Adair v. State

• Decision Date: 29 August 1911
• Parties: ADAIR v. STATE.
• Court: United States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma

118 P. 416

6 Okla.Crim. 284, 1911 OK CR 296

ADAIR v. STATE.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma

August 29, 1911

Syllabus by the Court.

Sanity being the normal and usual condition of mankind, the law presumes that every person is sane; hence the state in a criminal prosecution may rely upon such presumption without proof relative thereto. But when the defendant in a homicide case produces sufficient evidence to raise a reasonable doubt of his sanity, the law then imposes on the state the burden of establishing the sanity of the defendant, the same as any other material fact necessary to warrant a conviction; and if, upon consideration of all the evidence in the case, the jury have a reasonable doubt that the defendant at the time of the commission of the act charged was mentally competent to distinguish between right and wrong, or to understand the nature of the act he was committing, he must be acquitted.

Section 2034, Snyder's Sts., provides: "All persons are capable of committing crimes, except those belonging to the following classes: *** 4. Lunatics, insane persons, and all persons of unsound mind, including persons temporarily or partially deprived of reason, upon proof that at the time of committing the act charged against them they were incapable of knowing its wrongfulness."

Section 7000 provides: "An act done by a person in a state of insanity cannot be punished as a public offense."

Held, that the latter section does not in effect modify the former, but is supplemental to it; that under these provisions the test of criminal responsibility for committing an act, which is a crime under the law, is the mental capacity to distinguish between right and wrong as applied to the particular act, and to understand the nature and consequences of such act, or knowing its wrongfulness the defendant is not criminally responsible, if by reason of insanity he did not have the will and mental power to refrain from committing such act.

Insanity as a defense to crime is a question of fact for the jury to determine under proper instruction.

No man should be deprived of his life or liberty under the forms of law, unless the jurors who tried him are able, upon their consciences, to say that the evidence before them, by whomsoever adduced, is sufficient to show beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of every fact necessary to constitute the crime charged.

Appeal from District Court, Johnston County; A. T. West, Judge.

Lon Adair was tried for murder and convicted of manslaughter in the first degree, and was sentenced to serve a term of ten years imprisonment. From the judgment and sentence, he appeals. Reversed.

Cornelius Hardy, for plaintiff in error.

Smith C. Matson, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

DOYLE J. (after stating the facts as above).

The principal question presented arises upon the assignments of error based upon instructions given to the jury upon the defense of insanity, and the refusal to give an instruction upon that defense requested on behalf of the defendant.

On the defense of insanity, the court instructed the jury in part as follows: "Insanity once established is presumed to continue until the contrary is proven. The presumption of the continuance, however, applies only to cases of chronic or confirmed nature. This does not hold good in cases of occasional or intermittent derangement, or of partial insanity. When it is proved that the defendant had lucid intervals, the presumption is that the criminal act was committed during one of them; that is, if it is proved that the nature of the insanity under which the defendant was proved to have labored at some time in the past was only for a time, and at times he was partially insane, and at times he was sane, then it is presumed that the defendant committed the act while in his right mind, and it devolves upon the defendant to show that he was insane at the particular time that the offense was committed, in order to excuse him from the legal consequences of his act. A homicide committed by one who has not sufficient knowledge and understanding to comprehend right from wrong, and understand the consequences of his act, is excusable for his acts while his mind is in this condition; but it is not every derangement of the mind that will excuse one for the commission of a crime. If one has sufficient mind and understanding to know right from wrong regarding the particular act, and is able to understand and comprehend the consequences of such act, the law recognizes him as sane, and holds him responsible for such act. And, if you believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant killed the deceased as charged in the information, with a premeditated design to effect his death, and that at the time of such killing he knew and understood that it was wrong to take the life of the deceased, and was able to understand and comprehend the consequences of such act, then in that event it will be your duty to find the defendant guilty of murder as charged in the indictment. On the other hand, if you should find that he was not able to know right from wrong, and was not able to understand and comprehend the consequences of his act, then you will acquit him."

On behalf of the defendant, the following instruction was requested: "Gentlemen of the jury, you are instructed that the defendant has interposed as one of his defenses in this case the plea of insanity. When that defense is interposed, the burden of proof is upon the defendant to introduce sufficient evidence to raise in your minds a reasonable doubt of his sanity. It is not required that the defendant shall prove his insanity to the satisfaction of the minds of the jury by competent evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, or by a preponderance of the evidence. It is sufficient if he only introduces sufficient evidence to raise in your minds a reasonable doubt of his sanity, and when this is done you are instructed that the burden of proof is upon the state to prove the sanity of the defendant by competent evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, before you would be justified in convicting the defendant as charged in the indictment, and then the burden of proving the sanity of the defendant rests upon the state, like that of proving any other material allegation of the indictment; and if you believe that the state has failed to prove by competent evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, the sanity of the defendant, and if from all the evidence in the case there is a reasonable doubt in your minds as to the sanity of the defendant, you will return a verdict of not guilty and acquit the defendant. (Refused, and exception allowed. A. T. West Judge.)"

The important question presented is, What was the proper instruction to have given to the jury with regard to the degree of proof necessary for them to acquit the defendant on the ground of insanity?

Sanity being the normal and usual condition of mankind, the law in criminal cases presumes the defendant to be sane, and this presumption of law shreds until it is overcome by the evidence in the case. On the question as to what is sufficient proof to overcome this presumption, where the defense of insanity is interposed, and the degree of proof necessary to show that the defendant was not criminally responsible for his act, there has ever been an irreconcilable conflict of opinion. The authorities, American and English, recognize three general rules:

First that the presumption of sanity can only be overcome by the same degree of proof that is necessary to overcome the presumption of innocence; therefore the burden is upon the defendant to establish his insanity, when the act charged was committed, beyond a reasonable doubt. This doctrine is rudimental, and is now without support, except in one or two jurisdictions.

Second, that the presumption of sanity prevails until it is overcome by a fair preponderance of evidence, and the burden is on the defendant to establish his insanity to the reasonable satisfaction of the jury. Russell on Crimes (9th Ed.) 525; Roscoe on Criminal Evidence (7th Ed.) 975; Foster's Crown Law, 225. This might properly be termed the English doctrine. The leading case in the English courts is McNaghten's Case, 10 C. & Finn. 200. McNaghten was tried for the murder of a Mr. Drummond, private secretary of Sir Robert Peel, mistaking him for the Premier himself. He was acquitted on the ground of insanity, and his acquittal caused so much excitement that the question of insanity as a defense in criminal cases was made the subject of debate in the House of Lords, and the opinion of the judges on the law governing such cases was taken. On the question here involved, Lord Chief Justice Tindall, speaking for himself and the other judges, said that the jurors ought to be told in all cases where insanity is set up as a defense that "every man is presumed to be sane, and to possess a sufficient degree of reason to be responsible for his crimes, until the contrary be proved to their satisfaction." The rule so declared has been accepted as settling the law on this question by the English courts, and with minor modifications it has been approved by the courts of last resort in many of the states. In some of the states this rule is statutory.

Third. If any evidence is introduced tending to prove that the defendant was insane at the time of the commission of the act charged, then the burden of proving the sanity of the defendant devolves upon the prosecution, and the state is bound to establish his sanity, like all other elements of the crime, beyond a reasonable doubt. This doctrine is distinctively American, and is the rule declared by the Supreme Court of the United States.

The leading case supporting this rule is Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 16 S.Ct....