Livadas v. Bradshaw, 921920

CourtUnited States Supreme Court
Writing for the CourtSOUTER
Citation129 L.Ed.2d 93,114 S.Ct. 2068,512 U.S. 107
PartiesKaren LIVADAS, Petitioner, v. Victoria BRADSHAW, California Labor Commissioner
Docket Number921920
Decision Date13 June 1994

512 U.S. 107
114 S.Ct. 2068
129 L.Ed.2d 93
Karen LIVADAS, Petitioner,

v.

Victoria BRADSHAW, California Labor Commissioner.

No. 92-1920.
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued April 26, 1994.
Decided June 13, 1994.
Syllabus *

California law requires employers to pay all wages due immediately upon an employee's discharge, Labor Code § 201; imposes a penalty for refusal to pay promptly, § 203; and places responsibility for enforcing these provisions on the Commissioner of Labor. After petitioner Livadas's employer refused to pay her the wages owed upon her discharge, but paid them a few days later, she filed a penalty claim. The Commissioner replied with a form letter construing Labor Code § 229 as barring him from enforcing such claims on behalf of individuals like Livadas, whose employment terms and conditions are governed by a collective-bargaining agreement containing an arbitration clause. Livadas brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the nonenforcement policy was pre-empted by federal law because it abridged her rights under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). The District Court granted her summary judgment, rejecting the Commissioner's defense that the claim was pre-empted by § 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947 (LMRA). Although acknowledging that the NLRA gives Livadas a right to bargain collectively and that § 1983 would supply a remedy for official deprivation of that right, the Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that no federal right had been infringed because Livadas's case reduced to an assertion that the Commissioner had misinterpreted state law, namely § 229.

Held:

1. The Commissioner's policy is pre-empted by federal law. Pp. ____.

(a) This case is fundamentally no different from Nash v. Florida Industrial Comm'n, 389 U.S. 235, 239, 88 S.Ct. 362, 366, 19 L.Ed.2d 438, in which the Court held that a state rule predicating benefits on refraining from conduct protected by federal labor law was pre-empted because it interfered with congressional purpose. The Commissioner's policy, which requires Livadas to choose between Labor Code and NLRA rights, cannot be reconciled with a federal statutory scheme premised on the centrality of collective bargaining and the desirability of arbitration. Pp. ____.

(b) The Commissioner's answers to the foregoing conclusion flow from two significant misunderstandings of law. First, the assertion that the nonenforcement policy must be valid because § 229 is consistent with federal law is premised on irrelevant relationships and leads to the wrong question: Pre-emption analysis turns on the policy's actual content and its real effect on federal rights, not on whether § 229 is valid under the Federal Constitution or whether the policy is, as a matter of state law, a proper interpretation of § 229. Second, the argument that a "rational basis" supports the distinction the policy draws between employees represented by unions and those who are not mistakes a validity standard under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses for what the Supremacy Clause requires: a determination whether the state rule conflicts with the federal law. Pp. ____.

(c) This Court's decisions according pre-emptive effect to LMRA § 301 foreclose even a colorable argument that a claim under Labor Code § 203 was pre-empted here, since they establish that the section does not broadly pre-empt nonnegotiable employee rights conferred by state law; that it is a claim's legal character, as independent of rights under the collective-bargaining agreement, that decides whether a state cause of action may go forward; and that when liability is governed by independent state law and the meaning of contract terms is not in dispute, the bare fact that a collective-bargaining agreement is consulted for damage computation is no reason to extinguish the state-law claim. See, e.g., Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 105 S.Ct. 1904, 85 L.Ed.2d 206, and Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 108 S.Ct. 1877, 100 L.Ed.2d 410. Here, the primary text for deciding whether Livadas was entitled to a penalty was not the collective-bargaining agreement, but a calendar. The only issue raised by her claim, whether her employer wilfully failed to pay her wages promptly upon severance, was a question of state law entirely independent of the agreement. Absent any indication that there was a dispute over the penalty amount, the simple need to refer to bargained-for wage rates in computing the penalty is irrelevant. Pp. ____.

(d) The Commissioner's attempt before this Court to recast the nonenforcement policy as expressing a "conscious decision" to keep the State's "hands off" the claims of employees protected by collective-bargaining agreements, either because the Commissioner's efforts and resources are more urgently needed by others or because official restraint will actually encourage the collective-bargaining and arbitral processes favored by federal law, is rejected. If the policy were in fact animated by the first of these late-blooming rationales, the Commissioner's emphasis on the need to avoid "interpret[ing]" or "apply[ing]" collective-bargaining agreements would be entirely misplaced. Nor is the second asserted rationale convincing, since enforcement under the policy does not turn on the bargain struck by the contracting parties or on whether the contractual wage rate is even arbitrable, but simply on the fact that the parties have consented to arbitration. The suggestion that the policy is meant to stimulate free-wheeling bargaining over wage payments to discharged workers contradicts Labor Code § 219, which expressly and categorically prohibits the modification of rules under the Code by "private agreement." Even at face value, however, the "hands off" label poses special dangers that advantages conferred by federal law will be canceled out and its objectives undermined, and those dangers are not laid to rest by professions of the need for governmental neutrality in labor disputes. Similarly, the vague assertions that the policy advances federal interests are not persuasive, since this Court has never suggested that the federal bias toward bargaining is to be served by forcing employees and employers to bargain for what they would otherwise be entitled to under state law. Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 107 S.Ct. 2211, 96 L.Ed.2d 1, and the federal and state "opt-out" laws cited by the Commissioner, distinguished. Pp. ____.

2. Livadas is entitled to seek relief under § 1983 for the Commissioner's abridgment of her NLRA right to complete the collective-bargaining process and agree to an arbitration clause. That right is at least imminent in the NLRA's structure, if it is not provided in so many words by the statutory text, and the obligation to respect it on the part of those acting under color of law is not vague or amorphous. Moreover, Congress has given no indication of any intent to foreclose actions like Livadas's, and there is no cause for special caution here. See Golden State Transit Corp. v. Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 108-112, 110 S.Ct. 444, 449-452, 107 L.Ed.2d 420. Pp. ____.

987 F.2d 552 (CA 9 1991), reversed.

SOUTER, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Richard G. McCracken, San Francisco, CA, for petitioner.

Malcolm L. Stewart, Washington, DC, for the U.S. as amicus curiae by special leave of the Court.

H. Thomas Cadell, Jr., San Diego, CA, for respondent.

Justice SOUTER delivered the opinion of the Court.

California law requires employers to pay all wages due immediately upon an employee's discharge, imposes a penalty for refusal to pay promptly, precludes any private contractual waiver of these minimum labor standards, and places responsibility for enforcing these provisions on the State Commissioner of Labor (Commissioner or Labor Commissioner), ostensibly for the benefit of all employees. Respondent, the Labor Commissioner,1 has construed a further provision of state law as barring enforcement of these wage and penalty claims on behalf of individuals like petitioner, whose terms and conditions of employment are governed by a collective-bargaining agreement containing an arbitration clause. We hold that federal law pre-empts this policy, as abridging the exercise of such employees' rights under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or Act), 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq., and that redress for this unlawful refusal to enforce may be had under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

I

Until her discharge on January 2, 1990, petitioner Karen Livadas worked as a grocery clerk in a Vallejo, California, Safeway supermarket. The terms and conditions of her employment were subject to a collective-bargaining agreement between Safeway and Livadas's union, Local 373 of the United Food and Commercial Workers, AFL-CIO. Unexceptionally, the agreement provided that "[d]isputes as to the interpretation or application of the agreement," including grievances arising from allegedly unjust discharge or suspension, would be subject to binding arbitration. See Food Store Contract, United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 373, AFL-CIO, Solano and Napa Counties §§ 18.2, 18.3 (Mar. 1, 1989-Feb. 29, 1992) (Food Store Contract).2 When notified of her discharge, Livadas demanded immediate payment of wages owed her, as guaranteed to all California workers by state law, see Cal.Lab.Code Ann. § 201 (West 1989),3 but her store manager refused, referring to the company practice of making such payments by check mailed from a central corporate payroll office. On January 5, 1990, Livadas received a check from Safeway, in the full amount owed for her work through January 2.

On January 9, 1990, Livadas filed a claim against Safeway with the California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement (DLSE or Division), asserting that under § 203 of the Labor Code the company was liable to her for a sum equal to three days'...

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  • Cnh Am. Llc v. Int'l Union, No. 09–2001.
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (6th Circuit)
    • May 16, 2011
    ...collective-bargaining agreement for damages computation is no reason to hold the state-law claim defeated by 301.” Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 125, 114 S.Ct. 2068, 129 L.Ed.2d 93 (1994). We break no new ground in holding that a tort claim that turns entirely on extra-contractual or p......
  • Int'l Ass'n of Machinists Dist. Ten & Local Lodge 873 v. Allen, No. 17-1178
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit)
    • September 13, 2018
    ...only ‘implicit[ly] in the structure of the Act[.]’ " Brown , 554 U.S. at 68, 128 S.Ct. 2408 (quoting Livadas , 512 U.S. at 117 n.11, 114 S.Ct. 2068 ). This means that States cannot legislate on top of the protections of Section 7 of the NLRA or the prohibitions of Section 8, on the theory t......
  • Kole v. Vill. of Norridge, No. 11 C 3871
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 7th Circuit. United States District Court (Northern District of Illinois)
    • April 19, 2013
    ...a cause of action only for deprivations of rights "'secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States." Lividas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 132 (1994) (emphasis added). See also Padula v. Leimbach, 656 F.3d 595, 600 (7th Cir. 2011). To the extent Plaintiffs seek a declaration that t......
  • Local 447 of Painters v. Five Seasons Paint, No. 4:04 CV 00683 JEG.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 8th Circuit. United States State District Court of Southern District of Iowa
    • April 3, 2006
    ...Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 450-57, 77 S.Ct. 912, 1 L.Ed.2d 972 (1957); accord Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512. U.S. 107, 121-22, 114 S.Ct. 2068, 129 L.Ed.2d 93 (1994) (collecting cases); Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 209-10, 105 S.Ct. 1904; Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 459 U.S. ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1264 cases
  • Cnh Am. Llc v. Int'l Union, No. 09–2001.
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (6th Circuit)
    • May 16, 2011
    ...collective-bargaining agreement for damages computation is no reason to hold the state-law claim defeated by 301.” Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 125, 114 S.Ct. 2068, 129 L.Ed.2d 93 (1994). We break no new ground in holding that a tort claim that turns entirely on extra-contractual or p......
  • Int'l Ass'n of Machinists Dist. Ten & Local Lodge 873 v. Allen, No. 17-1178
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit)
    • September 13, 2018
    ...only ‘implicit[ly] in the structure of the Act[.]’ " Brown , 554 U.S. at 68, 128 S.Ct. 2408 (quoting Livadas , 512 U.S. at 117 n.11, 114 S.Ct. 2068 ). This means that States cannot legislate on top of the protections of Section 7 of the NLRA or the prohibitions of Section 8, on the theory t......
  • Kole v. Vill. of Norridge, No. 11 C 3871
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 7th Circuit. United States District Court (Northern District of Illinois)
    • April 19, 2013
    ...a cause of action only for deprivations of rights "'secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States." Lividas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 132 (1994) (emphasis added). See also Padula v. Leimbach, 656 F.3d 595, 600 (7th Cir. 2011). To the extent Plaintiffs seek a declaration that t......
  • Local 447 of Painters v. Five Seasons Paint, No. 4:04 CV 00683 JEG.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 8th Circuit. United States State District Court of Southern District of Iowa
    • April 3, 2006
    ...Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 450-57, 77 S.Ct. 912, 1 L.Ed.2d 972 (1957); accord Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512. U.S. 107, 121-22, 114 S.Ct. 2068, 129 L.Ed.2d 93 (1994) (collecting cases); Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 209-10, 105 S.Ct. 1904; Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 459 U.S. ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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