Acevedo v. Stericycle of P.R., Inc.
| Decision Date | 06 March 2020 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL NO. 19-1652 (JAG) |
| Parties | MARISOL MICHEO ACEVEDO, Plaintiff, v. STERICYCLE OF PUERTO RICO, INC., Defendant. |
| Court | United States District Courts. 1st Circuit. District of Puerto Rico |
GARCIA GREGORY, D.J.
Plaintiff Marisol Micheo Acevedo ("Ms. Micheo") brought this diversity suit against Defendant Stericycle of Puerto Rico, Inc. ("Stericycle") alleging retaliation in violation of Puerto Rico Law No. 115 of December 20, 1991, P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 29, § 194a ("Law No. 115"); and unjust dismissal in violation of the Puerto Rico Law No. 80 of May 30, 1976, P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 29 §§ 185a-185m, ("Law No. 80"). Docket No. 14. Before the Court are Stericycle's Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint and for Sanctions, Docket No. 19; and the Renewed Motion for Sanctions under Rule 11, Docket No. 20. Having considered the Parties' filings and the relevant case law, Stericycle's Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint and for Sanctions is hereby GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART, and the Renewed Motion for Sanctions under Rule 11 is DENIED for the reasons set forth below.
Ms. Micheo worked for Stericycle from April 2012 until the termination of her employment in January 2014. Docket No. 14 at 4, 14. In February 2015, Ms. Micheo commenced an earlier suit against Stericycle alleging discrimination, retaliation, interference with rights, and wrongful discharge in violation of federal and state laws. Micheo-Acevedo v. Stericycle of P.R., Inc. et al., Civ. No. 15-1097 (JAG), 2017 WL 5152173 (D.P.R. Mar. 31, 2017) ("Micheo-Acevedo I").
This Court granted Stericycle's Motion for Summary Judgment in Micheo-Acevedo I, dismissing with prejudice Ms. Micheo's claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. ("Title VII"); the Americans with Disabilities Act, 48 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq.; the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-54; Puerto Rico Law 44 of July 2, 1985, P.R. LAWS ANN. Tit. 1, §§ 501 et seq.; and Puerto Rico Law 53 of August 30, 1992, P.R. LAWS ANN. Tit. 1, §§ 511 et seq. Micheo-Acevedo I, 2017 WL 5152173. Having dismissed all the federal law claims, the Court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Ms. Micheo's remaining state law claims and dismissed them without prejudice. Micheo-Acevedo I, 2017 WL 5152173, at 14. The state law claims dismissed without prejudice included claims for retaliation and wrongful discharge under Law No. 115 and Law No. 80, respectivelly.
The First Circuit affirmed this Court's order granting summary judgment in favor of Stericycle. Micheo-Acevedo v. Stericycle of P.R., Inc., 897 F.3d 360 (1st Cir. 2018) ("Micheo-Acevedo II"). Ms. Micheo then filed a petition for rehearing en banc, which the First Circuit denied. Docket No. 14 at 3. And finally, Ms. Micheo filed a petition for a writ of certiorari before the U.S. SupremeCourt, which was also denied. Micheo-Acevedo v. Stericycle of Puerto Rico, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 1297 (2019) (Mem.).
A defendant may move to dismiss an action for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To survive dismissal under this standard, a complaint must allege "a plausible entitlement to relief." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007). According to Twombly, the complaint must state enough facts to "nudge [the plaintiff's] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible." Id. at 570. Therefore, to preclude dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the complaint must rest on factual allegations sufficient "to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id. at 555.
At the motion to dismiss stage, courts accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Grajales v. P.R. Ports Auth., 682 F.3d 40, 44 (1st Cir. 2012). Thus, the plaintiff bears the burden of stating factual allegations regarding each element necessary to sustain recovery under some actionable theory. Gooley v. Mobil Oil Corp., 851 F.2d 513, 515 (1st Cir. 1988). The First Circuit has cautioned against confounding the plausibility standard with the likelihood of success on the merits, explaining that the plausibility standard assumes "pleaded facts to be true and read in a plaintiff's favor." Sepulveda-Villarini v. Dep't of Educ. of P.R., 628 F.3d 25, 30 (1st Cir. 2010) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556); see also Ocasio-Hernandez v. Fortuno-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2011) () (citation omitted). Even taking plaintiff's well-pled allegations as true, however, courts need not address complaints supported only by "bald assertions, unsupportable conclusions, periphrastic circumlocutions, and the like." Aulson v. Blanchard, 83 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1996); see also Butler v. Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Ams., 748 F.3d 28, 32 (1st Cir. 2014). Likewise, unadorned factual statements as to the elements of the cause of action are insufficient as well. Penalbert-Rosa v. Fortuno-Burset, 631 F.3d 592, 595 (1st Cir. 2011). "Specific information, even if not in the form of admissible evidence, would likely be enough at [the motion to dismiss] stage; pure speculation is not." Id. at 596.
Stericycle argues that Ms. Micheo fails to state a plausible claim for relief because her claims are barred by collateral estoppel. Docket No. 19-1 at 9-13. The Court agrees.
The doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, is a branch of res judicata, which is the umbrella term.2 Aristud-Gonzalez v. Gov't Dev. Bank, 501 F.3d 24, 27 (1st Cir. 2007). The doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel preclude relitigation of claims and/or issues that have been or could have been litigated in a prior judicial action where judgment has been rendered. Apparel Art Int'l, Inc. v. Amertex Enter. Ltd., 48 F.3d 576, 583 (1st Cir. 1995). The First Circuit has indicated that"res judicata operates as an absolute bar to the relitigation of the same cause of action between parties (or their privies) and that a prior judgment rendered on the merits is conclusive not only to the issues which were determined but as to all matters which might have been determined as well." Westcott Constr. Corp. v. Firemen's Fund, 996 F.2d 14, 16 (1st Cir. 1993) (citing Griffin v. Rhode Island, 760 F.2d 359, 360 (1st Cir. 1991)).
Res judicata applies when a final judgment on the merits of the case has been issued, and there is sufficient identity between the parties and the causes of action in both suits. Ortiz-Cameron v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 139 F.3d 4, 5 (1st Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). Accordingly, pursuant to federal res judicata principles, the previous judgment has become the law of the case, and the Court is barred from addressing the issue for a second time. United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 163 (1984) ().
As to collateral estoppel, federal common law governs the preclusive effect of an earlier federal judgment. Negron-Fuentes v. UPS Supply Chain Solutions, 532 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2008); Hoult v Hoult, 157 F.3d 29, 31 (1st Cir. 1998). "The principle of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion . . . bars relitigation of any factual or legal issue that was actually decided in previous litigation between the parties, whether on the same or a different claim." Keystone Shipping Co. v. New England Power Co., 109 F.3d 46, 51 (1st Cir. 1997) (quotation marks and citation omitted); see Negron-Fuentes, 532 F.3d at 7. "The purpose of [the doctrine of collateral estoppel] is to prevent a party from relitigating an issue where there has been full and fair litigation, including an opportunity to appeal . . . ." In re Kane, 254 F.3d 325, 329 (1st Cir. 2001).
Subject to various exceptions, collateral estoppel "renders conclusive the determinations reached in previous law suits" between the same parties. Negron-Fuentes, 532 F.3d at 7 (citation omitted). An earlier federal judgment has preclusive effect if "(1) the issue sought to be precluded in the later action is the same as that involved in the earlier action; (2) the issue was actually litigated; (3) the issue was determined by a valid and binding final judgment; and (4) the determination of the issue was essential to the judgment." Latin Am. Music Co. Inc. v. Media Power Grp., Inc., 705 F.3d 34, 42 (1st Cir. 2013) ). An earlier judgment's preclusive effect, however, may be denied when there are "differences in the burden of proof (for example, where the victor in the first case has a greater burden in the second)." Bath Iron Works Corp. v. Dir., Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, U.S. Dep't of Labor, 125 F.3d 18, 21 (1st Cir. 1997) (citation omitted); see Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 28(4), cmt. f (Am. Law Inst. 1982). But even when some issues in an earlier judgment are not entitled to preclusive effect, the findings that are preclusive may legally doom a future claim. Negron-Fuentes, 532 F.3d at 8.
Stericycle argues that this Court's findings as to Ms. Micheo's Title VII retaliation claim preclude her Law No. 115 claim pursuant to the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Docket No. 19-1 at 9-13. The Court agrees.
The parties do not dispute that this case meets three of the four collateral estoppel requirements articulated by the First Circuit in Latin Am. Music Co. Inc. Ms. Micheo's Title VII claim was actually litigated, the issues therein were determined by a valid and binding final judgment, and the determination of those issues was essential to the Court's judgment. The parties disagree as to whether both cases...
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