Ackerman v. Tri-City Geriatric & Health Care, Inc.

• Decision Date: 12 July 1978
• Docket Number: TRI-CITY,No. 77-827,77-827
• Citation: 378 N.E.2d 145,9 O.O.3d 62,55 Ohio St.2d 51
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court
• Parties: , 9 O.O.3d 62 ACKERMAN, Dir., Department of Health, Appellant, v.GERIATRIC & HEALTH CARE, INC., et al., Appellees.

Page 51

55 Ohio St.2d 51

378 N.E.2d 145, 9 O.O.3d 62

ACKERMAN, Dir., Department of Health, Appellant, v. TRI-CITY GERIATRIC & HEALTH CARE, INC., et al., Appellees.

No. 77-827.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

July 12, 1978.

Syllabus by the Court

In an action by the Director of Health to enjoin the operation of an unlicensed nursing home pursuant to R.C. 3721.08, an injunction shall be granted where it is undisputed that the evidence shows that the facility is a nursing home pursuant to R.C. 3721.01, that the nursing home is unlicensed and that the home is unlicensed because it does not comply with essential licensing requirements.

The events giving rise to the instant cause began some time before June 1974, when Mr. and Mrs. Woodrow Ring, officers of Tri-City Geriatric & Health Care Center, Inc. (appellee herein), decided, in part because of a dispute with their landlord as to rents and as to who should pay for improvements required by an adjudication order, to move their nursing home operation from quarters leased from the First Baptist Church of Massillon, to a building in Carroll County on which they had a purchase contract. Mrs. Ring called the office of the State Department of Health to inquire about applying for a license for the new home on June 15, and on June 30 she submitted a license application. At about that time she also discussed renovating the new facility with a representative of the Department of Industrial Relations. ¹ A few weeks later Mrs. Ring moved nine patients into the unlicensed facility.

From July to November 1974, Mrs. Ring increased the number of patients in the new home, made some repairs on the building and began plans for, but not the actual work on, the installation of a $27,000 sprinkler system for the new facility. During that time, according to her testimony, Mrs. Ring was informed by a Mr. Donahue and a Mr. Sanders of the Department of Health that she was operating the home illegally. ² She also received two letters informing her that she was not to operate a nursing home in the new facility. (On October 11, 1974, the Department of Industrial Relations sent a letter listing the improvements it would require "before the building can be reopened as a nursing home and approved by this department." Approximately two weeks later the Department of Health wrote Mrs. Ring stating her application was being processed and notifying her that "no more than two patients or residents may be admitted to your home until a license has been issued by the Director of Health.")

After November 1974, Mrs. Ring began to install the sprinkler system and to continue with other renovations. In February 1975, without having either granted or denied the home a license and, according to the testimony of one of the investigators, some time long after such licenses are usually acted upon, the Director of Health, appellant herein, filed a complaint in the Court of Common Pleas of Carroll County to enjoin, pursuant to R.C. 3721.08, the operation of the Tri-City home. (Approximately ten months later the Department of Industrial Relations issued a final adjudication order against the home which appellee has appealed pursuant to R.C. 3781.031.)

During the hearing on appellant's motion to enjoin the operation of the home, the parties stipulated that the Tri-City facility was unlicensed and that it was operated as a nursing home within the meaning of R.C. 3721.01. Ruling that the maxim that "he who seeks equity must do equity" applies to the instant cause, the trial court denied the injunction, directed appellee to make further changes in the home and ordered appellant to issue a license. The Court of Appeals for Carroll County ruled that "where a statute creates a new statutory right of action, equitable principles may not be applicable" but affirmed the trial court's denial of the injunction on the grounds that R.C. 3721.07 (the statute setting forth the requirement that nursing homes be licensed) was unconstitutionally applied in the instant cause. The appellate court also substituted the common pleas court's order with an order to appellant to either grant or deny appellee's license application within ten days.

The cause is now before this court pursuant to an allowance of a motion to certify the record.

William J. Brown, Atty. Gen., and William J. McDonald, Columbus, for appellant.

Harry W. Schmuck, Canton, for appellees.

WILLIAM B. BROWN, Justice.

The main issue raised by the instant cause is whether equitable principles and maxims apply in a statutory injunction action brought by the Director of Health to enjoin the operation of an unlicensed nursing home. ³ The injunction sought in the instant cause is authorized pursuant to R.C. 3721.08. That statute provides, as follows:

"The director of health shall petition the court of common pleas of the county in which the home is located for an order enjoining any person * * * from operating a home as defined in section 3721.01 of the Revised Code without a license or from operating a home where, in the director's judgment, there is a real and present danger to the health or safety of any occupants of the home. The court shall have jurisdiction to grant such injunctive relief upon a showing that the respondent named in the petition is operating a home without a license or there is a real and present danger to the health or safety of any occupants of the home." (Emphasis added.)

The meaning of R.C. 3721.08 is clear. It grants a court jurisdiction to grant "such injunctive relief," that is, to enjoin the illegal or dangerous operation of a nursing home. Moreover, it grants that limited jurisdiction ⁴ to enjoin the operation of a nursing home either if that home is operated "without a license" or if there is "a real and present danger to the health or safety of any occupants of the home." It is not necessary, pursuant to R.C. 3721.08, to show both a danger and unlicensed operation. However, because it might be less harmful to the residents of a home to stay in an unlicensed facility which complies with all essential licensing requirements than to be moved when the facility's operation is enjoined, we find, for the purposes of an R.C. 3721.08 injunction, that the evidence must show, in addition to the facts that the facility is a nursing home and that the home is unlicensed, that the home is unlicensed because the facility or the Director fails to comply with essential licensing requirements. ⁵

The parties in the instant cause stipulated that appellee is operating a nursing home and that the home is unlicensed. In addition, the evidence in the instant cause reveals that the Tri-City home fails to comply with essential licensing requirements such as the width of hallways, the number of staff members and certain fire regulations. The statutory prerequisites for an R.C. 3721.08 injunction have, therefore, been met. Therefore, unless equitable defenses or maxims are also to be considered by a court entertaining an R.C. 3721.08 motion for an injunction, the injunction should be granted.

It is established law in Ohio that, when a statute grants a specific injunctive remedy to an individual or to the state, the party requesting the injunction "need not aver and show, as under ordinary rules in equity, that great or irreparable injury is about to be done for which he has no adequate remedy at law * * *." Stephan v. Daniels (1875), 27 Ohio St. 527, 536. (See, also, State v. Alexander Brothers, Inc. (1974), 43 Ohio App.2d 154, 334 N.E.2d 492; 29 Ohio Jurisprudence 2d, 176, Injunctions, Section 13; and 42 American Jurisprudence 2d 776, Injunctions, Section 38, for further support of the propositions that the traditional concepts for the issuance of equity injunctions do not apply in statutory injunction actions.)

Moreover, it is the majority rule in federal courts and the law in a growing number of state jurisdictions that, where an injunction is authorized by a statute designed to provide a governmental agent with the means to enforce public policy, "no balancing of equities is necessary," Brown v. Hecht Co. (1943), 78 App.D.C. 98, 101, 137 F.2d 689, 692; State v. O. K. Transfer Company (1958), 215 Or. 8, 15, 330 P.2d 510; and "(i)t is enough if the statutory conditions are made to appear." Ibid., at pages 15-16, 330 P.2d at page 513. See also, United States v. San Francisco (1940), 310 U.S. 16, 30, 60 S.Ct. 749, 8 L.Ed. 1050; Conway v. State Board of Health (1965), 252 Miss. 315, 173 So.2d 412; Nevada Real Estate Comm. v. Ressel (1956), 72 Nev. 79, 294 P.2d 1115; Arizona State Board of Dental Examiners v. Hyder (1977), 114 Ariz. 544, 562 P.2d 717.

Given the fact that statutory actions granting governmental agents the right to sue for injunctive relief have a history and purpose different from equitable actions for injunctive relief, we find the rule that statutory injunctions should issue if the statutory requirements are fulfilled to be appropriate to actions under R.C. 3721.08. Unlike equitable-injunction actions which were developed in response to a...