Adair v. Broadlawns Medical Center, Civil No. 4-96-CV-20739.

• Decision Date: 22 September 1999
• Docket Number: Civil No. 4-96-CV-20739.
• Citation: 102 F.Supp.2d 1092
• Parties: Bobbie ADAIR, Plaintiff, v. BROADLAWNS MEDICAL CENTER, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Iowa

102 F.Supp.2d 1092

Bobbie ADAIR, Plaintiff, v. BROADLAWNS MEDICAL CENTER, Defendant.

Civil No. 4-96-CV-20739.

United States District Court, S.D. Iowa, Central Division.

September 22, 1999.

Robert A. Wright, Jr., Des Moines, IA, for Plaintiff.

James R. Swanger and David L. Brown, Des Moines, IA, for Defendant.

RULING ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, AND ORDER

BREMER, United States Magistrate Judge.

This matter comes before the Court on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Clerk's No. 35), filed July 21, 1999. Plaintiff filed a Resistance to the Motion (Clerk's No. 40) on August 11, 1999; and an Amended Resistance (Clerk's No. 50) and Memorandum in Support of Resistance (Clerk's No. 52)¹ on September 13, 1999. Defendant filed a Reply (Clerk's No. 55) on September 20, 1999. The parties consented to proceed before a United States Magistrate Judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). The Motion is fully submitted.

Plaintiff filed her Petition in the Iowa District Court for Polk County on August 16, 1996, and Defendant filed a Notice of Removal to this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d) on October 7, 1996. Plaintiff asserts claims for racial discrimination through failure to promote and creation of a hostile work environment under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e—2000e-17 (1994 &amp West Supp.1996), and the Iowa Civil Rights Act, Iowa Code chapter 216 (1996).

In the Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendant argues the following: The Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because Plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies; Plaintiff can establish neither a prima facie case of discrimination, nor facts that would permit a jury to conclude that Defendant's proffered legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for its actions were a pretext for racial discrimination; Defendant responded appropriately to all Plaintiff's complaints; and the statute of limitations bars all or some of Plaintiff's claims.

I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

After filing a motion for summary judgment, the moving party holds the initial burden of showing it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law when no genuine issues of material fact remain for trial. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Estate of Gavin v. United States, 113 F.3d 802, 805 (8th Cir.1997); Honeywell, Inc. v. United States, 973 F.2d 638, 641 (8th Cir.1992). On a motion for summary judgment, a court must consider the facts and inferences to be drawn in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). "Where the unresolved issues are primarily legal rather than factual, summary judgment is particularly appropriate." Shempert v. Harwick Chemical Corp., 151 F.3d 793, 795 (8th Cir.1998) (citing Crain v. Board of Police Comm'rs, 920 F.2d 1402, 1405-06 (8th Cir.1990)), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1139, 119 S.Ct. 1028, 143 L.Ed.2d 38 (1999).

II. FACTS

For purposes of this Motion, the following facts are undisputed or are viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.

Plaintiff Bobbie Adair (Adair), an African-American female, has had several positions at Defendant Broadlawns Medical Center (Broadlawns), Des Moines, Iowa, since she began work there in 1979. Adair has worked in the collection department under Doug Clarke's supervision since the fall of 1995.

On March 21, 1996, Adair filed a complaint with the Iowa Civil Rights Commission (ICRC). In her complaint, Adair described why she felt she was discriminated against:

I believe that I have been discriminated against by my employer who has failed to take appropriate action to relieve a racially hostile work environment that has been created by my supervisor, Doug Clark.

In addition to that, I have made application for promotions and/or transfers in the collection area and have been passed over for less qualified white individuals.

I was recently told that I would not be considered for a position as collector on the ground that I did not meet some of the minimal qualifications though I have been working in collections for 8 or 9 months.

I believe that this is another act of discrimination on the basis of my race. Furthermore, my employer has not taken adequate action against my supervisor though I have complained in the past, I continue to be subjected to harassment, increased scrutiny, discipline, and different terms and conditions of employment than that enjoyed by white employees. All of this has subjected me to a hostile work environment.

Def.'s Ex. 14 at 4-5.

ICRC's procedure provides that after a complaint is filed, the agency may draft and mail written questionnaires to the parties. Iowa Admin. Code r. 161-3.12(1)(a) (1993). The parties must respond in writing to their respective questionnaires, or they may submit written position statements, which should cover the same general subjects covered by the questionnaire. Iowa Admin. Code r. 161-3.12(1)(b)(1).

The ICRC sent Adair a questionnaire seeking information regarding her claim, as provided under regulation 1613.12(1)(a). Broadlawns asserts, and Adair does not dispute, that Adair did not respond to the questionnaire as required under regulation 161-3.12(1)(b)(1).

When a complainant fails to respond to a questionnaire, "A complaint may be administratively closed." Iowa Admin. Code r. 161-3.12(1)(c)(1). An administrative closure, unlike a "no probable cause determination," is not a final determination of the merits of the case. Iowa Admin. Code r. 161-3.12(3).

On May 20, 1999, an ICRC screening investigator completed a case determination of Adair's complaint. The analysis section stated as follows:

ANALYSIS: Respondent [Broadlawns] provided a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for its actions supported by documentation. Ms. Adair's allegations were unsupported. She provided no evidence that her race played any role in any adverse action alleged or that she was subjected to a racially hostile work environment. Ms. Adair failed to submit a completed questionnaire to the Iowa Civil Rights Commission.

As allowed by Iowa Admin. Code 1613.12(1)c Failure to respond. (1) Complainant. A complaint may be administratively closed when Complainant fails to respond to the questionnaire.

As allowed under Iowa Code section 216.16(16), this case has been screened and it has been determined that the following action will be taken:

ADMINISTRATIVE CLOSURE

Based on a review of the information provided by the parties as outlined above, it is determined that this complaint does not warrant further processing.

Def.'s Ex. 1. On May 22, 1996, 60 days after Adair filed her complaint, the ICRC sent her a copy of the case determination, and a letter stating that her complaint had been administratively closed.

After a complainant has filed a complaint with the ICRC in compliance with Iowa Administrative Code regulation 161-3.5, and the complaint has been on file at least 60 days, the complainant can get a right-to-sue letter from the ICRC. Iowa Admin. Code r. 161-3.10(2). An exception to this rule provides that the agency will not send a right-to-sue letter if the administrative law judge made a "no probable cause" finding. Iowa Admin. Code r. 161-3.10(4)(a).

After the ICRC closed Adair's case administratively without making a final determination of the complaint's merits, Adair requested and received a right-to-sue letter from the ICRC.

III. DISCUSSION

Defendant asserts the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because in failing to complete the ICRC's questionnaire, Adair did not cooperate with the commission during its investigation of her claims, and thus she failed to exhaust her administrative remedies as required by Title VII.

Title VII prohibits unlawful employment discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994). But the statute also establishes an administrative procedure that a complainant must follow before filing a lawsuit in federal court. Briley v. Carlin, 172 F.3d 567, 571 (8th Cir.1999) (quoting Williams v. Little Rock Mun. Water Works, 21 F.3d 218, 222 (8th Cir.1994)). An employee cannot bring a discrimination claim without first exhausting established administrative remedies. Briley, 172 F.3d at 571 (citing Artis v. Francis Howell North Band Booster Ass'n, 161 F.3d 1178, 1183 (8th Cir.1998)). "Compliance with the administrative review apparatus provided by Title VII is a requisite for judicial review of a discrimination claim." Hargens v. U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, 865 F.Supp. 1314, 1323 (N.D.Iowa 1994) (citations omitted); cf. Peters v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 80 F.3d 257, 262-63 (8th Cir. 1996) ("Where relief is available from an administrative agency, the plaintiff is ordinarily required to pursue that avenue of redress before proceeding to the courts; and until that recourse is exhausted, suit is premature and must be dismissed") (citing Reiter v. Cooper, 507 U.S. 258, 269, 113 S.Ct. 1213, 122 L.Ed.2d 604 (1993)). Exhaustion of administrative remedies is necessary "because it provides the EEOC the first opportunity to investigate discriminatory practices and enables it to perform its roles of obtaining voluntary compliance and promoting conciliatory efforts." Williams v. Little Rock Mun. Water Works, 21 F.3d 218, 222 (8th Cir.1994) (citing Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 180-81, 109 S.Ct. 2363, 105 L.Ed.2d 132 (1989)); Butts v. City of New York Dep't of Housing Preservation & Dev., 990 F.2d 1397, 1401-02 (2d Cir.1993) ("the purpose of the [Title VII] exhaustion requirement ... is to give the administrative agency the opportunity to investigate, mediate, and take remedial action") (brackets and ellipses in original).

Courts have held that because "[f]ailure to cooperate in an EEOC investigation, no less than failure to file with the administrative agency, serves to thwart the policy underling [sic] the enactment...