Acree, Matter of, S97Y0449

• Decision Date: 09 February 1998
• Docket Number: No. S97Y0449,S97Y0449
• Citation: 269 Ga. 57,495 S.E.2d 293
• Parties: , 98 FCDR 466 In the Matter of Marc Edward ACREE.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

Page 293

495 S.E.2d 293

269 Ga. 57, 98 FCDR 466

In the Matter of Marc Edward ACREE.

No. S97Y0449.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Feb. 9, 1998.

William P. Smith, III, General Counsel, E. Duane Cooper, Asst. General Counsel, State Bar of Georgia, Atlanta, for State Bar of Georgia.

Marc Acree, Duncan, Thomasson & Acree, LaGrange, John W. Denney, Denney, Peace, Allison & Kirk, Columbus, for Marc Edward Acree.

Paul Kilpatrick Jr., Pope, McGlamry, Kilpatrick & Morrison, Columbus, for other interested parties.

PER CURIAM.

Following a hearing before a special master under Bar Rule 4-106, the special master recommended that the respondent, Marc Edward Acree, be suspended from the practice of law for six months, based on his guilty plea in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia to the misdemeanor of bank larceny, 18 USC § 2113(b). Before this Court, Acree contends that a public reprimand is the appropriate level of discipline, and the State Bar contends that disbarment is appropriate.

It is clear that Acree has engaged in grave misconduct. By filing statements with lenders that were false by omission, Acree enabled a loan transaction to proceed that otherwise would not have proceeded if he had been truthful. Although Acree did not benefit from the loan transaction except for the attorney fees he received, the lenders lost their investment. Because of the severity of Acree's misconduct, a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude, we reject Acree's contention that a public reprimand is appropriate, as well as the special master's recommendation of only a six-month suspension. We also reject as too severe the State Bar's contention that disbarment is the appropriate level of discipline. Balancing the severity of Acree's conduct, with the mitigating factors that are present--that Acree does not have a prior disciplinary infraction; that he has a solid record of supporting and serving his community; and that he has built an outstanding reputation for integrity both in the legal community and the community at large ¹--we conclude that a two-year suspension is the appropriate level of discipline. Further, in two recent similar cases, this Court has ordered suspensions of two years ² and three years. ³ For these reasons, this Court suspends Acree from the practice of law for two years. Acree is reminded of his duties and responsibilities under Bar Rule 4-219 to notify any clients of his inability to represent them, to take all actions necessary to protect the interests of his clients, and to certify to this Court that he has satisfied the requirements of this Rule.

Two-year suspension.

All the Justices concur, except BENHAM, C.J., HUNSTEIN and THOMPSON, JJ., dissent.

HUNSTEIN, Justice, dissenting.

While I agree with the majority that Acree has engaged in grave misconduct, including a violation of Standard 66 which authorizes disbarment upon conviction of any felony or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude, I cannot agree with its conclusion that the penalty of disbarment is too severe in this disciplinary action. Because the record clearly establishes that Acree engaged in felonious conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit and misrepresentation and that he engaged in deceptive practices during the disciplinary process, a factor not considered by the majority, I would disbar Acree from the practice of law in this State.

There are essentially two questions before the Court in this disciplinary matter, the appropriate level of discipline to be imposed and whether Acree's testimony at the show cause hearing contradicted his testimony at the plea hearing and trials in federal court. One look at the transcripts in this case reveals that Acree's position at the show cause hearing not only contradicts his testimony at the plea hearing, but is also, at best, disingenuous. At the plea hearing, the U.S. Attorney's summarization of the government's case reflects that Acree, in submitting misleading documents to lending institutions, was fully aware that those documents were misleading and that Acree intended to mislead those institutions as well as the Small Business Administration. Indeed, when directly asked by the trial court if he agreed that he had acted as outlined in the government's case, Acree responded affirmatively and only clarified that his misconduct was that of omission. ⁴ At the show cause hearing, however, Acree attempted to minimize the gravity of his crime, thereby contradicting his previous testimony, by contending that he did not know his conduct was criminal at the time he submitted the misleading documents to the lending institutions. Such serious misconduct constitutes a deceptive practice within the disciplinary process as well as a refusal to acknowledge the...