Adams County School Dist. No. 50 v. Dickey, 89SC103
| Decision Date | 14 May 1990 |
| Docket Number | No. 89SC103,89SC103 |
| Citation | 791 P.2d 688 |
| Parties | 60 Ed. Law Rep. 964 ADAMS COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 50, Ali Joseph and Michael Bassett, Petitioners, v. Robert E. DICKEY, Respondent. |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
Semple & Jackson, P.C., Martin Semple, Dwight L. Pringle and Patrick B. Mooney, Denver, for petitioners.
Mark S. Bove, Denver, for respondent.
We granted certiorari to review the court of appeals decision in Dickey v. Adams County School District No. 50, 773 P.2d 585 (Colo.App.1988). The court of appeals held that plaintiff Robert Dickey's (Dickey's) complaint stated causes of action for breach of contract, and deprivation of property without due process of law in violation of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). Id. at 586. We affirm and remand for further proceedings.
Dickey's complaint alleges that he was hired as a warehouse foreman by Adams County School District No. 50 (the School District) on July 25, 1981. Dickey was categorized by the School District's personnel policy as a "classified" employee.
During his employment with the School District, Dickey received a Classified Employees' Handbook (the handbook). The most recent edition of the handbook is dated July 1984. The handbook is addressed "to all classified employees," and states that the School District will follow a policy of progressive discipline. The handbook states that a supervisor may only discharge a classified employee if the employee's work is of such quality to require discharge, and that in discharging employees supervisors must follow a policy of progressive discipline. The handbook also states that the School District may only resort to immediate dismissal of an employee for certain enumerated acts of misconduct, or for other just and good causes.
Dickey received an unfavorable performance appraisal on or about December 20, 1984, which stated that he would be placed on probation for a period of 30 calendar days. The School District issued a series of progress reports from December 20, 1984, to January 21, 1985, and on January 21, issued a memorandum indicating satisfactory performance by Dickey and improvement in all areas. The School District held further meetings on the subject of Dickey's performance and issued a memorandum dated March 8, 1985, indicating that Dickey was making satisfactory progress.
Dickey took authorized medical leave from March 1, 1985, to April 8, 1985. On April 16, 1985, the School District gave Dickey an unfavorable performance appraisal which recommended his immediate termination. The School District served Dickey with a notice terminating his employment. The notice was executed by petitioner Michael Bassett (Bassett), Executive Director of Personnel for the School District. Dickey requested reinstatement and a hearing before petitioner Ali Joseph (Joseph), Superintendent of the School District. A hearing was held on May 23, 1985. On May 28, 1985, Joseph issued a memorandum denying reinstatement to Dickey.
Dickey filed a complaint against the School District, Joseph, and Bassett, which includes claims for breach of implied contract and deprivation of property without due process of law. Dickey alleges in his complaint that the School District did not follow principles of progressive discipline in discharging him, and that the School District discharged him when his work was not of such quality to require discharge. Dickey also alleges that his discharge was not justified by any just and good cause, or by any of the causes enumerated in the handbook. Dickey also alleges that the School District's actions constituted a deprivation of property without due process of law. Fairly read, Dickey's complaint alleges that his property interest in continued employment with the School District entitled him to constitutionally sufficient pre-termination procedures.
The district court dismissed Dickey's complaint for failure to state a claim for relief. The court of appeals reversed the district court and held that Dickey's complaint stated claims for relief for breach of implied contract and deprivation of property without due process of law.
The first issue we address is whether the employment termination procedures outlined in the School District's handbook are void on the ground they contravene an explicit grant of authority by the state. We conclude that they do not.
Id. (quoting County Comm'rs v. Love, 172 Colo. 121, 125, 470 P.2d 861, 862 (1980)).
In Johnson a Jefferson County public health officer claimed that his dismissal by the Jefferson County Board of Health violated Jefferson County personnel rules. The board of health argued that its actions were authorized by subsection 25-1-505(1), 11 C.R.S. (1978), which provided that a county public health officer "shall be appointed by the board to serve at the pleasure of the board." Id. We held that the board's statutory power to terminate the public health officer was not limited by the county personnel rules because the rules did "not override the explicit statutory authority of the board to discharge a public health officer appointed by the board." Id. (footnote omitted).
Johnson 's definition of the limits of local government power guides our determination of whether the School District could limit its power to discharge personnel through the adoption of a handbook establishing employment termination procedures. Whether Dickey may enforce the employment termination procedures contained in the handbook depends on whether the School District, acting through the Adams County Board of Education (the School Board), possessed the requisite statutory authority. We therefore examine the relevant statutes to determine whether the School Board could, through the promulgation of an employee handbook, adopt policies, rules and regulations which affect certain employment termination procedures.
"Legislative intent is the polestar of statutory construction." Schubert v. People, 698 P.2d 788, 793 (Colo.1985). Statutes must be construed as a whole to give a consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all of their parts. See, e.g., Martinez v. Continental Enters., 730 P.2d 308, 313 (Colo.1986); Board of County Comm'rs v. Denver, 194 Colo. 252, 257, 571 P.2d 1094, 1097 (1977). In determining the meaning of a particular word or phrase, the meaning of the entire statute, or the relevant portion thereof, should be considered. See § 2-4-201, 1B C.R.S. (1980).
Article IX, section 2, of the Colorado Constitution directs the General Assembly to provide for the establishment and maintenance of a thorough and uniform system of free public schools throughout the state for children between the ages of 6 and 21. Article IX, section 15, of the Colorado Constitution directs the General Assembly to provide for the organization of school districts of convenient size, and to establish a board of education in each school district.
Acting at the direction of these constitutional mandates, the legislature has invested school boards in Colorado with a variety of enumerated "duties" and "powers." See §§ 22-32-109 & 22-32-109.5, 9 C.R.S. (1988) (); § 22-32-110, 9 C.R.S. (1988) (). We stated in Fremont RE-1 School District v. Jacobs, 737 P.2d 816, 818 (Colo.1987), that "[a]s we read the statutes, section 22-32-109 sets forth mandatory 'duties' of school boards and section 22-32-110 sets forth discretionary 'powers.' " (Emphasis supplied).
This case concerns two of the discretionary powers vested in school boards by subsections 22-32-110(1)(h) and (k). Section 22-32-110 provides that:
(1) In addition to any other power granted to a board of education of a school district by law, each board of education of a school district shall have the following specific powers, to be exercised in its judgment:
....
(h) To discharge or otherwise terminate the employment of any personnel.
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(k) To adopt written policies, rules and regulations, not inconsistent with law, which may relate to the efficiency, in-service training, professional growth, safety, official conduct, and welfare of the employees, or any classification thereof, of the district. The practices of employment, promotion, and dismissal shall be unaffected by the employee's religious beliefs, marital status, racial or ethnic background, or participation in community affairs.
Subsection 22-32-110(1)(h) grants to school...
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