Acker v. Priest

• Decision Date: 14 December 1894
• Citation: 61 N.W. 235,92 Iowa 610
• Parties: ACKER ET AL. v. PRIEST ET AL. (TWO CASES).
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

92 Iowa 610

61 N.W. 235

ACKER ET AL.

v.PRIEST ET AL. (TWO CASES).

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Dec. 14, 1894.

Appeal from district court, Cass county; N. W. Macy, Judge.

The first of these actions is a suit in equity to establish a trust in certain funds in the hands of the defendants and appellees, arising from the sale of a farm in Cass county, Iowa, by defendant Priest. The second is a law action, aided by attachment, to recover for an alleged conversion of certain moneys belonging to the estate of Elizabeth V. Priest, deceased. The cases were tried to the court without a jury, and judgment and decree were rendered, dismissing the plaintiffs' petition in each case, and the plaintiffs appeal. Affirmed.H. G. Curtis, for appellants.

Willard & Willard and De Lano & Meredith, for appellees.

DEEMER, J.

1. The plaintiffs in the equity suit are the heirs at law of Elizabeth Priest, deceased, and the defendant Stephen C. Priest is their father. Mrs. Priest was a daughter of one Jos. Abrams. Jos. Abrams had one son and three daughters, besides Mrs. Priest. In the month of July, 1884, Abrams, who was then living in the state of Kansas, concluded to make a partial distribution and advancement of his property to his children. He was then the owner of two farms in Kansas, one of which was known as his “Home Farm,” and the other was occupied by defendant Priest and his family. Thomas W. King, another son-in-law, owned and occupied another and a third farm in the same county as the other two. In order to carry out his purpose, and make an equal distribution of property to his daughters, Abrams made arrangements with King to exchange the home farm, valued at $8,000, for the King place, at the agreed price of $4,000. Prior thereto, however, Abrams had had a conversation with defendant Priest, in which he told him he intended to give him a farm. After making arrangements with King, Abrams informed defendant that he had an opportunity to trade the home farm for King's land, and directed defendant to go and look at the farm, and if it suited him he (Abrams) would make the exchange. Defendant, after examining the place, was pleased with it, and so informed Abrams, and Abrams made the contemplated exchange. Abrams deeded the home farm to King, and King, by direction of Abrams, and with the knowledge, direction, and consent of the deceased, Mrs. Priest, made a deed to his place to the defendant Priest. This last deed was a warranty deed, in the usual form, and for the expressed consideration of $4,000. Shortly after the making of these deeds, the defendant moved onto the King farm, and used and occupied it for a year or more, when he sold it, and with the proceeds purchased a farm in Cass county, Iowa, from one Isabella Goodale. The deed to the Cass county land was taken in the name of the defendant with the knowledge and consent of his wife. Defendant and his wife immediately took possession of the Cass county land, and occupied and used the same until the death of the wife, in April, 1888. After the death of the wife, and in May, 1891, the defendant sold the land in Cass county, and at the time of the commencement of this suit was in possession of a large part of the proceeds of the sale. Plaintiffs claim that the defendant at all times had the title to the Kansas land and to the land in Cass county in trust for his wife, Elizabeth V. Priest, and that they, as her heirs at law, are entitled to have a trust impressed upon the funds now in the hands of the defendant, arising out of the sale of the Cass county land. Defendant Isaac Dickerson was made a party to the suit because of his having possession of some of the funds arising from the sale of the land in this state.

Our first inquiry will be directed to the question as to whether there was any equitable title in the Kansas land in Mrs. Priest or not. Defendants pleaded and proved upon the trial in the court below the statutes of the state of Kansas with reference to trusts in land, which are as follows (Gen. St. Kan. 1868, c. 114):

“Sec. 6. When a conveyance for a valuable consideration is made to one person, and the consideration thereof paid by another, no use or trust shall result in favor of the latter, but the title shall vest in the former, subject to the provisions of the next two sections.

Sec. 7. Every such conveyance shall be presumed fraudulent as against the creditors of the persons paying the consideration therefor. And where a fraudulent intent is not disproved, a trust shall, in all cases, result in favor of prior creditors to the extent of their just demands and also in favor of subsequent creditors, if there be sufficient evidence of fraudulent intent.

Sec. 8. The provisions of the section next before the last shall not extend to cases where the alienee shall have taken an absolute conveyance in his own name without the consent of the person with whose money the consideration was paid, or where such an alienee, in violation of some trust, shall have purchased the land with money not his own, or where it shall be made to appear that by agreement and without any fraudulent intent the party to whom the conveyance was made, or in whom the title shall vest, was to hold the land, or some interest therein, in trust for the party paying the purchase money, or some part thereof.”

They also pleaded and proved the statute of frauds in that state, which is as follows (Gen. St. Kan. 1863, § 6, c. 43, p. 934): “No action shall be brought whereby to charge a party upon any special promise to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage of another person, or to charge any executor or administrator upon any special promise to answer damages out of his own estate, or to charge any person upon any agreement made upon consideration of marriage, or upon any contract for the sale of lands, tenements, hereditaments, or any interest in or concerning them, or upon any agreement that is not to be performed within the space of one year from the making thereof, unless the agreement upon which such action shall be brought, or some memorandum or note thereof shall be in writing and signed by the party to be charged therewith, or some other person therein, to, by him, or her, lawfully authorized,”--and section 1: “No trust concerning lands, except such as may arise from implication of law, shall be created unless in writing, signed by the party creating the same, or by his attorney thereto, lawfully authorized in writing.”

Plaintiffs do not--nor, indeed, could they, under the statutes of either Kansas or of this state--claim an express trust in the land, or the proceeds thereof. Their claim is that from the transactions between the parties, as proved, there arose an implied, a resulting, or a constructive trust, which the law will recognize and enforce. We turn then to the evidence, and find that while it was the intention of Abrams to make a partial distribution of his estate among his heirs, yet it did not appear to him to be important to whom he made the deeds,--whether to his daughters, in their own names, or to their husbands. The deed to the home farm was made to King, the husband of one of his daughters, and the deed to the King farm was made direct to defendant Priest. Abrams had previously spoken to defendant about giving him a farm, and while the deed was, no doubt, made so as to place all his children on an equality, it is quite evident to us that it was wholly immaterial to him as to whom the deed should be made to. Before having the deed made to defendant, Abrams spoke to his daughter, Mrs. Priest, about how the deed should be made, and “she said to make it to her husband; it was all the same.” Again, Abrams testifies, “My daughter gave no reason [for making the deed to her husband], except that it would be all right, recognizing him as her husband.” Even if Abrams intended the deed to be for the benefit of Mrs. Priest and her children, as he says, he did not so state to defendant, and defendant had no knowledge but that he was to take the beneficial as well as the legal estate. Abrams directed King to make the deed to defendant, and King had no conversation whatever with defendant.

Applying these facts to the statutes of Kansas, before quoted, with reference to the creation of trusts, and it is clear that defendant took an absolute title to the land deeded him by King, unincumbered with any trust. It is contended, however, that the laws of Kansas have no application to this case, that the statutes above quoted relate simply to the remedy, and that the lex fori governs. Without deciding this question, so far as it relates to the statute of frauds, for it is not necessary for a determination of the case, and passing it with the single remark that where the statute relates simply to the remedy, and does not make the parol contract void, as is the case with the statute in question, there is much force in appellants' position, we are clearly of the opinion, however, that the other statutes with reference to the creation of trust estates are binding, for they go to the validity and operation of the contract, and of the alleged trust in the land. It is a familiar doctrine that the law of the place where the contract is made is to govern as to its nature, validity, obligation, and interpretation, and the law of the forum as to the remedy. Bank v. Donnally, 8 Pet. 361;Scudder v. Bank, 91 U. S. 406;Burchard v. Dunbar, 82 Ill. 450. It is also everywhere acknowledged that the title and disposition of real property are exclusively subject to the laws of the country where it is situated, which can alone prescribe the mode by which a title to it can pass from one person to another. Kerr v. Moon, 9 Wheat. 565;McCormick v. Sullivant, 10 Wheat. 196. And a title or right in or to real estate can be acquired, enforced, or lost only according to the law of the place where such property is situated. Bentley v. Whittemore, 18 N. J. Eq. 373;Hosford v. Nichols, 1 Paige, 220;Williams...