Acacia Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Feinberg

• Decision Date: 14 September 1944
• Citation: 317 Mass. 8,56 N.E.2d 914
• Parties: ACACIA MUT. LIFE INS. CO. v. FEINBERG et al.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

317 Mass. 8

56 N.E.2d 914

ACACIA MUT. LIFE INS. CO.

v.FEINBERG et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Sept. 14, 1944.

Suit in equity by Acacia Mutual Life Insurance Company against Goldie Sedar Feinberg and the trustees of the Feinberg estate, a voluntary association, to require defendants to interplead in order to determine their rights as claimants to proceeds of life policy. A final decree was rendered for the trustees. Goldie Sedar Feinberg brings exceptions, and also appeals.

Exceptions sustained, and final decree reversed in accordance with opinion.

Appeal dismissed.Appeal and Exceptions from Superior Court, Suffolk County; Hammond, judge.

Before FIELD, C. J., and QUA, RONAN, and WILKINS, JJ.

No brief for plaintiff.

H. Bergson, of Boston, for defendant Goldie Sedar Feinberg.

H. M. Pakulski and M. H. Slobodkin, both of Boston, for defendants Archibald I. Feinberg and others, trustees.

QUA, Justice.

This is a bill to require the defendant Goldie Sedar Feinberg and the other defendants, described as trustees of ‘the Feinberg estate,’ a voluntary association, to interplead in order to determine their rights as claimants to the proceeds of a policy of life insurance issued by the plaintiff. The bill raises the question whether an attempted change of beneficiary by the insured in his lifetime from Goldie Sedar Feinberg to the trustees was valid. The judge entered a final decree in favor of the trustee claimants, and Goldie Sedar Feinberg filed a bill of exceptions and also appealed.

The practice in this case has been confused, and it may be that the record does not fully disclose all that took place before the judge; but we must take it as we find it. The claimant Goldie Sedar Feinberg answered the bill in detail admitting some of its allegations but stating her ignorance as to many others necessary to support the decree and leaving the plaintiff to prove the same. Under Rule 29 of the Superior Court (1932) the allegations last mentioned must be treated as having been denied. She closed her answer with a claim for the fund. The trustee claimants answered admitting all allegations of the bill and claiming the fund. At this stage of the case the claimant Goldie Sedar Feinberg filed an anomalous motion entitled ‘Motion for Final Decree’ wherein she moved that ‘on the pleadings a final decree be entered in her favor.’ From the bill of exceptions it appears that at the hearing on this motion ‘No evidence was adduced by any party,’ but that ‘This case was submitted on the pleadings and was argued by counsel.’ In view of the language just quoted it cannot be assumed that any admissions not contained in the pleadings were made at this hearing, or that any statements of counsel were accepted by common consent in lieu of evidence. See Boucher v. Hamilton Manuf. Co., 259 Mass. 259, 267, 156 N.E. 424. The bill of exceptions further states that the judge found all the facts set forth in the plaintiff's bill to be true. This includes the facts denied in the answer of Goldie Sedar Feinberg. The judge also found...