 S.Ct. 1235, 163 L.Ed.2d 1097 (2006) —not to be confused with the lead plaintiff here, Karen Abraugh.

It's also what happened here. In this case, the district court was "less than meticulous" about one particular aspect of jurisdiction—the concept of "standing." The following two principles, stated independently, are both legally correct as far as they go: (1) A plaintiff like Abraugh lacks "standing" to bring suits like this. (2) If a plaintiff lacks "standing," then the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider the plaintiff's claims.

But combining these statements here, as the district court did, creates legal error. That's because they involve different conceptions of standing.

The first statement concerns prudential standing, not Article III standing: Abraugh lacks prudential standing because Louisiana law does not authorize her to bring this particular cause of action. The second statement, by contrast, concerns Article III standing: If Abraugh lacks Article III standing, then the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over her claims.

In this case, Abraugh lacks prudential standing. But she has Article III standing. She has a constitutionally cognizable interest in the life of her son. And that determination does not turn on whether Louisiana law allows her to sue.

So the district court erred when it held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider any of Abraugh's amended complaints. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

I.

Karen Abraugh brought this suit over the wrongful death of her son Randall. Authorities booked Randall into the Bossier Maximum Security Facility as a pretrial detainee. He was both medicated and intoxicated at the time, and he had a history of mental health treatment. Though Randall was identified as "a detainee who should be followed for alcohol withdrawal syndrome and possible delirium tremens," prison officials allegedly placed him in a cell without an operable source of water and failed to monitor him or provide any medication or liquids. The next day, officials found him hanging from his bedsheets. After emergency medical services personnel restored his cardiac function, he was transported to the hospital for treatment, but he eventually died there from his injuries.

So Karen filed this action. She filed the complaint both individually and on behalf of Randall's estate. The complaint asserted civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, wrongful death and survival claims under Louisiana law, and other state-law claims against various defendants whom she alleges were responsible for her son's death. It alleged that Randall was survived by his wife, Kelsey Rice Abraugh, along with his biological parents and siblings.

Karen later amended her complaint to "substitute Plaintiff with individual heirs" by "adding Kelsey Rice Abraugh (Randall Abraugh's surviving spouse), and [M.A.] (Randall Abraugh's minor child)." She subsequently amended the complaint again to allow M.A. to appear through Reashelle Morrow, her mother and natural tutor.

The district court granted Defendants' motions to dismiss. It held that Karen lacked Article III standing to bring this suit, on the ground that Louisiana law does not provide her with a right of action to pursue these claims. The district court also found that the later amendments adding Kelsey and M.A. to this action could not cure the initial jurisdictional defect, because Karen was the only plaintiff in the original complaint. Karen timely appealed.

We review a dismissal for lack of Article III standing de novo. See, e.g., Glen v. Am. Airlines, Inc. , 7 F.4th 331, 334 (5th Cir. 2021).

II.

There are three elements that a plaintiff must prove to establish Article III standing: injury in fact, traceability, and redressability. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife , 504 U.S. 555, 560–61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992).

In addition, courts have occasionally articulated other "standing" requirements that plaintiffs must satisfy under certain conditions, beyond those imposed by Article III. As relevant here, "[s]tanding under the Civil Rights Statutes is guided by 42 U.S.C. § 1988." Pluet v. Frasier , 355 F.3d 381, 383 (5th Cir. 2004). And § 1988 "provides that state common law is used to fill the gaps in administration of civil rights suits." Id. See also 42 U.S.C. § 1988(a).

So "a party must have standing under the state wrongful death or survival statutes to bring a claim under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1988." Pluet , 355 F.3d at 383.

Under Louisiana law, the right to pursue a survival or wrongful death action is available to four exclusive categories of survivors. Those four classes are as follows:

(1) The surviving spouse and child or children of the deceased, or either the spouse or the child or children.

(2) The surviving father and mother of the deceased, or either of them if he left no spouse or child surviving.

(3) The surviving brothers and sisters of the deceased, or any of them, if he left no spouse, child, or parent surviving.

(4) The surviving grandfathers and grandmothers of the deceased, or any of them, if he left no spouse, child, parent, or sibling surviving.

LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2315.1(A) & 2315.2(A).

These provisions make clear that the existence of a higher class of survivors prevents a person in a lower class from filing suit. Id. And that is precisely the problem here: Karen would be allowed to sue under Louisiana law, but for the fact that there are other individuals who enjoy superior status under the governing provisions. Indeed, she concedes as much. She concedes, as she must, that Randall was survived by his wife, Kelsey, and his daughter, M.A. As the "surviving spouse and child ... of the deceased," they are the only ones who may bring these survival and wrongful death claims in accordance with Louisiana law. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2315.1(A)(1) & 2315.2(A)(1). And because they are available to sue, Karen is disabled from suing as a matter of Louisiana law as the "surviving ... mother of the deceased." Id. arts. 2315.1(A)(2) & 2315.2(A)(2).

That much is undisputed. But it led the district court to (incorrectly) conclude that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Karen lacked Article III...