Adam Huntsman's Lessee v. Randolph

• Decision Date: 30 June 1818
• Parties: ADAM HUNTSMAN'S LESSEE v. NATHAN RANDOLPH.
• Court: Tennessee Court of Appeals

6 Tenn. 263

ADAM HUNTSMAN'S LESSEE

v.NATHAN RANDOLPH.

Supreme Court of Errors and Appeals of Tennessee.

June Term, 1818.

The fourth section of 1813, 84, vacating entries not surveyed within the time prescribed, is not a violation of the Bill of Rights, section 20, declaring that no retrospective law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be allowed. (See Townsend v. Townsend, Peck, 1, as to retrospective laws.)

Archibald Roane and Robert Whyte, JJ.

The following case agreed and statement of facts are submitted to the Court for decision; to-wit, 1st. Adam Huntsman entered the land in the declaration mentioned in the third surveyor's district the 15th June, 1815; the same was surveyed in August, 1815, and granted 23d May, 1816. It is agreed the entry under which the defendant claims was made in 1810, was surveyed in 1815, after the plaintiff's survey was made, and granted in 1816. It is also agreed both grants cover the same land mentioned in the plaintiff's declaration; and that the defendant has for the three last years past been, and yet is, in the possession of the same. It is also agreed that defendant's entry is a special one. Now, if upon the above statement of facts, the Court is of opinion the law is for the plaintiff, then judgment is to be entered for the plaintiff for his term and six cents damages and costs, as on the finding of a jury for him. But if the Court is of opinion the law is for the defendant, arising from the above statement of facts, then the judgment shall be given for the defendant as on the finding of a jury, and he recover his costs; and that the judgment be entered of record, and supersede a trial by jury.

The opinion of the Court was delivered verbally by Roane, J., and judgment ordered to be entered up for the plaintiff. Whyte, J., observed, that, as it was a new case, being the first that had occurred under the act, he would file a written opinion at next term, which is as follows:--

The entry of the lessor of the plaintiff was made under and by virtue of the Act of 1813, c. 83, sections 4, 12; and the question presented by the parties, by this case agreed, for the opinion of the Court is, whether the said Act of 1813, c. 83, is constitutional or not. By the defendant's counsel it is contended, that, by the laws in force at and previous to the passage of the Act of 1813, the defendant, by his entry in 1810, had acquired a vested right; that the Act of 1813, c. 83, section 4, declaring a forfeiture of this vested right is unconstitutional, being after a contract made with the State; that this act varied the terms of that contract; that by it he, the defendant, had only to make his entry. He was not bound to survey it, much less was he bound to survey within any particular limited time; and contends it was the duty of the State by its officer to perform this business without his agency or intervention. And in support of this position was cited the twentieth section of the twentieth article of the Constitution, which is in the following words: “That no retrospective law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts, shall be made.”

It is first to be seen what is the substance of the contract between the defendant Randolph and the State, and then it can be more correctly ascertained whether the Act of 1813, c. 83, has impaired its obligation.

Whilst the territory now composing the State of Tennessee formed a part of the State of North Carolina a considerable portion of it was appropriated by the latter State to the discharge of claims originating under her laws or acts of assembly. These claims were variously founded: some for military services performed during the war of the Revolution; some for services performed in the first settlement of and on account of the territory itself for laying it off, surveying, &c.; others for military services performed in its protection during the infancy of its establishment; some for money paid to and for the use of the State of North Carolina, in the liquidation of her certificates, or the vouchers of her public debt.

In the year 1789, and before satisfaction had upon all these different claims by the issuing of the grants, North Carolina made the cession to the United States of this territory, comprising the present limits of the State of Tennessee, reserving to herself the right of perfecting the titles by grant, upon the above claims, not then so perfected. In the year 1796 this ceded territory became an independent State. The above claims not being all then satisfied, but many, very many, titles founded thereon yet remaining to be perfected. The exercise of these rights reserved by the Cession Act produced a collision between the two States, which in the year 1801 produced on the part of the State of Tennessee the passing an act (Nov. 14, 1801, c. 2) interdicting in future to any person, under the authority of the State of North Carolina, to enter, survey, or mark any spot of land in the State of Tennessee for the purpose of obtaining a title for the same from the State of North Carolina; and if any such grant should be obtained from the State of North Carolina not to be admitted as evidence in any court of record, section 7; but that all titles on the above claims hereafter, should be perfected by the State of Tennessee, section 2.

This conflict at last terminated in an agreement or compact between the two States, and assented to by Congress, by which the State of Tennessee was authorized, acquired the rights, and engaged in a certain manner to perfect the titles which by the Cession Act were reserved to the State of North Carolina to be by her perfected. See Act of North Carolina, 1803; Act of Tenn. 1804, c. 14, Rev. 425; Act of Congress, April, 1806; Act of Tenn, 1806, c. 10, Rev. 452.

To effectuate the objects of this compact, the State of Tennessee, by her Acts of 1806, c. 1, and 1807, c. 2, established boards of commissioners for the purpose of judging and ascertaining the validity of unsatisfied claims to lands with this State. The original evidences of these claims (the warrants, grants, &c.) judged by the boards, were retained by them, and new evidences were issued (under the appellation of duplicate warrants and certificates.) The claims in passing through this process lost their locality, except in some particular cases where special entry had been made, and their former characteristic names of military, John Armstrong's Evans's battalion, and county warrants, pre-emption, commissioner, and guard rights, with the particulars previously attached to them, and came forth under a perfect equality, having the same denomination, the same principles, and the same rights. The vacant disposable lands of the State under the above acts of assembly and act of Congress, was assigned as a common fund for their satisfaction. It was divided into districts with respective and correspondent offices and officers, it is true; but this division was for the purpose of facilitating the satisfaction of the claims, and promoting the completion of the title. Each and every office was open to each and every claimant at his pleasure. Such is the new-modelled claim under the compact in the hands of the...