Vill. of Vernon Hills v. Heelan

• Decision Date: 24 September 2015
• Docket Number: No. 118170.,118170.
• Citation: 39 N.E.3d 937
• Parties: VILLAGE OF VERNON HILLS, Appellant, v. William J. HEELAN, Appellee.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

39 N.E.3d 937

VILLAGE OF VERNON HILLS, Appellant

v.William J. HEELAN, Appellee.

No. 118170.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Sept. 24, 2015.

Keith L. Hunt and Bradley E. Faber, Hunt & Associates, P.C., Chicago, for appellant.

Charles W. Smith, Smith, LaLuzerne & Hartman, Ltd., Waukegan, for appellee.

Roger Huebner, Springfield, and James J. Powers, Rosemont, for amicus curiae Illinois Municipal League et al.

OPINION

Justice FREEMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Defendant, William J. Heelan, was awarded a line-of-duty disability pension (40 ILCS 5/3–114.1 (West 2010) ) by the Board of Trustees of the Vernon Hills Police Pension Fund (Board). Plaintiff, the Village of Vernon Hills (Village), filed a complaint for declaratory relief against Heelan in the circuit court of Lake County. The Village sought a declaration that it was not obligated to pay the health insurance premium for Heelan and his family pursuant to section 10 of the Public Safety Employee Benefits Act (Act). 820 ILCS 320/10 (West 2010). The circuit court entered judgment in favor of Heelan.

¶ 2 A divided panel of the appellate court affirmed. 2014 IL App (2d) 130823, 383 Ill.Dec. 611, 14 N.E.3d 1222. This court allowed the Village's petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S.Ct. R. 315 (eff. Jan. 1, 2015). We now affirm the judgment of the appellate court.

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 On December 9, 2009, Heelan was a police officer who had been employed by the Village of Vernon Hills for approximately 20 years. While responding to an emergency call, Heelan slipped on ice and fell on his right side. He was taken by ambulance to a hospital emergency room. Heelan was diagnosed as having a back spasm, a shoulder sprain, and a hip contusion. He was prescribed pain medication and released. On December 22, 2009, an MRI (magnetic resonance imaging ) scan was taken of Heelan's right hip.

¶ 5 In January 2010, Dr. Jay Levin conducted an independent medical evaluation of Heelan,¹ which he reviewed in a February 2010 report. Dr. Levin concluded that Heelan's MRI revealed preexisting, significant osteoarthritis. Observing that Heelan had no hip complaints prior to his injury, Dr. Levin opined that the December 2009 injury had aggravated Heelan's preexisting right hip osteoarthritis. In April 2010, Heelan underwent a right hip replacement. For the next two months he worked light duty. In June 2010, Dr. Levin examined Heelan and prepared a report. Heelan complained of left hip pain. Testing revealed long-standing left hip osteoarthritis. In an August 2010 follow-up report, Dr. Levin clarified that Heelan's MRI showed preexisting osteoarthritis of both hips. Dr. Levin concluded in both reports that Heelan's left hip osteoarthritis was aggravated by his right hip replacement, which in turn was related to his injury. In September 2010, Heelan underwent a left hip replacement. He did not return to work.

¶ 6 A. Board Hearing

¶ 7 In December 2010, Heelan applied for a line-of-duty disability pension pursuant to section 3–114.1 of the Illinois Pension Code (40 ILCS 5/3–114.1 (West 2010) ).² On June 28, 2011, the Board held a hearing on Heelan's application. The report of proceedings listed the appearances of Heelan's counsel, the Board's counsel, and individual Board members, and listed the Village manager and the attorney for the Village as “also present” at the hearing. The Board admitted into evidence the reports of three Board-selected physicians: Drs. Joseph Meis, Joshua Jacobs, and Thomas Gleason. The Board also heard live testimony from Heelan and telephone testimony from Dr. Gleason. After considering the evidence, the Board determined that Heelan qualified for a line-of-duty disability pension. On August 24, 2011, the Board adopted its written findings and decision and granted Heelan a line-of-duty disability pension. However, the Village neither petitioned to intervene in the proceeding nor otherwise objected to the Board's decision. A few days later, Heelan sent a letter to the Village in which he claimed that, based on his line-of-duty disability award and pursuant to the Act, the Village was responsible for paying the health insurance premium for himself and his dependents.

¶ 8 B. Instant Declaratory Judgment Action

¶ 9 On September 22, 2011, the Village filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that it was not responsible for paying the health insurance premium for Heelan and his family pursuant to the Act.³ The Village alleged that he did not meet the statutory requirements of suffering a catastrophic injury (820 ILCS 320/10(a) (West 2010)) and of having an injury that resulted from his response to what he reasonably believed to be an emergency (820 ILCS 320/10(b) (West 2010)). The Village acknowledged this court's holding in Krohe v. City of Bloomington, 204 Ill.2d 392, 400, 273 Ill.Dec. 779, 789 N.E.2d 1211 (2003), that a catastrophic injury is synonymous with an injury resulting in a line-of-duty disability pension. However, the Village alleged that “the facts and circumstances of Mr. Heelan's disability application are readily distinguishable from those in Krohe. ” Heelan answered the complaint and filed a counterclaim for a declaratory judgment that the Village was obligated to pay his health insurance premiums pursuant to section 10 of the Act.⁴

¶ 10 The Village filed notices of deposition of Drs. Levin, Meis, Jacobs, and Gleason. Relying on Krohe and its progeny, the circuit court granted Heelan's motion to strike the depositions. Heelan thereafter filed a motion in limine to bar any testimony on the issue of whether he had suffered a catastrophic injury pursuant to section 10(a) of the Act. Heelan contended that, pursuant to Krohe, the Village was prohibited from denying that he suffered a catastrophic injury. The court granted Heelan's motion in limine.

¶ 11 On March 18, 2013, the Village made an offer of proof on the issue of whether Heelan suffered a catastrophic injury under section 10(a) of the Act. The offer of proof included the record of the Board proceedings; evidence that was before the Board, including the reports of Drs. Meis, Jacobs, and Gleason; Heelan's medical records, including the reports of Dr. Levin; and Heelan's employment records and performance review. The Village conceded that Heelan was responding to what he reasonably believed to be an emergency, thereby satisfying section 10(b) of the Act.

¶ 12 The cause proceeded to a bench trial. The circuit court granted Heelan's motion for a directed finding that the Village failed to establish that Heelan was not entitled to the Act's health insurance benefit. In support of his counterclaim, Heelan testified that he was awarded a line-of-duty disability pension and that he sought the Act's health insurance benefit from the Village. The circuit court concluded that Heelan was “entitled to his [Act] benefits because he has shown catastrophic injury by way of showing that he received a line-of-duty pension, and there's a stipulation that he was responding to an emergency.” The court subsequently entered a written order in favor of Heelan on the Village's complaint and on Heelan's counterclaim.

¶ 13 The Village appealed from the circuit court's judgment that it was obligated under the Act to pay the health insurance premium for Heelan and his family. A divided panel of the appellate court affirmed. 2014 IL App (2d) 130823, 383 Ill.Dec. 611, 14 N.E.3d 1222. The court noted the Village's concession that Heelan satisfied section 10(b) of the Act, and concluded that Heelan also satisfied section 10(a). The court reasoned that Heelan was “catastrophically injured” for purposes of section 10(a) because the Board awarded him a line-of-duty disability pension. Id. ¶¶ 20–26. The Village claimed a due process deprivation, contending that it was denied the opportunity to litigate the nature, extent, or causation of Heelan's injuries. The appellate court rejected this argument, reasoning that since Heelan was awarded a line-of-duty disability pension, “[n]othing remained to be litigated under section 10(a).” Id. ¶¶ 31–33. The dissenting justice contended that the Village was denied due process because there was no proceeding of which the Village had notice and where the Village had an opportunity to be heard regarding the evidence of catastrophic injury. Id. ¶¶ 44–53 (McLaren, J., dissenting).⁵

¶ 14 The Village now appeals to this court. We granted the Illinois Municipal League and the Illinois Public Employer Labor Relations Association leave to submit an amicus curiae brief in support of the Village. Ill. S.Ct. R. 345 (eff. Sept. 20, 2010). Additional pertinent background will be discussed in the context of our analysis.

¶ 15 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 16 The Village (a) disagrees with this court's construction of the phrase “catastrophic injury” in section 10(a) of the Act, which (b) allegedly denies the Village procedural due process.

¶ 17 A. Meaning of “Catastrophic Injury”

¶ 18 We first address the Village's invitation to revisit this court's definition of “catastrophic injury” as used in section 10(a) of the Act. The construction of a statute is a question of law that is reviewed de novo. In re Andrew B., 237 Ill.2d 340, 348, 341 Ill.Dec. 420, 930 N.E.2d 934 (2010) ; Williams v. Staples, 208 Ill.2d 480, 487, 281 Ill.Dec. 524, 804 N.E.2d 489 (2004).

¶ 19 The primary objective in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. Slepicka v. Illinois Department of Public Health, 2014 IL 116927, ¶ 14, 386 Ill.Dec. 605, 21 N.E.3d 368 ; Citizens Opposing Pollution v. ExxonMobil Coal U.S.A., 2012 IL 111286, ¶ 23, 357 Ill.Dec. 55, 962 N.E.2d 956. When a court construes a statute and the legislature does not amend it to supersede that judicial gloss, we presume that the legislature has acquiesced in the court's exposition of legislative intent. People v. Coleman, 227 Ill.2d 426, 438, 317 Ill.Dec. 869, 882 N.E.2d 1025 (2008) ; Miller v. Lockett, 98 Ill.2d 478, 483, 75...