Adair v. Mcfarlin
Decision Date | 09 May 1911 |
Docket Number | Case Number: 882 |
Citation | 1911 OK 129,28 Okla. 633,115 P. 787 |
Parties | ADAIR v. McFARLIN et al. |
Court | Oklahoma Supreme Court |
¶0 1. STATUTES--Construction--Retroactive Effect. Generally, a statute will be construed as applying to conditions that may arise in the future. An act will not be given a retrospective operation unless the intention of the Legislature that it shall so operate is unequivocally expressed.
2. COURTS--Jurisdiction--Cases Pending at Advent of Statehood--Effect of Subsequent Statute. The jurisdiction of the district court of a civil cause involving $ 387.30 pending in the United States Court for the Indian Territory, Western District, on the advent of statehood and then properly transferred to said court, is unaffected by an act approved June 4, 1908 (Sess. Laws 1907-08, c. 27, art. 1), passed pursuant to article 10, § 7, of the Constitution, giving the county court, coextensive with the county, among other things, exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil cases involving in excess of $ 200, and not exceeding $ 500.
3. SAME. An act approved June 4, 1908 (Sess. Laws Okla. 1907-08, p. 284), is prospective, and not retrospective, in its operation, and does not divest the district court of jurisdiction of civil causes then pending therein involving in excess of $ 200 and not exceeding $ 500.
Error from District Court, Seminole County; John Caruthers, Judge.
Action by James L. Adair against B. Porter McFarlin and others. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiff brings error. Reversed and remanded, with directions.
Crump, Rogers & Harris and T. T. Baker, for plaintiff in error.
N. A. Gibson and H. C. Thurman, for defendants in error.
¶1 On October 7, 1905, James L. Adair, plaintiff in error, sued defendants in error in the United States Court for the Indian Territory, Western District, as assignee of their written promise to pay, for $ 387.30, which cause was there pending on the admission of the state into the Union. On said event, said cause was properly transferred to the district court of Hughes county, where it was pending untried on the passage and approval of the act of June 4, 1908 (Sess. Laws of Okla. 1907-08, c. 27, p. 284), entitled "An act to define the jurisdiction and duties of the county court * * *," in part providing:
* * *"
¶2 After the approval of said act a motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction was sustained and plaintiff brings the case here.
¶3 The only question for us to determine is whether said act divested the jurisdiction of said cause out of the district court and vested it in the county court. It did not. The Constitution (article 7, § 10) provides:
"The district court shall have original jurisdiction in all cases, civil and criminal, except where exclusive jurisdiction is by this Constitution, or by law, conferred on some other court. * * *"
¶4 This act confers exclusive jurisdiction in certain cases on the county court. Being purely prospective in its terms, this case, already pending in the district court, was unaffected by said act.
¶5 Laws are generally construed as applicable to future conditions, and are not to be allowed a retroactive effect unless such intention upon the part of the Legislature is so clearly expressed that no other construction can be fairly given. In Lawrence v. City of Louisville, 96 Ky. 595, 29 S.W. 450, 27 L.R.A. 560, 49 Am. St. Rep. 309, the syllabus says:
"While restrospective legislation may, in some cases, be upheld, the words of a statute ought not to have a retrospective operation unless they are so clear and imperative that no other meaning can be annexed to them, or unless the intention of the Legislature cannot be otherwise satisfied."
¶6 Potter's Dwarrin on Stat. & Con. 162, note 9, says:
. ."
¶7 In Rock Island Nat. Bank v. Thompson, 173 Ill. 593, 50 N.E. 1089, 64 Am. St. Rep. 137, the court said:
¶8 Even remedial statutes, such as is the one in construction, are to be deemed prospective in their operation, and are not to be applied to proceedings pending at the time they are enacted, unless a contrary intent appears. Litch v. Brotherson, 25 How. Prac. (N.Y.) 416; Trist v. Cabenas, 18 Abb. Prac. (N.Y.) 143; Potter's Dwarris on Stats. & Consts. note 9, p. 164. See, also, Wallace v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 16 Idaho 103, 100 P. 904; Hawley v. Simms (Ill. 1887) 14 N.E. 7; Rogers v. Greenbush, 58 Me. 395; Provident Life, etc., Co. v. Brunner, 4 Neb. Unoff. 48, 93 N.W. 144.
¶9 In Trist v. Cabenas, supra, an order of reference was made to a referee prior to the act of 1862, at...
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