Abruzzo v. City of Park Ridge
| Decision Date | 02 October 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. 104935.,104935. |
| Citation | 898 N.E.2d 631,231 Ill.2d 324 |
| Parties | Jo Ann ABRUZZO, Independent Adm'r of the Estate of Joseph Furio, Deceased, Appellant, v. The CITY OF PARK RIDGE, Appellee. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Corboy & Demetrio, P.C., Chicago (Susan J. Schwartz, of counsel), for appellant.
Judge, James & Kujawa, LLC, Park Ridge (Jay S. Judge, Michael E. Kujawa, Thomas J. Condron, of counsel), for appellee.
J. Dale Berry, Carrie A. Herschman, of Cornfield & Feldman, Chicago, for amicus curiae Associated Firefighters of Illinois.
Plaintiff Jo Ann Abruzzo sued the City of Park Ridge, alleging the City's emergency medical technicians were dispatched to provide medical care to her minor son, Joseph Furio, but left without examining him or providing any treatment. Plaintiff alleged Joseph died as a result of the City's willful and wanton misconduct. The City filed a motion to dismiss under section 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9) (West 2004)), asserting immunity under the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (Tort Immunity Act) (745 ILCS 10/1-101 et seq. (West 2004)). The circuit court of Cook County granted the motion to dismiss, and the appellate court affirmed. 374 Ill.App.3d 743, 312 Ill.Dec. 568, 870 N.E.2d 1012. We allowed plaintiff's petition for leave to appeal. 210 Ill.2d R. 315(a).
In this appeal, we must decide whether the Tort Immunity Act immunizes the City from liability for the acts alleged in the complaint. We hold that the limited immunity provision of the Emergency Medical Services (EMS) Systems Act (EMS Act) (210 ILCS 50/3.150(a) (West 2004)) applies to these facts over the Tort Immunity Act. Accordingly, we reverse the dismissal of plaintiff's complaint and remand for further proceedings.
Plaintiff filed a complaint as the independent administrator of Joseph's estate seeking damages under the Wrongful Death Act (740 ILCS 180/0.01 et seq. (West 2004)), the Survival Act (755 ILCS 5/27-6 (West 2004)), and the Rights of Married Persons Act (750 ILCS 65/15 (West 2004)). Plaintiff's amended complaint alleged that Joseph was 15 years old and staying with his father, Lawrence Furio, in the City of Park Ridge on October 31, 2004. At 1:06 a.m., Lawrence called 911 to request emergency assistance for Joseph, "a nonresponsive child who required CPR."
The City dispatched a fire engine and an ambulance staffed by emergency medical technicians (EMTs), paramedics, and firefighters. Upon their arrival, Joseph was unresponsive. Plaintiff alleged the EMTs, paramedics, and firefighters did not evaluate, assess, provide advanced life support, or transport Joseph to a hospital despite his condition requiring immediate medical treatment. The complaint further alleged that the EMTs and paramedics knew or should have known that Joseph had a history of drug abuse. Plaintiff alleged the City acted with willful and wanton disregard for Joseph's health and safety by responding to the request for emergency medical services and failing to evaluate or assess him, failing to transport him to a hospital, and failing to prepare a "run sheet" for the 911 call. Plaintiff further alleged that Joseph died as a result of the alleged acts or omissions.
Plaintiff attached to her amended complaint a certificate of merit with a physician's report, as required by section 2-622 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-622 (West 2004)). The physician's report notes that the EMTs and paramedics did not prepare a run sheet for the emergency response and there is no record of any assessment or treatment during the response. The report states that basic principles of training, standing orders and protocols, and accepted emergency procedures require EMTs to evaluate and assess any person with an altered mental status. The treatment for a person with an altered mental status requires initiation of advanced life support and assessment of airway, breathing, and circulation. Joseph was presumed to have an altered mental status because he was unresponsive.
The physician's report further states that a second 911 call was made on Joseph's behalf at 9 a.m. on October 31, 2004. Joseph was in cardiac arrest upon the emergency responders' arrival. The emergency responders began resuscitation and transported Joseph to a local hospital where he died. The cause of death was anoxic encephalopathy due to cocaine and opiate intoxication. The physician's report concluded that failures of the emergency responders were a proximate cause of Joseph's death.
The City filed a motion to dismiss the complaint under section 2-619, claiming immunity based on sections 6-105 and 6-106(a) of the Tort Immunity Act (745 ILCS 10/6-105, 6-106(a) (West 2004)). The City asserted that plaintiff's allegations fell within the absolute immunity of sections 6-105 and 6-106(a), barring liability against a local public entity for failure to evaluate, diagnose, or prescribe treatment for an illness or physical condition.
Plaintiff responded that the Tort Immunity Act did not immunize the alleged act of failing to provide any assistance to her unresponsive son. Along with her response, plaintiff filed a motion to amend the complaint to conform with the physician's report. Plaintiff sought to add allegations that the City acted with willful and wanton disregard for Joseph's health by failing to initiate advanced life support and failing to assess his airway, breathing, and circulation. Plaintiff alleged that those actions were required due to Joseph's altered mental status. The City replied that the EMTs' alleged failure to provide services fell squarely within the provisions of the Tort Immunity Act.
The trial court found that the Tort Immunity Act applied to the allegations of the complaint. The trial court did not rule on plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint, but noted that the proposed amendment would not alter or prevent application of the Tort Immunity Act to these facts. Accordingly, the trial court granted the City's motion to dismiss the complaint with prejudice.
On appeal, plaintiff argued that the Tort Immunity Act is inapplicable because the immunity provision of the EMS Act is more specifically directed to the facts alleged in the complaint. Plaintiff contended that the EMS Act does not provide immunity in this case because the emergency responders were willful and wanton in failing to provide any treatment to Joseph. The City maintained that the absolute immunity provision of the Tort Immunity Act applied because no treatment was provided by the emergency responders.
The appellate court held that the plain language of the Tort Immunity Act applied to plaintiff's allegations that the EMTs and paramedics failed to examine, diagnose, or otherwise treat the decedent. The Tort Immunity Act applied to the exclusion of the immunity provision of the EMS Act. The City was, therefore, immune from liability. Accordingly, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the complaint. 374 Ill.App.3d 743, 312 Ill.Dec. 568, 870 N.E.2d 1012.
We allowed plaintiff's petition for leave to appeal. 210 Ill.2d R. 315(a). We then allowed the Associated Firefighters of Illinois to file an amicus curiae brief in support of the City. 210 Ill.2d R. 345.
The sole issue in this appeal is whether sections 6-105 and 6-106(a) of the Tort Immunity Act apply to immunize the City from liability for the acts alleged in plaintiff's complaint. Plaintiff contends that the EMS Act's immunity provision applies here because that Act is comprehensive legislation designed to ensure delivery of emergency medical services. Plaintiff also argues that the limited immunity provision in the EMS Act is more specific and should apply over the more general provisions of the Tort Immunity Act. The City's alleged willful and wanton misconduct is not immunized under the EMS Act. Accordingly, plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in granting the City's section 2-619 motion to dismiss the complaint.
The City responds that the Tort Immunity Act applies before providing any emergency medical services. The EMS Act immunity provision applies only after medical services are undertaken in good faith. The Tort Immunity Act, therefore, applies to plaintiff's allegations that the emergency responders arrived, but failed to examine, diagnose, or prescribe any treatment for Joseph. The City also argues that the EMS Act does not impose a duty to provide emergency medical services in responding to a 911 call. Rather, the EMS Act applies only upon providing actual emergency medical services. The City contends, therefore, that the trial court properly found plaintiff's claim barred by the Tort Immunity Act.
We note the facts alleged in the complaint are unusual. Ordinarily, it is accepted that emergency responders will provide necessary aid upon arriving at an emergency. In this case, however, plaintiff alleges that the emergency responders arrived at the residence and then left without evaluating or giving necessary treatment to her unresponsive minor son. Although these alleged facts are unusual, we must accept them as true in reviewing the dismissal under section 2-619. See Kedzie & 103rd Currency Exchange, Inc. v. Hodge, 156 Ill.2d 112, 115, 189 Ill.Dec. 31, 619 N.E.2d 732 (1993) (). Thus, although plaintiff's factual allegations seem unusual, we must determine whether sections 6-105 and 6-106(a) of the Tort Immunity Act or the EMS Act's immunity provision governs those allegations.
Section 2-619(a)(9) of the Code provides for dismissal of a claim if it is barred by "affirmative matter." 735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9...
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