Acedo v. State Dept. of Public Welfare, 1
| Decision Date | 25 September 1973 |
| Docket Number | CA-HC,No. 1,1 |
| Citation | 513 P.2d 1350,20 Ariz.App. 467 |
| Parties | Herlinda Marie ACEDO, Appellant, v. STATE of Arizona, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE, Appellee. 30. |
| Court | Arizona Court of Appeals |
The only issue presented by this appeal is whether a natural mother, who voluntarily executes a consent authorizing the placement of her child for adoption, may regain her child after the child has been placed in an adoptive home, solely upon the ground that at the time she signed the requisite consent form she had an unexpressed misconception as to the form's legal significance, which misconception was not the result of any improper actions on the part of the adoption agency. We hold that on the facts here presented, she may not.
The natural mother, hereinafter referred to as petitioner, filed a habeas corpus petition in the trial court, seeking the return of her baby. The evidence shows that the child was born on February 3, 1972 to petitioner, an unmarried woman, who at that time was 18 years of age and a high school graduate. Prior to the child's birth, petitioner had gone to the County Department of Public Welfare, hereinafter referred to as the adoption agency, at which time she decided that it would be best for the unborn baby to give it up for adoption. After the birth of the baby she changed her mind and decided to keep the child.
Petitioner and the baby resided at the home of petitioner's parents until about August 13, 1972, when, although unemployed and in possession of only $20, she moved out of her parents' home, taking the baby with her. On August 14, 1972, only one day after moving, she made another visit to the adoption agency, where the possibility of adoption was again discussed. On August 15, 1972, a welfare worker went to petitioner's temporary residence to discuss the adoption. Petitioner at that time stated that she wanted to place the baby for adoption, and thereafter petitioner accompanied the welfare worker back to her office.
At the office, petitioner was given a 'Consent to Place Child for Adoption' form to read, and after reading it was asked if she understood it. She responded that she did, and thereupon signed the form.
The adoption procedure had been explained to petitioner before the consent form was signed. Included in this explanation, was the fact that in an adoption proceeding the adoption itself is not final until six months after the adoption petition is filed. At no time was there any conversation between petitioner and the representatives of the adoption agency as to petitioner having six months, or any other time period, within which she could, upon request, get her baby back.
In accordance with the written consent, petitioner voluntarily gave her baby to the adoption agency on August 15, 1972. Subsequently, on September 1, 1972, the baby was placed in an adoptive home. During the latter part of August or early September of 1972, petitioner, her $20 expended, returned to her parents' home. On September 4, 1972, petitioner sought to have the baby returned to her and was told that the child had been placed in an adoptive home and that nothing further could be done. On September 8, 1972, petitioner sent to the adoption agency a form prepared by her attorney which purported to revoke her previously given consent. This revocation was received on September 11, 1972. Thereafter petitioner commenced habeas corpus proceedings to have the child returned to her, alleging that the consent for adoption was procured by threats, coercion and fraud.
At the hearing petioner testified that when she signed the consent form she did not realize its finality, but rather thought she could get her baby back at any time within six months. While no formal findings of fact or conclusions of law were made, the trial judge informally stated at the end of the hearing that 'because of the nature of this case', he 'would resolve in (petitioner's) favor the fact she was confused about the six months.' The court did specifically find that the adoption agency had not engaged in threats, coercion or fraud in obtaining the petitioner's consent, and therefore denied the petition based on In re Holman's Adoption, 80 Ariz. 201, 295 P.2d 372 (1956) and In re Adoption of Hammer, 15 Ariz.App. 196, 487 P.2d 417 (1971). From this denial, petitioner has appealed on the ground that her mistaken belief that she could have her baby back anytime within six months rendered her consent invalid.
The requirement for parental consent to an adoption is found in A.R.S. § 8--106, which states in pertinent part:
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'(d) Consent is not necessary from a father who was not married to the mother of the child both at the time of its conception and the time of its birth, unless the father under oath has acknowledged parentage in a document filed with the court or with the agency or division at or prior to the time the petition is filed, or unless the parentage of the father has been previously established by judicial proceedings.
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As to the time of execution and contents of the consent, A.R.S. § 8--107 provides:
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There is no contention that petitioner could not have legally consented to the adoption or that the statutory formalities were not complied with. Nor does petitioner Now contend that her consent was brought about by fraud, duress, coercion, misrepresentation or other wrongful conduct. Her sole contention on this appeal is that the consent form itself coupled with her conversations with the welfare worker relative to the adoption procedure, justified her belief that she could change her mind and get her baby back within six months.
The consent form is entitled 'Consent to Place Child for Adoption' and states in relevant part:
'That I have given the matter due consideration, and I believe the best interests of the child will hereby be promoted.
'NOW, THEREFORE, I do hereby voluntarily and unconditionally consent to the placement of my said child for adoption with the Coconino County Department of Public Welfare, P.O. Box 1966, Flagstaff, Arizona 86001 a duly authorized agency for the placing of children for adoption;
'I hereby surrender custody and relinquish all rights which I may have in the child to said agency, and I do hereby authorize said agency to take all necessary steps towards the adoption of the child.
'I hereby confer absolute and unrestricted power upon the said agency to consent to the adoption of the child without further notice to me, and with the same force and effect as though I personally gave consent at the time of adoption, and I expressly agree and pledge that I will not interfere in any way with the care, management, or adoption of the child.
'I realize that as a result of this consent to place child for adoption, and by the eventual giving of consent by the said agency, the parent-child relationship between me and the child shall, upon entry of a decree for adoption, be completely terminated and that all the legal rights, privileges, duties, obligations, and other legal consequences of said relationship, shall cease to exist, under A.R.S. Sec. 8--117.' (Emphasis added).
It should be noted that the form gives unconditional consent to the placement of the child, and specifically states that the signer relinquishes all rights in the child. While the last paragraph of the form does speak in future terms, we are of the opinion that the form, taken as a whole, clearly indicates that the consent given is immediately effective. There is no language in the form which states or implies that the consentor may change her mind, revoke her consent and thereby regain custody of the child. Moreover, in none of the conversations between petitioner and representatives of the adoption agency was the possibility of petitioner regaining custody discussed.
Based on these conversations...
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