Adam J. ex rel. Robert J. v. Keller Indep. School
| Decision Date | 02 May 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 02-11032 Summary Calendar.,02-11032 Summary Calendar. |
| Citation | 328 F.3d 804 |
| Parties | ADAM J., by next friends, on behalf of ROBERT J., Mr. on behalf of Robert J., Mrs., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. KELLER INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Myrna Bernice Silver, Dallas, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Eric W. Schulze, Susan Bell Graham, Walsh, Anderson, Brown, Schulze & Aldridge, Austin, TX for Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas.
Before DAVIS, WIENER, and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff-Appellant "Adam J." appeals the district court's judgment affirming the decision of the special hearing officer in a proceeding under the Individuals With Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400, et seq. ("IDEA"). Both the state hearing officer and district court concluded that Defendant-Appellee Keller Independent School District ("District") complied with the procedural requirements of the IDEA and that the individual education programs ("IEPs") developed for Adam were appropriate, i.e., were reasonably calculated to enable him to receive educational benefits. For the following reasons, we affirm.
Adam J. was born in 1984 and moved to the Keller School District in the spring of 1998, while in seventh grade. By all accounts, Adam is a very bright young man who suffers from serious behavioral problems and Asperger's Syndrome, a form of autism. He was originally diagnosed, in second grade, with attention deficit hyper-activity disorder and by fifth grade was also diagnosed with depression and generalized anxiety disorder. In the fall of 1998, after a comprehensive evaluation, the District determined that Adam was eligible for special education as a child with an emotional disturbance. The school district convened an "Admission, Review, and Dismissal" ("ARD") committee meeting, developed an Individual Education Program ("IEP"), and placed Adam in a highly-structured behavior modification class at Fossil Ridge High School. At that time, Adam's parents agreed to both the IEP and the behavior modification placement.
In October 1998, Adam's parents privately arranged for another psychological evaluation of Adam. This evaluation revealed that Adam suffers from Asperger's Syndrome and Oppositional Defiant Disorder. Adam's parents did not notify the District of this new diagnosis until May 1999.1 Later that month, the ARD committee reconvened and Adam's "primary" disability was reclassified as Asperger's Syndrome.
In September 1999, in response to severe behavioral problems at home, Adam's parents unilaterally removed him from Fossil Ridge and placed him in a private residential treatment facility. Adam earned no academic credits while in the private facility and returned to Fossil Ridge in January 2000, where he successfully completed the spring semester.
By August 2000, Adam's behavior had improved, and he was able to maintain employment at a local fast-food restaurant. In November 2000, the District removed Adam's "emotional disturbance" eligibility, and he was administratively "coded" for autism only. Adam's behavior dramatically declined, however, and he was involved in several "major disciplinary incidents" in the fall 2000 semester. These occurrences included throwing a chair at a staff member and throwing lighted matches at other students. The ARD committee convened following each significant incident; and after the fire incident, the committee determined that Adam's behavior was not a manifestation of his disability. The committee then placed Adam in an "alternative educational setting" for fifteen days. When Adam returned to Fossil Ridge, the District provided a personal aide, and his behavior improved.
In May 2001, the ARD committee met to discuss Adam's progress and to develop an IEP for the 2001-02 school year. The committee determined that Adam should remain in special education classes, with the option of enrolling in general education electives. The proposed IEP also provided for both parent and teacher training; however, the District did not commit to assigning a full-time aide to Adam in 2001. The ARD noted Adam's academic progress and an overall decrease in behavioral problems.
Adam's parents disagreed with the proposed IEP and contended that private placement, at the District's expense, is appropriate for Adam. In April 2001, Adam's parents filed a request for a state "due process" administrative hearing in accordance with the IDEA. The state hearing officer denied all relief, and Adam appealed to the 342d Judicial District Court of Tarrant County, Texas. The District removed the case to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas in September 2001, and summary judgment was granted in favor of the District in August of the following year. Adam timely appealed.
Under the IDEA, a federal district court's review of a state hearing officer's decision is "virtually de novo."2 The district court must receive the state administrative record and must receive additional evidence at the request of either party.3 The hearing officer's findings should be accorded "due weight," but the district court must arrive at an independent conclusion based on a preponderance of the evidence.4
We review de novo, as a mixed question of law and fact, a district court's decision that an IEP was or was not appropriate.5 The district court's underlying findings of fact are reviewed for clear error.6 The party contesting the propriety of the IEP bears the burden of establishing why the IEP and the resulting placement are inappropriate under the IDEA.7
The IDEA conditions federal funding on, inter alia, the state's providing a "free appropriate public education" ("FAPE") to disabled children.8 Under this act, the FAPE must be tailored to the child's particular needs by means of an individual education program ("IEP"), which is a written statement prepared at a meeting attended by a qualified representative of the school district, a teacher, the child's parents or guardians, and, when appropriate, the child himself.9 In Texas, the ARD committee is charged with preparing IEPs for disabled children.
The free appropriate public education proffered in an IEP "need not be the best possible one, nor one that will maximize the child's educational potential; rather, it need only be an education that is specifically designed to meet the child's unique needs, supported by services that will permit him `to benefit' from the instruction."10 The IDEA "guarantees only a `basic floor of opportunity,' consisting of `specialized instruction and related services which are individually designed to provide educational benefit.'"11 This educational benefit "cannot be a mere modicum or de minimis,"12 but "must be meaningful" and "likely to produce progress."13
When a parent challenges the appropriateness of an IEP, the district court's inquiry, and ours on appeal, is limited to two questions. First, we must decide whether the school district complied with the procedures prescribed in the IDEA.14 Second, we "must determine whether the IEP developed for the disabled child is `reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits.'" "If these requirements are met, the State has complied with the obligations imposed by Congress and the courts can require no more."15
In this case, Adam alleges both procedural and substantive violations of the IDEA. Most of the seven points of error Adam raises on appeal are without merit. He asserts first that the hearing officer's decision should not be afforded "due weight" because the officer was biased in favor of the school district. In support of this allegation, Adam offers four examples of bias (1) in a "synopsis" of the case, the officer erroneously "reframed" the issues presented for his consideration; (2) the officer did not provide adequate reasons for his decision; (3) the officer incorrectly described private placement as "extraordinary relief"; and (4) the officer "mis-cited" a case "in exactly the same way it was mis-cited" in the District's brief, allegedly reflecting that he "never actually had the case before him when he wrote his decision, but merely adopted the statements made in the District's Final Argument."
Adam's assertion of bias is unavailing. As a threshold matter, he cites no authority, other than statutory provisions calling for a "qualified and impartial mediator," in support of his sweeping assertion that "[w]here the decision of the Hearing Officer plainly shows that he is biased, his decision deserves no deference by the Trial Court." Moreover, the district court acknowledged that its review is "virtually de novo," and Adam offers no evidence that the court deviated from this standard.
We note also that the "evidence" in support of Adam's charge of bias is unconvincing. First, even if the hearing officer mischaracterized Adam's complaints in a synopsis, the officer's conclusions of law adequately address all of Adam's claims; whatever was "reframed" or "restated" in the synopsis is likely irrelevant. Second, Adam fails to explain how the hearing officer's analysis, even if conclusional or scant, demonstrates bias. Third, the officer's reference to private placement as "extraordinary relief" does not reflect bias and there is no evidence that the officer applied a "higher burden of proof" to Adam's case. Adam's fourth point, that the hearing officer abdicated his responsibility and "merely adopted the statements made in the District's Final Argument" is specious at best, and warrants no further discussion.
Several of Adam's remaining arguments are similarly meritless. For example, he strenuously argues that the district court erred in concluding that he "took the same courses as other...
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