Adams Express Company v. Commonwealth of Kentucky
Decision Date | 14 June 1915 |
Docket Number | No. 271,271 |
Citation | 59 L.Ed. 1267,35 S.Ct. 824,238 U.S. 190 |
Parties | ADAMS EXPRESS COMPANY, Plff in Err., v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY |
Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
Messrs. Joseph S. Graydon and Lawrence Maxwell for plaintiff in error.
[Argument of Counsel from pages 191-192 intentionally omitted] Mr. James Garnett, Attorney General of Kentucky, and Mr. Robert T. Caldwell for defendant in error.
Messrs. J. B. Snyder and W. B. Wheeler as amici curioe.
The Adams Express Company was indicted for violation of § 2569a of the statutes of the state of Kentucky, which, omitting the portions not essential to the consideration of this case, provides:
The charge of the indictment was that the Adams Express Company, doing the business of a common carrier in Kentucky, did knowingly bring into and deliver in Whitley county of that state certain intoxicating liquors to one John Horshaw, contrary to law. This case, with eighteen others, was heard in the circuit court of Whitley county, upon an agreed statement of facts, which stipulated that the Adams Express Company was engaged in the business of a common carrier and did such business in Whitley county, Kentucky, and between that county and the cities of Jellico and High Cliff, in the state of Tennessee. That on the dates named in the indictment the Adams Express Company knowingly brought into, transferred, delivered, and distributed certain spirituous liquors, to wit: whisky, in local option territory and where the local option law was in force, as charged in the indictment. That before bringing such liquors into such territory the consignees of said liquors, being the persons named in the indictment, sent orders by mail for such liquors to dealers at Jellico and High Cliff, in the state of Tennessee, and paid the purchase price of said liquors to said dealers at the places named in Tennessee. That upon receipt of the orders, the dealers, at their respective places of business at Jellico and High Cliff, Tennessee, for the purpose of filling such orders delivered to the Adams Express Company the several packages of liquor, directing the Express Company to carry and deliver the same to such persons; that the Adams Express Company did thereupon carry said packages of liquor from Jellico and High Cliff, in Tennessee, into Whitley county, Kentucky, and there delivered the same to the consignees thereof, who were the persons who had made the orders and to whom the indictment charged the defendant with delivering and distributing the liquors mentioned. That the liquors were intended by said consignees for their personal use and were so used by them, and were not intended by them to be sold contrary to law, and were not so sold by them. That the transactions and all of them described occurred since the enactment and going into effect of the act of Congress known as the Webb-Kenyon law [37 Stat. at L. 699, chap. 90, Comp. Stat. 1913, § 8739].
The Express Company requested a peremptory instruction for a verdict of not guilty because the shipments of liquor were interstate shipments and constituted interstate commerce within the meaning of the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution. That the liquors being for the personal use of the consignees respectively § 2659a is repugnant to the Constitution of Kentucky, and if the indictment was authorized by the act of Congress known as the Webb-Kenyon law, that law is in contravention of the interstate commerce clause of the Constitution of the United States and of the 5th and 14th Amendments to the Constitution. This request for a peremptory instruction for the defendant was refused. The court instructed the jury that if it believed from the evidence that the Adams Express Company, as a common carrier, brought any spirituous, vinous, or malt liquors into Whitley county, being local option territory in the state of Kentucky, and there delivered the same to the persons named in the indictment, then the defendant was guilty and its punishment should be fixed at not less than $50 nor more than $100; and that upon the whole case, if they had any reasonable doubt of the guilt of the company, they should find a verdict of not guilty. The defendant duly excepted to the giving of these instructions and to the refusal to grant its prayer for a peremptory instruction. The company was convicted, and fined in the sum of $50. That amount not being sufficient to give the court of appeals of the state jurisdiction, a writ of error was taken from this court to the circuit court of Whitley county.
The Kentucky statute now under consideration was before this court in the case of Louisville & N. R. Co. v. F. W. Cook Brewing Co. 223 U. S. 70, 56 L. ed. 355, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 189. In that case it was held that, as applied to interstate shipments, the statute was void as an attempt by the state to regulate commerce among the states. Such must still be the fate of the statute unless it is the effect of the act of Congress of March 1 1913, 37 Stat. at L. 699, chap. 90, Comp. Stat. 1913, § 8739, known as the Webb-Kenyon act, to require a different result. That act provides:
An Act Divesting Intoxicating Liquors of Their Interstate Character in Certain Cases.
Be it enacted, etc., that the shipment or transportation, in any manner or by any means whatsoever, of any spirituous, vinous, malted, fermented, or other intoxicating liquor of any kind, from one state, territory, or district of the United States, or place noncontiguous to but subject to the jurisdiction thereof, into any other state, territory, or district of the United States, or place noncontiguous to but subject to the jurisdiction thereof, or from any foreign country into any state, territory, or district of the United States, or place noncontiguous to but subject to the jurisdiction thereof, which said spirituous, vinous, malted, fermented, or other intoxicating liquor is intended by any person interested therein, to be received, possessed, sold, or in any manner used, either in the original package or otherwise, in violation of any law of such state, territory, or district of the United States, or place noncontiguous to but subject to the jurisdiction thereof, is hereby prohibited.
Before entering upon a consideration of the meaning of this act, it is well to have in mind certain principles of constitutional law, and, as well, certain legislation of Congress upon this subject in force at the time when the Webb-Kenyon act was passed. The Constitution of the United States grants to Congress authority to regulate commerce among the states, to the exclusion of state control over the subject. This power is comprehensive, and subject to no limitations, except such as are found in the Constitution itself. This general principle runs through all the cases decided in this court considering the matter, and has never been questioned since Chief Justice Marshall, for the court, delivered the judgment in Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 6 L. ed. 23. Applying this general principle it was held by this court in Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100, 34 L. ed. 128, 3 Inters. Com. Rep. 36, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 681, that the state of Iowa, in the absence of congressional permission, had no authority to prohibit the sale of liquor in original packages in the hands of importers from other states in that state, and the court there declared that, whatever the individual views of its members might be concerning the deleterious qualities of certain articles of commerce, when such articles were recognized by Co...
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