Adams Express Co. v. Beckwith
| Decision Date | 09 December 1919 |
| Docket Number | 16200 |
| Citation | 126 N.E. 300,100 Ohio St. 348 |
| Parties | The Adams Express Co. v. Beckwith Et Al. |
| Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
Negligence -Joint tort-feasors - Written release construed - Presumptions and specific covenants - All wrongdoers not discharged, when.
1. A written release in general and unqualified terms, made and executed upon legal consideration between a party wronged and one or more of the persons charged with the commission of the wrong, is presumed in law to be a release for the benefit of all the wrongdoers.
2. Such written releases, however, are to be construed according to the well-known rules governing the construction of contracts.
3. Where such written releases expressly provide that the release is solely and exclusively for the benefit of the parties thereto, and expressly reserves a right of action as against any other wrongdoer, such reservation is legal and available to the parties thereto.
4. Such written release, whether it be a covenant not to sue, a covenant to cease suing, or a covenant in partial satisfaction: does not inure to the benefit of any other persons than those who are parties to such written release save and except that it is a satisfaction pro tanto to the party wronged and to that extent works a discharge to all joint wrongdoers. (Ellis v. Bitzer, 2 Ohio 89, disapproved and overruled.)
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In September, 1917, the case of Ida Beckwith v. The Adams Express Company et al. was tried in the court of common pleas of Lucas county upon the amended petition, the answer, and the reply. At the conclusion of plaintiff's evidence, as appears from plaintiff in error's brief, the defendant express company moved the court to arrest the evidence from the jury and direct a verdict for the defendant on the ground that "no negligence has been shown against The Adams Express Company and that no act of The Adams Express Company can be said to have been the proximate or contributing cause of this injury." This motion was sustained.
Error was prosecuted to the court of appeals by Ida Beckwith, which court reversed the judgment of the court of common pleas and remanded the case for further proceedings according to law. The judgment of the court of appeals is now here for review.
Messrs Marshall & Fraser, for plaintiff in error.
Mr. Wm H. McLellan, Jr.; Messrs. Doyle & Lewis and Messrs. Brown Geddes, Schmettau & Williams, for defendants in error.
The full opinions of the court of common pleas and the court of appeals are not before this court. Briefs and arguments of counsel, however, disclose substantially three controversies between the parties in this court:
1. As appears from plaintiff in error's brief: "No negligence has been shown against The Adams Express Company."
Whether or not negligence has been shown under the evidence is a question not for the judge, but for the jury. The record discloses.that there was some evidence tending to show negligence, and the question whether or not it was sufficient should have been submitted to the jury.
2. "That no act of The Adams Express Company can be said to have been the proximate or contributing cause of this injury." Whether or not The Adams Express Company was guilty of negligence, as pleaded, was not the only question for the jury to determine upon this record, but also whether or not such negligence was a proximate cause, not necessarily the proximate cause, of her injury. These were both questions of fact for submission to the jury.
3. The main contention between the parties hereto is one of law arising upon two paper writings, known as Exhibits A and B, Exhibit A being between Ida Beckwith and The Hocking Valley Railway Company, and Exhibit B between Ida Beckwith and The New York Central Railroad Company. These agreements are substantially the same in style and the chief substance of both is contained in the following paragraphs:
The Adams Express Company now claims that these exhibits releasing the railroad companies of all claims for the injuries in question to said Ida Beckwith inure to the benefit of the express company, upon the theory and doctrine that the three defendant companies were joint feasors at most; that the exhibits show a release as to the railroad companies, and that, therefore, under the doctrine announced and long in effect in Ellis v. Bitzer, 2 Ohio 89, The Adams Express Company was likewise released and discharged from all liability to said Ida Beckwith.
It must be conceded that the Ellis v. Bitzer case has been the law of Ohio since 1825. It must also be conceded that that case has been approved or cited with favor by many courts of last resort, including Michigan, North Carolina, Tennessee, Washington, Colorado, Iowa and numerous other courts.
What is the doctrine announced in that case? The syllabus speaks for itself:
Where, in an action of trespass against five plaintiff accepts a note from two, for a sum of money to be paid at a future day, in satisfaction as to them, but not to operate as a satisfaction for the other defendants, the cause of action is discharged as to all."
The particular trespass in that case was One of assault and battery. The suit was against five defendants. It appeared that two of them, Wil- liams and Adkins, had executed a promissory note for a definite sum of money and delivered the same to the injured party "in satisfaction as to them, but not to operate as a satisfaction for the other defendants." Upon the trial it was held that the satisfaction as to Williams and Adkins, by which they were discharged from further liability, inured to the benefit of all the other defendants, and the supreme court of Ohio held that the action was discharged as to each and all of such other defendants.
It must be admitted that if this be the true legal doctrine, defining the rights and relations of alleged joint tort-feasors, it is very persuasive in the case at bar.
A decided case is worth as much as it weighs in reason and righteousness, and no more. It is not enough to say "thus saith the court." It must prove its right to control in any given situation by the degree in which it supports the rights of a party violated and serves the cause of justice as to all parties concerned.
In this case, and others following it, the court seems to have got the cart before the horse. It has unduly emphasized the importance of a release either a release from liability to be sued, a release from a further prosecution of an action already begun, or a release from further satisfaction as to damages for an injury. A release presupposes an obligation, and an obligation as between private parties is either contractual or tortious. In such an obligation the first question naturally is, what is the remedy in order to obtain satisfaction for such obligation? Such remedy however, presupposes that somebody's right has been violated. A right given and guaranteed by the constitution is certainly comprehended within such rights.
The Bill of Rights of Ohio, Section 16, declares and defines the rights as to one's person in providing that there shall be remedy by due course of law for any injury done such person. That injury being pleaded, and proven at least to an extent sufficient to submit the question to the jury, the paramount consideration of court and jury in such a situation is to see to it that that right, when proven violated, is at all stages of the case safeguarded, in order that there be an adequate remedy given the injured party for such violation. All other considerations touching release, satisfaction, discharge of some of the parties, are subsidiary and must in no wise be applied so as to defeat the main object of such a suit at law, to-wit, remedy for the injury.
Again we speak of remedial provisions of constitution and remedial provisions of statutes being liberally construed so as to effect their substantial and...
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