Adames v. Executive Airlines Inc., 00-1663

• Decision Date: 10 January 2001
• Docket Number: No. 00-1663,00-1663
• Citation: 258 F.3d 7,2001 WL 792750
• Parties: (1st Cir. 2001) MARISOL ADAMES, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS, APPELLANTS, v. EXECUTIVE AIRLINES, INC. AND/OR AMERICAN EAGLE, ETC., ET AL DEFENDANTS, APPELLEES. Heard
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

Page 7

258 F.3d 7 (1st Cir. 2001)

MARISOL ADAMES, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS, APPELLANTS, v. EXECUTIVE AIRLINES, INC. AND/OR AMERICAN EAGLE, ETC., ET AL DEFENDANTS, APPELLEES.

No. 00-1663

United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit

Heard January 10, 2001

Decided July 19, 2001

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO [Hon. Juan M. Perez-Gimenez, U.S. District Judge] [Copyrighted Material Omitted] Richard P. Wrede, Association of Flight Attendants, Afl-cio, for appellants.

Harry A. Rissetto, with whom Vicente J. Antonetti, Goldman, Antonetti & Cordova, P.S.C., Angel Castillo, Jr., Kara A. Standen and Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, were on brief for appellees.

Before Torruella, Circuit Judge, Stahl, Senior Circuit Judge, and Lipez, Circuit Judge.

Lipez, Circuit Judge

Marisol Adames and some ninety-three other flight attendants sued Executive Airlines ("Executive") in July 1999 for violation of various Puerto Rico labor laws. Adames¹ argues that she is entitled to compensation and benefits commensurate with the provisions of Commonwealth law dealing with wages, overtime pay, maternity benefits, meal periods, days off, vacation, bonuses, and sick leave. She asserts that her right to these benefits exists independently of the terms of the collective bargaining agreement with Executive. In response, Executive argues that the claims under the labor laws of Puerto Rico are preempted by the Railway Labor Act because they cannot be resolved without interpreting the collective bargaining agreement. The district court agreed with Executive, dismissing Adames's claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We affirm.

I. Background

Executive Airlines is a regional air carrier serving various locations in the Carribean. The plaintiffs work at least fifty percent of their time within the territorial jurisdiction of Puerto Rico and consider Puerto Rico their domicile. Adames claims that Executive owes her compensation for the following employment practices, pursuant to the following Commonwealth labor law provisions: requiring uncompensated work time (duty time and standby time) and denying appropriate overtime pay (29 L.P.R.A §§ 274, et seq.); failing to provide for appropriate maternity leave (29 L.P.R.A §§ 467); failing to provide compensated meal periods (29 L.P.R.A §§ 283); failing to provide one day of rest following six days of work and sufficient vacation time (29 L.P.R.A. §§ 295 and Mandatory Decree No. 38); failing to compensate for sick leave accrued in excess of 26 days (Mandatory Decree No. 38); and failing to pay Christmas bonuses (29 L.P.R.A §§ 501).

This case was initially filed in the courts of the Commonwealth. Executive then removed the action to federal court, asserting that the claims were preempted by the Railway Labor Act (RLA), 45 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq., because the dispute required interpretation of the terms of the collective bargaining agreement ("CBA" or "Agreement"). Though Adames asserted that the rights claimed under state law existed independently of the Agreement, the district court dismissed her claim on the basis of its prior decision in Burgos v. Executive Air Inc., 914 F. Supp. 792 (D.P.R. 1996).

In Burgos, the district court evaluated some claims by a former Executive flight attendant seeking compensation for overtime, accrued vacation time, and rest and meal periods. The court concluded that "vindication of the Commonwealth-based right that Burgos asserts requires interpretation of the CBA, with the consequence that the Court must find the claim preempted by the RLA." Id. at 796.

The plaintiffs did not appeal the Burgos decision. Instead, the Association of Flight Attendants of the AFL-CIO, also supporting the flight attendants here, filed a grievance with the American Eagle Airlines' Flight Attendant System Board of Adjustment ("Board"), as prescribed in the RLA. 45 U.S.C. §§ 184. In its petition to the Board, the flight attendants framed their grievance as follows: "Whether certain provisions of the collective bargaining agreement conflict with and are thus preempted by Puerto Rican law? In the event this is found to be true, does Puerto Rican law control in those situations?" Opinion of American Eagle Airlines Flight Attendants System Board of Adjustment, Executive Airlines, Inc. and Association of Flight Attendants, AFL-CIO, Grievance No. 29-99-02-02-87 (Herbert Fishgold, Neutral Chairman, June 22, 1999) [hereinafter System Board of Adjustment Opinion]. Apparently troubled by jurisdictional issues raised by this framing of the grievance, the neutral chairman of the Board worked with the parties in an attempt to clarify the issue before the Board. However, the parties remained at odds, prompting the chair to ask for written submissions on the jurisdictional issue. The Board ultimately concluded that it did not have jurisdiction to resolve the dispute before it, stating: "Whether or not particular labor laws of Puerto Rico are applicable to the Company's San Juan-based flight attendants is not [] an issue for this Board." Id. However, the Board reserved the possibility of later consideration "[s]hould the Association raise an arbitral issue concerning the interpretation of the parties' Agreement." Id.

Following this setback, the flight attendants returned to the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico court with a new lawsuit involving Adames and her fellow plaintiffs. This lawsuit revived the claims made in Burgos and added to the array. As noted, Executive removed the action to the district court and opposed successfully the motion of the plaintiffs to remand on preemption grounds under the RLA.² Simultaneous with that ruling, the court, citing to its decision in Burgos, dismissed the claims of the plaintiffs for lack of subject matter jurisdiction "on account of the RLA's prescribed grievance mechanism for settlement of all 'minor disputes.'" Burgos, 914 F. Supp. at 797. Plaintiffs then filed this appeal. Essentially, this is the appeal not taken in Burgos. Indeed, plaintiffs explicitly ask us to rule that Burgos was wrongly decided. We review the district court's determination de novo. See Puerto Rico Tel. Co. v. Telecomm. Regulatory Bd., 189 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1999).

II. Railway Labor Act Preemption

A. Legal Framework

Under the RLA, disputes involving the interpretation and enforcement of agreements covering "rates of pay, rules, or working conditions" are deemed "minor" disputes. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151a; see also Consol. Rail Corp. v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 491 U.S. 299, 303 (1989). These minor disputes are resolved by an industry-specific dispute resolution mechanism, in this case arbitration by the System Board of Adjustment. See Andrews v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 406 U.S. 320, 324 (1972); Consol. Rail, 491 U.S. at 303-04; Rosa Sanchez v. Eastern Airline, Inc., 574 F.2d 29, 32 (1st Cir. 1978). "Congress' purpose in passing the RLA was to promote stability in labor-management relations by providing a comprehensive framework for resolving labor disputes . . . . [A] determination that [a party's] complaints constitute a minor dispute would preempt [] state-law actions." Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 252-53 (1994).

Given that a state law claim requiring interpretation of the CBA is preempted, the key question becomes whether resolution of a dispute "hinges upon" such interpretation. Flibotte v. Penn. Truck Lines, Inc., 131 F.3d 21, 26 (1st Cir. 1997); see also Hawaiian Airlines, 512 U.S. at 253. If "the asserted state-law claim plausibly can be said to depend upon the meaning of one or more provisions within the collective bargaining agreement," federal law preempts the claim. Flibotte, 131 F.3d at 26.

However, state law claims may exist independently of the CBA; in fact "establishment of labor standards falls within the traditional police power of the state." Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 21 (1987). While "substantive protections provided by state law, independent of whatever labor agreement might govern, are not pre-empted under the RLA," Hawaiian Airlines, 512 U.S. at 257 (involving wrongful discharge), other state law rights can be "waived or altered by agreement of the parties." Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 213 (1985). State law claims requiring only consultation with the CBA, versus actual interpretation, should not be extinguished. See Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 124 (1994); Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 413 n.12 (1988) ("Although federal law would govern the interpretation of the agreement to determine the proper damages, the underlying state-law claim, not otherwise pre-empted, would stand."). For instance, "'purely factual questions' about an employee's conduct or an employer's conduct and motives do not 'requir[e] a court to interpret any term of a collective-bargaining agreement.'" Hawaiian Airlines, 512 U.S. at 261 (quoting Lingle, 486 U.S. at 407).³ In addition, a state law claim may rely, in part, on interpretation of the CBA, but also involve a separate and distinct state law analysis, thereby preserving the claim. See Lingle, 486 U.S. at 413.

In many cases, however, the state law claims are "inextricably intertwined" with the meaning of terms in the CBA and are thus preempted by federal labor law. Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 213. In such instances, state law "must yield to the developing federal common law, lest common terms in bargaining agreements be given different and potentially inconsistent interpretations in different jurisdictions." Livadas, 512 U.S. at 122.

Other circuits considering state law claims for overtime pay and vacation time almost always find that interpretation of the agreement is necessary for resolution of the claim if the agreement addresses those same subjects and the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the terms of the CBA is unclear. See Firestone v. Southern Cal. Gas Co., 219 F.3d...