Abreu v. SCI Greene State Corr. Inst.

• Decision Date: 04 April 2023
• Docket Number: 5:23-cv-01092
• Parties: RALPH ABREU, Plaintiff, v. SCI GREENE STATE CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION; PA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; SUPT. MICHAEL ZAKEN; STEPHEN BUZAS; JOHN DOE LIEUTENANT NAPOLEAN; and JOHN DOES #1-10; Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

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RALPH ABREU, Plaintiff, v. SCI GREENE STATE CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION; PA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; SUPT. MICHAEL ZAKEN; STEPHEN BUZAS; JOHN DOE LIEUTENANT NAPOLEAN; and JOHN DOES #1-10; Defendants.

No. 5:23-cv-01092

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania

April 4, 2023

OPINION

JOSEPH F. LEESON, JR. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Ralph Abreu, through counsel, initiated the above-captioned action regarding an alleged assault while incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution (“SCI”) Greene. Pursuant to this Court's duty to screen all prisoner complaints, it has reviewed the allegations of the Complaint. Because the Complaint contains very few factual allegations and fails to sufficiently state a claim, it is dismissed without prejudice and with leave to amend.

II. BACKGROUND

The Complaint alleges that this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1988, giving rise to federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and civil rights jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343. Compl. ¶ 1, ECF No. 1. It further alleged that this Court has supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Id. ¶ 2. The Defendants include SCI Greene; the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“DOC”); Michael Zaken, Superintendent of SCI Greene; Stephen Buzas, Deputy Superintendent of SCI Greene; John Doe Napolean, Lieutenant at SCI Greene; and John Does #1-10, ten unidentified correctional officers at SCI Greene. Id. ¶¶ 5-11. The individual Defendants are sued in both their official and individual capacities and are alleged to have acted under color of state law. Id. ¶¶ 7-14. The Complaint, which seeks only monetary relief, lists five counts: (I) assault and battery; (II) negligence; (III) conspiracy; (IV) intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”); and (V) negligent infliction of emotional distress (“NIED”). Each count is asserted against “all Defendants.”

The only specific factual allegations in the Complaint state:

17. On or about March 28, 2021, Plaintiff was removed from a restraint chair and placed on I-B-7 cell floor.

18. At the aforesaid place, The Defendants violently, horrifically, and ruthlessly inflicted a beating on Plaintiff, who variously received a knee and multiple punches to the face by Defendants their agents, servants, and employees and those whom they are answerable in damages of the law.

19. On or about March 30, 2021, Plaintiff submitted a grievance with the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Department of Corrections in reference to the aforesaid matter. ...

29. Defendants, by and through their agents, servants, workers, employees, contractors and/other [sic] representatives, violently and forcibly struck and pushed the Plaintiff, causing injuries to Plaintiff.

Compl. ¶¶ 17-19, 29.^[1] Without identifying the nature of the injuries, the Complaint also includes broad allegations that Abreu's injuries may be permanent, that he has and may in the future incur expenses for medical treatment, and that he has been and may in the future not be able to perform usual functions. See generally Compl. All other allegations in the Complaint are legal conclusions unsupported by any facts.^[2]

III. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Screening of Prisoner Complaints - Review of Applicable Law

“In an effort to address the large number of prisoner complaints filed in federal court, Congress enacted the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995” (“PLRA”), which “mandates early judicial screening of prisoner complaints.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 202 (2007) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A). Section 1915A provides:

(a) Screening. The court shall review, before docketing, if feasible or, in any event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.

(b) Grounds for dismissal. On review, the court shall identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint-

(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or

(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(a)-(b). “The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to . . . § 1915A(b)(1) is identical to the legal standard used when ruling on 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss.” Johnson v. Caputo, No. 11-2603, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83380, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 30, 2013) (citing Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999)).

B. Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) - Review of Applicable Law

In rendering a decision on a motion to dismiss, this Court must “accept all factual allegations as true [and] construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Pinker v. Roche Holdings Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 374 n.7 (3d Cir. 2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Only if “the ‘[f]actual allegations . . . raise a right to relief above the speculative level'” has the plaintiff stated a plausible claim. Id. at 234 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 540, 555 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). However, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Id. (explaining that determining “whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief . . . [is] a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense”). “[I]n light of Twombly, Rule 8(a)(2) requires a ‘showing' rather than a blanket assertion of an entitlement to relief. We caution that without some factual allegation in the complaint, a claimant cannot satisfy the requirement that he or she provide not only ‘fair notice,' but also the ‘grounds' on which the claim rests.” Phillips, 515 F.3d at 233 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 n.3). See also Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a) (requiring the complaint to contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”).

C. Section 1983 claims - Review of Applicable Law

“To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). The first step for the court analyzing a claim under § 1983 “is to identify the exact contours of the underlying right said to have been violated.” Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n.5 (1998). The court must determine “whether the plaintiff has alleged a deprivation of a constitutional right at all.” See Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 806 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Id.). Section “1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (internal quotations omitted). The court must also determine whether a defendant is acting under color of state law, i.e., whether the defendant is a state actor, which depends on whether there is “such a ‘close nexus between the State and the challenged action' that seemingly private behavior ‘may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.'” Leshko v. Servis, 423 F.3d 337, 339 (3d Cir. 2005) (internal quotations omitted). Additionally, a “defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs; liability cannot be predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior.” See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988). “Personal involvement can be shown through allegations of personal direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence. Allegations of participation or actual knowledge and acquiescence, however, must be made with appropriate particularity.” Id. “Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. A supervisory defendant may be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if the defendant, “with deliberate indifference to the consequences, established and maintained a policy, practice or custom which directly caused [the plaintiff's] constitutional harm.” Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720, 725 (3d Cir. 1989).

D. Conspiracy claims under sections 1983 and 1985 - Review of Applicable Law

“To demonstrate a conspiracy under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that two or more conspirators reached an agreement to deprive him or her of a constitutional right ‘under color of law.'” Parkway Garage, Inc. v. City of Phila., 5 F.3d 685, 700 (3d Cir. 1993) (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970)).

Section 1985 proscribes conspiracies aimed at: (1) preventing an officer from performing duties; (2) obstructing justice and intimidating a party, witness, or juror; and (3) depriving persons of certain rights or privileges. See 42 U.S.C. § 1985. “Subsections (1) and the first clause of (2) of § 1985 concern interference with federal officials and federal court proceedings.” Edwards v. Colleran, No. 88-7820, 1989 U.S. Dist LEXIS 147, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 9, 1989). “In order to pursue a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2) (second clause) and (3), plaintiff must demonstrate that defendants' actions were motivated by...