Acevedo v. Phoenix Opportunities Industrialization Center, 1

• Decision Date: 01 July 1976
• Docket Number: No. 1,CA-CIV,1
• Citation: 27 Ariz.App. 156,551 P.2d 1322
• Parties: , 22 Wage & Hour Cas. (BNA) 1240 Jose ACEVEDO, Appellant, v. PHOENIX OPPORTUNITIES INDUSTRIALIZATION CENTER, an Arizona Corporation, Appellee. 2977.
• Court: Arizona Court of Appeals

Page 1322

551 P.2d 1322

27 Ariz.App. 156, 22 Wage & Hour Cas. (BNA) 1240

Jose ACEVEDO, Appellant, v. PHOENIX OPPORTUNITIES INDUSTRIALIZATION CENTER, an Arizona Corporation, Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CIV 2977.

Court of Appeals of Arizona, Division 1.

July 1, 1976.

Richmond, Ajamie, Fay & Warner, by Richard T. Aubuchon, Phoenix, for appellant.

Andrews & Johnson, by Judis R. Andrews, Phoenix, for appellee.

OPINION

HATHAWAY, Judge.

Appellant, employed by appellee, frequently worked in excess of forth hours per week, thereby accumulating a significant amount of overtime hours. On August 10, 1973, his employment was terminated by appellee, at which time he demanded that appellee pay him for the accrued overtime hours (comp time) at his regular hourly wage. Appellee refused to pay. After a bench trial, the trial court made the following findings: (1) that appellant had accumulated uncompensated total comp time of 282.5 hours; (2) that compensatory time was not to be paid in cash, but was to be paid in the nature of time off the job with full pay; (3) that appellee had not violated A.R.S. Sec. 23--353(A) which requires that a discharged employee be paid wages due him at once; and (4) that despite the fact appellee changed from bimonthly to bi-weekly payment of wages, and one week's wages were withheld, appellant was not owed any wages when he was terminated.

Our review of the record discloses that if an employee of appellee worked overtime, he or she recorded the amount of hours on a time sheet which was then signed by a supervisor. The signature of the supervisor was, in essence, validation of the time sheet.

On August 10, 1973, appellant had accumulated 282.5 hours of comp time. This fact was stipulated to by the parties and recognized by the trial court in its judgment. At trial, Leon Caver, appellee's personnel manager on August 10, 1973, testified as to appellee's procedure relative to compensatory time. He stated that he kept the records of appellant's comp time and never had to get approval from anyone prior to posting the amount of comp time in his records. During June or July 1973, appellee implemented its Manual of Personnel Policies and Practices which included under the heading Benefits and Privileges, a section entitled Compensatory Time which provided:

'Employee's (sic) maybe (sic) required in the judgment of the Executive Director to work before or after regular working hours. In such cases, if work continues for one half hour or more, time adjustments will be made.

Compensatory time may be taken at a later date, subject to approval by the immediate supervisor.'

Caver further testified that if an employee accumulated comp time he would receive time away from work and still be paid in full. He was not aware of an instance, like the situation presented here, where upon termination an employee sought to be compensated in cash for his accrued comp time.

Caver testified that he never literally complied with the Compensatory Time section of the Manual in that he never questioned appellee's Executive Director as to whether compensatory time had been authorized for appellant or for other employees. In addition, he never received instructions from the Executive Director that comp time should not be authorized for appellant or for other employees.

On appeal, appellant contends that he should be compensated for the 282.5 hours of accumulated comp time, that this compensation should be in cash and that he should receive one week's wages withheld by appellee when the company changed from a bi-monthly to a bi-weekly payroll system.

Appellee, on the other hand, argues that appellant never proved he was authorized to work those overtime hours, that there was never a showing as to what services appellant actually performed, and that...