Adamian v. University of Nevada
Citation | 359 F. Supp. 825 |
Decision Date | 16 April 1973 |
Docket Number | Civ. No. R-2530. |
Parties | Paul S. ADAMIAN, Plaintiff, v. The UNIVERSITY OF NEVADA et al., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Nevada |
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
Charles E. Springer, Ltd., Reno, Nev., for plaintiff.
Thomas G. Bell, Deputy Atty. Gen., Las Vegas, Nev., for defendants.
The plaintiff, a tenured professor of English of the University of Nevada, was discharged by action of the University's Board of Regents for attempting to stop a motorcade and for attempting to disrupt ceremonies of the Governor's review of ROTC activities, which ceremonies were conducted on the Reno campus of the University.
Plaintiff, alleging that jurisdiction exists under the Civil Rights Act, Title 28, U.S.C., § 1343, and Title 42, U.S.C., § 1983, brought this action against the University of Nevada, the Board of Regents of the University of Nevada, Dr. Louis E. Lombardi, Fred M. Anderson, Procter E. Hug, William W. Morris, Helen R. Thompson, James H. Bilbray, Archie C. Grant, Paul McDermott, Harold J. Jacobsen, Mel Steninger, Molly Knudtsen, and John Does I through VIII.
On December 23, 1971, Judge Philip C. Wilkins dismissed the action as to the University of Nevada and the defendant Board of Regents because these state agencies are not a "person" within the meaning of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U. S.C. § 1983. Whitner v. Davis, 410 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1969). Judge Wilkins also dismissed the John Doe defendants. The Regents are being sued, both individually and in their representative capacities. Plaintiff seeks from this Court an order directing that plaintiff be reinstated with back pay and an award of damages for the violation of his civil rights. The Court is being asked to:
1. Order the members of the Board of Regents now in office, in their representative capacities, to reinstate the plaintiff and compensate him for loss of earnings.
2. Award the plaintiff damages for the violation of his civil rights against those Regents, in their individual capacities, then in office, responsible for his discharge.
Although the Board of Regents as a state agency is not a "person" within the Civil Rights Act, the Regents themselves are "persons" and can be sued both as individuals and in their representative capacities. The rule is explained in Harkless v. Sweeny Independent School District, 427 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. den. 400 U.S. 991, 91 S.Ct. 451, 27 L.Ed.2d 439, where the Court said:
The Ninth Circuit lays down the same rule. In Whitner v. Davis, 410 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1969), at page 30 the Court said:
The rule is also followed in Williams v. Eaton, 443 F.2d 422 (10th Cir. 1971), and Hayes v. Cape Henlopen School District, 341 F.Supp. 823 (D.C. Del.1972). It is not necessary for the plaintiff to amend the complaint to include the present members of the Board of Regents who are being sued in their representative capacities. The present Regents are already properly before this Court because the plaintiff has sued all of the Regents in their representative capacities. This is accomplished by F. R.Civ.P. 25(d)(1) which states in pertinent part:
The applicability of Rule 25(d)(1) to the instant case is explained in the Advisory Committee's Note of 1961 to Subdivision (d) found in 3B Moore's Federal Practice, Section 25.01(13):
Therefore, the Regents being sued in their representative capacities are those Regents who presently are members of the Board of Regents. Those Regents who are being sued in their individual capacities are those Regents who were members of the Board of Regents at the time of plaintiff's dismissal.
The plaintiff has moved for partial summary judgment on the claim against the Regents in their representative capacities seeking reinstatement and back pay. The plaintiff argues that the University regulation upon which the Regents relied to terminate the plaintiff is unconstitutionally vague in violation of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiff further claims that because the regulation is unconstitutionally overbroad, as well as vague, it infringes upon his rights of free speech and assembly protected by the First Amendment, which by the Fourteenth Amendment is made applicable to the states.
The section of the University Code upon which the defendants based their determination to terminate the employment of the plaintiff was Chapter IV, Section 2.3, which reads as follows:
The defendants admit that the University Code is given the effect of law in the State of Nevada. In State v. Board of Regents, 70 Nev. 144, 261 P.2d 515 (1953), the Nevada Supreme Court held:
"In our opinion this rule (university tenure regulations), having been duly established, has the force and effect of statute."
Therefore, in deciding the constitutionality of Section 2.3, the Court will not be concerned with the question whether disciplinary rules must meet the same vagueness and overbreadth criteria as statutes and ordinances. The instant case is distinguishable from cases like Sword v. Fox, 446 F.2d 1091 (4th Cir. 1971), which holds that the same specificity of language is not required for college disciplinary rules as is required for statutes. In the instant case, the section of the University Code under scrutiny has the effect of a statute.
For this challenge to the substantive constitutionality of the University Code section, whether or not the plaintiff received procedural due process and whether or not the plaintiff's conduct could conceivably be said to be proscribed by Section 2.3, is irrelevant. Although this Court does not reach the question, if it be assumed that the plaintiff's conduct was not constitutionally protected and such conduct could be prohibited by a properly drawn regulation, the plaintiff can nonetheless challenge the substantive constitutionality of the section under which he was terminated. As the Court stated in Soglin v. Kauffman, 418 F.2d 163 (7th Cir. 1969):
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