Acevedo Luis v. Zayas

• Decision Date: 28 February 2006
• Docket Number: Civil 03-1376(SEC)(JA).
• Citation: 419 F.Supp.2d 115
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico
• Parties: Justino ACEVEDO LUIS, Plaintiff, v. Yolanda ZAYAS, Secretary, Department of the Family; Mercedes Pagán, Aguadilla Regional Director, Family Department, in their official and personal capacities, Defendants.

419 F.Supp.2d 115

Justino ACEVEDO LUIS, Plaintiff, v. Yolanda ZAYAS, Secretary, Department of the Family; Mercedes Pagán, Aguadilla Regional Director, Family Department, in their official and personal capacities, Defendants.

Civil 03-1376(SEC)(JA).

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

February 28, 2006.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Irael Roldán-González, Aguadilla, PR, for Plaintiff.

María Eugenia Villares-Seneriz, Department of Justice, San Juan, PR, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

ARENAS, Chief United States Magistrate. Judge.

Plaintiff Justino Acevedo Luis, a member of the New Progressive Party, began working for the Family Department on April 16, 1978 as a career employee. He was appointed Technician I, later to Technician II, then Technician III, then supervisor and finally Local Director II, at the San Sebastián office of the Family Department. On April 18, 2002, co-defendant Mercedes Pagán gave plaintiff a letter signed by co-defendant Yolanda Zayas, which letter ordered plaintiff's transfer to the office of Aguadilla. (Joint Ex. I.) The letter assigned no responsibilities or duties to plaintiff in his new position. This transfer resulted from the San Sebastián office being placed in charge of Juan Sotomayor, a member of the Popular Democratic Party, as the result of a court order. While plaintiff had many responsibilities at the San Sebastián office, he had practically none at the Aguadilla office.

On April 8, 2003, plaintiff filed this civil action based upon violations of the Civil Rights Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1983, and Puerto Rico and United States Constitutions. Claims invoking the court's supplemental jurisdiction are also included in the complaint. A jury trial began on November 21, 2005, and on November 28, 2005, the jury returned a general verdict in favor of plaintiff and against the remaining defendant, Mercedes Pagán, awarding no compensatory damages, and punitive damages in the amount of $5,000. (Docket No. 60.) Both parties have attacked the verdict.

PLAINTIFF'S POST TRIAL MOTIONS

On December 7, 2005, plaintiff moved pursuant to Rule 59(a) and 59(e), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for a new trial on damages, basing his argument on there having been committed a manifest error of law, and also in order to prevent manifest injustice. Plaintiff argues that in cases involving constitutional guarantees, plaintiffs may recover nominal, compensatory, and punitive damages, particularly since "damages have been regarded as the ordinary remedy for an invasion of personal interests in liberty." Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 395, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971). Plaintiff emphasizes that nominal damages are awarded where a violation of constitutional rights is established, but the plaintiff is unable to demonstrate measurable monetary damages. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266-67 n. 24, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978). Plaintiff sums up his argument by referring to a well-traveled quote: "[t]he loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury." Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976). Plaintiff preserved objections to my not giving two instructions to the jury, including the following.

The First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, guarantees every citizen Freedom of Expression and Freedom of Association. This includes the freedom to speak in favor of or against any political party or candidate and also includes the right to support or affiliate or be known as member of any political party or support any candidate. The loss of First Amendment Freedom for even minimal periods of time unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury. Citing Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 91 S.Ct. 2140, 29 L.Ed.2d 822.

Docket No. 61, at 6.

Plaintiff argues that this instruction would have given the jury a clear directive to award damages to plaintiff because of his loss of First Amendment freedoms, and that such instruction would have given them a clear guideline regarding their duty to award damages, based on specific violations of his freedom of expression and freedom of association, both secured by the First Amendment. Plaintiff clearly notes that a violation of a constitutional right is compensable and that the jury determined that the defendants acted maliciously, thus awarding punitive damages.

Plaintiff also argues that I erred in instructing the jury that they could consider the financial resources of the defendant in fixing the amount of punitive damages. Plaintiff timely objected to my failure to give this instruction, in view of the provisions of Law No. 9, of November 26, 1975, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 32, § 3085, which provides for the Commonwealth Government paying the amount of a verdict in certain circumstances. Law No. 9 states as follows:

Every official, ex-official, employee or ex-employee of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico who is sued for damages in his personal capacity, when the cause of action is based on alleged violations of the plaintiffs civil rights, due to acts or omissions committed in good faith, in the course of his employment and within the scope of his functions, may request the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico to provide him with legal representation, and to subsequently assume the payment of any judgment that may be entered against his person.

P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 32, § 3085.

Plaintiff argues that since no evidence was presented as to the defendants' financial resources, it was error to give such an instruction. Plaintiff concludes that the award of zero damages is unreasonable and merits a partial new trial limited to the issue of damages alone.

DEFENDANT'S POST TRIAL MOTIONS

On December 13, 2005, defendant Mercedes Pagán de Guntin moved for judgment as a matter of law since there was no evidence upon which a jury could have properly proceeded to find a verdict for plaintiff, and that a directed verdict should have been entered. On the other hand, the defendant argues that the jury clearly reached an erroneous result, and that letting the verdict stand would result in a blatant miscarriage of justice, since there was clearly insufficient evidence to warrant the award of punitive damages. The defendant argues that a prima facie showing of political discrimination was never made, and that plaintiff never proved an adverse employment action. Furthermore it is argued that plaintiff does not have a property right over his duties. Finally, the defendant argues that she is entitled to qualified immunity. Plaintiff opposed the motions on December 27, 2005, arguing that at trial he established with sufficient evidence that he was the victim of political discrimination, and that the defendant acted under color of authority, having done so willfully and intentionally, and that her conduct violated plaintiff's constitutional rights.

Plaintiff, a public employee for 25 years, testified at trial, retracing his career path to the position he held on October 16, 2001, that is, director of the local office (or local director of the office) of the Family Department in San Sebastián. In that position he assured that family laws were complied with, signed checks, worked with personnel and made sure that supervisors complied with their work plans giving services to the public. He worked with technicians and other workers in rendering service to the public. He also worked with minors in the community. About 90 to 98 persons worked under him. The San Sebastián office was the largest office in the region. In fact, there were two San Sebastián offices, San Sebastián I and San Sebastián II. Juan Sotomayor, a member of the Popular Democratic Party, and formerly a municipal assemblyman, was in charge of San Sebastián I, and plaintiff was in charge of San Sebastián II. Plaintiff belongs to the New Progressive Party, and was also a municipal assemblyman. Plaintiff and Mr. Sotomayor were roommates in college but kept a necessary distance professionally.

As a result of an integration of San Sebastián Offices I and II, plaintiff was transferred to Aguadilla and was supposed to receive new orders and be assigned new duties from the remaining defendant. (Joint Ex. I.) Mercedes Pagán, a member of the Popular Democratic Party, gave him the letter transferring him on May 6, 2002. When he reported to his new job, Mercedes Pagán said there were no tasks but that he was to help Olga Vélez who was the associate director. Olga Vélez had no tasks to give plaintiff. There was no one to supervise. There was no office, and there were no duties. Plaintiff did help to prepare reports that clerks would prepare. Those reports, which had to do with the movement of children, were sent by fax to the regional office and took, at most, an hour to prepare every Monday morning. When Olga Vélez retired months later, he no longer had those reports to prepare. In a typical day, there was nothing to do. He read magazines, newspapers.

Plaintiff felt humiliated, useless, like someone stealing his salary, since his capabilities were being lost, although he did some monitoring for a few months. On the date that he was given the letter, May 6, 2002, there were vacant director positions in Las Marías, Aguada and Rincón. On October 14, 2005, plaintiff was relocated to the vacant position at the office in Aguada.

Plaintiff has never been admonished and has never received any complaints about his work in 25 years. When asked why he spent 3½ years doing nothing in Aguadilla, he responded that it was because he was a member of the New Progressive Party.

Aida Sierra Ramos, a member of the PNP, who works for the Family Department in Aguadilla, testified that she worked two desks away from plaintiff when plaintiff was transferred and that he had no duties...