Adair v. McFarlin
| Decision Date | 09 May 1911 |
| Citation | 115 P. 787,28 Okla. 633,1911 OK 129 |
| Parties | ADAIR v. McFARLIN et al. |
| Court | Oklahoma Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
Generally a statute will be construed as applying to conditions that may arise in the future. An act will not be given a retrospective operation unless the intention of the Legislature that it shall so operate is unequivocally expressed.
The jurisdiction of the district court of a civil cause involving $387.30 pending in the United States Court for the Indian Territory Western District on the advent of statehood and then properly transferred to said court, is unaffected by an act approved June 4, 1908 (Sess. Laws 1907-08, c. 27. art 1), passed pursuant to article 10, § 7, of the Constitution giving the county court, coextensive with the county, among other things, exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil cases involving in excess of $200, and not exceeding $500.
An act approved June 4, 1908 (Sess. Laws Okl. 1907-08, p. 284), is prospective, and not retrospective, in its operation, and does not divest the district court of jurisdiction of civil causes then pending therein involving in excess of $200 and not exceeding $500.
Error from District Court, Seminole County; John Caruthers, Judge.
Action by James L. Adair against B. Porter McFarlin and others. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiff brings error. Reversed and remanded, with directions.
Crump Rogers & Harris and T. T. Baker, for plaintiff in error.
N. A. Gibson and H. C. Thurman, for defendants in error.
On October 7, 1905, James L. Adair, plaintiff in error, sued defendants in error in the United States Court for the Indian Territory, Western District, as assignee of their written promise to pay, for $387.30, which cause was there pending on the admission of the state into the Union. On said event said cause was properly transferred to the district court of Hughes county, where it was pending untried on the passage and approval of the act of June 4, 1908 (Sess. Laws of Okl. 1907-08, c. 27, p. 284), entitled "An act to define the jurisdiction and duties of the county court ***," in part providing: ***" After the approval of said act a motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction was sustained and plaintiff brings the case here.
The only question for us to determine is whether said act divested the jurisdiction of said cause out of the district court and vested it in the county court. It did not The Constitution (article 7, § 10) provides: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction in all cases, civil and criminal, except where exclusive jurisdiction is by this Constitution, or by law, conferred on some other court. ***"
This act confers exclusive jurisdiction in certain cases on the county court. Being purely prospective in its terms, this case, already pending in the district court was unaffected by said act.
Laws are generally construed as applicable to future conditions, and are not to be allowed a retroactive effect unless such intention upon the part of the Legislature is so clearly expressed that no other construction can be fairly given. In Lawrence v. City of Louisville, 96 Ky. 595, 29 S.W. 450, 27 L. R. A. 560, 49 Am. St. Rep. 309, the syllabus says: "While retrospective legislation may, in some cases, be upheld, the words of a statute ought not to have a retrospective operation unless they are so clear and imperative that no other meaning can be annexed to them, or unless the intention of the Legislature cannot be otherwise satisfied." Potter's Dwarrin on Stat. & Con. 162, note 9, says: "The general rule is that no statute, however positive in its terms, is to be construed as designed to interfere with existing contracts, rights of action, or suits, and especially vested rights, unless the intention that it shall so operate is expressly declared, and courts will apply new statutes only to future cases, unless there is something in the nature of the case, or in the language of the new provision, which shows that they were intended to have a retroactive operation. And, although the words of the statute are broad enough in their literal extent to comprehend existing cases, they must yet be construed as applicable only to cases that may thereafter arise, unless a contrary intention is unequivocally expressed therein. Wood v. Oakley, 11 Paige [N. Y.] 403; Butler v. Palmer, 1 Hill [N. Y.] 325; Johnson v. Burrell, 2 Hill [N. Y.] 238; Dash v. Van Kleeck, 7 Johns. [N. Y.] 477 ; Berley v. Rampacher, 5 Duer [N. Y.] 183; Calkins v. Calkins, 3 Barb. [N. Y.] 306; Sackett v. Andross, 5 Hill [N. Y.] 334; Vedder v. Alkenbrack, 6 Barb. [N. Y.] 328; People v. Supervisors of Columbia Co., 10 Wend.
[N. Y.] 362; Van Rensselaer v. Livingston, 12 Wend. [N. Y.] 490." In Rock Island Nat. Bank v. Thompson, 173 Ill. 607, 50 N.E. 1093, 64 Am. St. Rep. 137, the court said Even remedial statutes, such as is the one under construction, are to be deemed prospective in their operation, and are not to be applied to proceeedings pending at the time th...
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