Adams v. Aircraft Spruce & Specialty Co.
| Decision Date | 27 September 2022 |
| Docket Number | AC 44524 |
| Citation | 215 Conn.App. 428,283 A.3d 42 |
| Parties | John S. ADAMS, Coadministrator (Estate of Ryan Michael Adams), et al. v. AIRCRAFT SPRUCE AND SPECIALTY COMPANY et al. |
| Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
David S. Golub, Stamford, for the appellants (plaintiffs).
Laura Pascale Zaino, Hartford, with whom, on the brief, were Richard C. Tynan, Hartford, and Logan A. Carducci, for the appellee (defendant James W. Depuy).
This appeal arises out of a tragic accident involving two first year students at Colgate University (Colgate) who died when the airplane in which they were flying, piloted by one of them, crashed in Morrisville, New York. The principal issue in this appeal is whether the father of the pilot can be held individually liable in an action brought by the estate of the deceased passenger on a claim of negligent entrustment because the father facilitated the airplane's rental from an entity operating out of a small airport near Colgate. More particularly, we are called on to consider whether there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether the father's actions could constitute sufficient control over the airplane, a potentially dangerous instrumentality, so that he could be deemed a supplier or entrustor of that instrumentality under our law regarding the tort of negligent entrustment.
The plaintiffs, John S. Adams and Mary Lou Hanney, brought the underlying action as coadministrators of the estate of their son, Ryan Michael Adams, who was eighteen years old when he died on September 20, 2015, in the airplane crash that also claimed the life of the eighteen year old, newly licensed pilot of the airplane, Cathryn Depuy. The plaintiffs now appeal from the summary judgment rendered against them on the two counts of their complaint brought against the defendant James W. Depuy, the father of the deceased pilot,1 which sounded in negligence and negligent entrustment.
The plaintiffs claim on appeal that the trial court improperly rendered summary judgment with respect to the negligent entrustment count.2 In particular, they claim that genuine issues of material fact remain in dispute regarding the defendant's rental of the Cessna 150H airplane that his daughter was piloting when it crashed, which, the plaintiffs contend, if proven, would demonstrate that he had the requisite control over the airplane to establish that he negligently entrusted the airplane to his daughter.3 We conclude that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the defendant is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law on the negligent entrustment count because the undisputed facts demonstrate that, assuming he rented the airplane for his daughter's use, he nevertheless lacked the necessary control over the airplane to meet an essential element of a cause of action sounding in negligent entrustment. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court.
The record before the court, which we view in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs as the nonmoving parties, reveals the following relevant facts and procedural history. On August 2, 2013, the defendant's daughter began taking ground instruction at the Danbury Airport in Connecticut. On August 17, 2015, shortly before leaving for college and approximately one month prior to the crash at issue, she obtained her private pilot's license from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Up to this point, all of her training and experience flying had been in a Piper Warrior airplane. She had no training or experience flying a Cessna 150H prior to leaving for college.
On August 23, 2015, the defendant's wife, Cathleen Wright, drove their daughter to Colgate, located in Hamilton, New York, intending to leave the vehicle with their daughter for her use while at college. The defendant, who also is a licensed pilot and owns his own plane, flew his plane to the Hamilton Municipal Airport to join his wife and help move their daughter into her dormitory room.
After he arrived at the airport in Hamilton, the defendant needed to wait for his wife to pick him up to bring him to the Colgate campus. During that time, the defendant had an opportunity to meet and speak with Richard O. Bargabos, who owned and operated Bargabos Earthworks, Inc., which was doing business as Eagle View Flight (Eagle View) and was based at the Hamilton Municipal Airport. Eagle View offered both flight instruction and airplane rentals. The two discussed the fact that the defendant's daughter was a licensed pilot. They agreed that she would contact Bargabos about scheduling further training at the Eagle View flight school, which would include the rental of Eagle View's Cessna 150H airplane, and that Eagle View would be provided with a $1000 retainer to cover the cost of Eagle View's services, including any rental fees.4
This was the only conversation that the defendant had with Bargabos until after the plane crash on September 20, 2015. After the defendant helped his daughter move into her dormitory room, she drove him and Wright back to the Hamilton Municipal Airport, and the defendant flew himself and his wife back to the airport in Danbury.
The defendant's daughter attended Eagle View's flight school on August 29 and 30, 2015, at which time Bargabos provided her with both ground instruction and dual flight instruction in a Cessna 150H airplane owned by Eagle View. On August 30, 2015, Bargabos permitted her to fly the Cessna 150H airplane by herself without an instructor.
On August 31, 2015, the defendant spoke with his daughter on the phone and learned that she had begun receiving flight instruction from Bargabos and Eagle View. He asked her how she had paid for those services, and she indicated that she had not yet paid any money to Eagle View. Thereafter, the defendant sent a $1000 check to Eagle View payable to "Eagle View Flight." He included a handwritten note with the check, indicating that the money was for "flight training [and] plane rental for Cathryn Depuy." Neither the check nor the note made reference to any specific dates, to a specific aircraft, or to how the $1000 payment was to be allocated between past and future instruction and rentals. The defendant never signed any rental agreement or other paperwork with Eagle View or Bargabos.5
The defendant was not aware until after the crash occurred that Bargabos had cleared his daughter to fly without a flight instructor out of the Hamilton Municipal Airport. The defendant was also not aware that his daughter had intended to fly anywhere on September 20, 2015, that she had rented an airplane on that date, or that she flew with the plaintiffs’ decedent as a passenger.
Bargabos and Eagle View had rented the same Cessna 150H airplane to two other pilots in the week prior to renting it to the defendant's daughter on September 20, 2015. Bargabos and Eagle View permitted her to rent the plane on the day of the crash without any communication with the defendant and allowed her to fly it without a flight instructor. Ryan Adams joined her as a passenger. Shortly before 12:51 p.m., on September 20, 2015, the Cessna 150H airplane apparently lost power to the engine.6 The airplane soon thereafter crashed to the ground, and both teenagers were killed.
In September, 2017, the plaintiffs commenced the underlying lawsuit. The operative revised complaint was filed on March 23, 2018, and contained six counts. Counts one and two alleged product liability against Aircraft Spruce & Specialty Company (Aircraft Spruce) and Kelly Aerospace Power Systems, Inc., and its successor in liability, Kelly Aerospace Energy Systems, LLC, related to the airplane's allegedly faulty carburetor.7 Count three sounded in negligence and was brought against the defendant and Wright in their representative capacities as the coadministrators of their daughter's estate. Count four alleged negligent entrustment of the airplane by Bargabos and Eagle View. Counts five and six were brought against the defendant in his individual capacity and, as previously stated, sounded in negligence and negligent entrustment.
The defendant filed an answer and special defenses to the revised complaint.
On January 30, 2020, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment as to both counts against him individually and a memorandum of law in support of the motion. Attached to the memorandum of law were exhibits consisting of excerpts from the depositions of Hanney and Bargabos; sworn affidavits by the defendant and Bargabos; a copy of the handwritten note that accompanied the defendant's payment to Eagle View; and a copy of the final accident report issued by the National Transportation Safety Board regarding the September 20, 2015 crash.
With respect to the negligence count, the defendant argued that he was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law because he had no legal right or duty to control his adult daughter on the date of the accident or any duty to protect the plaintiffs’ decedent. He also argued that an action for negligence could not be maintained unless some legally cognizable duty of care exists. With respect to the negligent entrustment count, the defendant argued that he could not be liable as a matter of law on a theory of negligent entrustment because he had no physical or legal control over the Cessna 150H involved in the crash, which was owned by Eagle View and which Bargabos had cleared his daughter to use.
The plaintiffs filed a memorandum of law in opposition to the motion for summary judgment, to which they attached a number of exhibits, including excerpts from interrogatory responses by Bargabos and Eagle View, and excerpts from transcripts of depositions of Bargabos, the defendant, Wright, and the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs argued that there were genuine issues of material fact in dispute that should preclude the rendering of summary judgment. Two of those issues arguably pertained to...
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