Adams v. Bradshaw

• Citation: 826 F.3d 306
• Decision Date: 13 June 2016
• Docket Number: No. 07-3688,07-3688
• Parties: Stanley T. Adams, Petitioner–Appellant, v. Margaret Bradshaw, Warden, Respondent–Appellee.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (6th Circuit)

826 F.3d 306

Stanley T. Adams, Petitioner–Appellant

v.Margaret Bradshaw, Warden, Respondent–Appellee.

No. 07-3688

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Argued: October 7, 2015

Decided and Filed: June 13, 2016

ARGUED: Neil S. McElroy, Toledo, Ohio, for Appellant. Charles L. Wille, Office of the Ohio Attorney General, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Neil S. McElroy, Jeffrey J. Helmick, Toledo, Ohio, Spiros P. Cocoves, Toledo, Ohio, for Appellant. Thomas E. Madden, Jocelyn S. Kelly, Office of the Ohio Attorney General, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellee.

Before: COLE, Chief Judge; SILER and WHITE, Circuit Judges.

AMENDED OPINION

SILER

, Circuit Judge.

Stanley T. Adams, an Ohio death row inmate, appeals the district court's order denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254

. We certified two claims for appellate review: (1) whether requiring Adams to wear a stun belt throughout trial denied him a fundamentally fair trial; and (2) whether Ohio's lethal injection protocol violated the Eighth Amendment. We granted Adams's motion to hold the case in abeyance pending the resolution of Glossip v. Gross , ––– U.S. ––––, 135 S.Ct. 2726, 192 L.Ed.2d 761 (2015)

, which was decided on June 29, 2015. For the following reasons, we AFFIRM the district court's denial of a writ of habeas corpus.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

I. State court proceedings

An Ohio jury convicted Adams of burglary, kidnapping, two counts of rape, and three counts of aggravated murder. Following the penalty phase, the trial court followed the jury's recommendation and sentenced Adams to death. On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of Ohio vacated Adams's kidnapping conviction and the related specifications, but affirmed the remaining convictions and the death sentence. State v. Adams , 103 Ohio St.3d 508, 817 N.E.2d 29, 59 (2004)

.

In 2003, Adams filed a petition for post-conviction relief under Ohio Revised Code § 2953.21

. The trial court denied the petition. The Court of Appeals of Ohio affirmed the decision. State v. Adams , No. 2003–T–0064, 2005 WL 238144, at *13 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 28, 2005). The Ohio Supreme Court declined further review. State v. Adams , 106 Ohio St.3d 1414, 830 N.E.2d 346, 346 (2005) (table).

II. Federal court proceedings

In 2006, Adams filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court, raising constitutional challenges both to the use of a stun belt during trial and to Ohio's lethal injection protocol as the third and fourth grounds for relief, respectively. In 2007, the district court denied the petition.

On appeal, we granted a Certificate of Appealability for the third and fourth claims of Adams's habeas corpus petition. Adams v. Bradshaw , No. 07-3688, slip op. at 4 (6th Cir. Nov. 9, 2007). In 2009, following final briefing but before oral argument, we granted Adams's motion both to stay the appellate proceedings and to remand his case to the district court to pursue the factual development of the fourth claim, Adams's constitutional challenge to Ohio's lethal injection protocol. Adams v. Bradshaw , No. 07-3688, slip op. at 1 (6th Cir. Feb. 13, 2009). On remand, the district court rejected the warden's motion to dismiss Adams's lethal injection claim for lack of jurisdiction. On interlocutory appeal (case no. 10-4281), we affirmed the decision, reasoning that pursuant to Hill v. McDonough , 547 U.S. 573, 126 S.Ct. 2096, 165 L.Ed.2d 44 (2006)

, and Nelson v. Campbell , 541 U.S. 637, 124 S.Ct. 2117, 158 L.Ed.2d 924 (2004), “Adams's lethal-injection claim, if successful, could render his death sentence effectively invalid. Further, Nelson 's statement that ‘method-of-execution challenges [ ] fall at the margins of habeas,’ 541 U.S. at 646, 124 S.Ct. 2117, strongly suggests that claims such as Adams's can be brought in habeas.” Adams v. Bradshaw , 644 F.3d 481, 483 (6th Cir. 2011) (alteration in original). We remanded the case to the district court.

In 2013, the district court indicated that it had complied with our requests set forth in the 2009 order of remand. Further, the court denied: (1) Adams's motions for additional discovery and to take judicial notice of another case, which involved a challenge to Ohio's lethal injection protocol brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983

being litigated in federal district court in the Southern District of Ohio; and (2) the warden's motion for summary judgment.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A district court's grant or denial of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is reviewed de novo. Robins v. Fortner , 698 F.3d 317, 328 (6th Cir. 2012)

. We review the district court's findings of fact for clear error and its legal conclusions on mixed questions of law and fact de novo. Henderson v. Palmer , 730 F.3d 554, 559 (6th Cir. 2013)

. Because Adams filed his habeas corpus petition in 2006, it is subject to the requirements of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), which became effective on April 24, 1996. Nali v. Phillips , 681 F.3d 837, 840 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Woodford v. Garceau , 538 U.S. 202, 210, 123 S.Ct. 1398, 155 L.Ed.2d 363 (2003) ). Under AEDPA, a writ may not be granted unless the state court's adjudication of the claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)

. “Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, § 2254(d)(1), ‘a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme Court] on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the Supreme Court] has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.’ ” Campbell v. Bradshaw , 674 F.3d 578, 585 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Williams v. Taylor , 529 U.S. 362, 412–13, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) ). “Under the ‘unreasonable application’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from the Supreme Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the petitioner's case.” Hodges v. Colson , 727 F.3d 517, 525 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Williams , 529 U.S. at 413, 120 S.Ct. 1495 ). “[T]he state court's factual findings are presumed correct unless rebutted by the habeas petitioner by clear and convincing evidence.” Id . at 526 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) ).

DISCUSSION

I. Constitutional effect of the stun belt

We turn first to Adams's contention that the use of a stun belt throughout the jury trial deprived him of a fundamentally fair trial. Before the completion of jury selection, the trial court conducted a hearing concerning the use of a stun belt. The prosecution explained that its motion to use the stun belt in this case stemmed from Adams's recent convictions and sentencing for murder and rape in an unrelated case as well as Adams's statements to two mental health professionals indicating that he would attack his previous counsel if he saw them again. Further, the prosecution expressed concern about the emotional intensity of the crowd within the courtroom:

I would note that the evidence in this case is going to have effects on a great deal of the participants. We have at least 15 representatives of the victim, or victims in this case, and a prior victim that family members indicate that they want to attend this trial. That—considering the number of people that could be in this Courtroom and the emotional impact that aggravated murder would have on victims, that it is imperative that the Sheriff's Department feel comfortable that they can secure this for the public and the participants in a reasonable fashion. And so that is why we are here, the Sheriff's Department feels that they have the manpower to handle it, and they want to take all reasonable precautions to make sure that we have a safe and secure trial.

In response, trial counsel indicated that Adams's desire to attack his previous counsel should be of little concern, commenting that “as long as his attorneys are not in this room or within arms-length, then I don't think that we're going to have any problem, if that [is the] corner stone for the necessity of this disabling device.” Trial counsel rejected the significance of the emotional impact upon the victims given the experience of the judge and both parties' counsel with similar circumstances, submitting that it did not warrant the use of “a harmful device.” Trial counsel argued:

[Adams] has an excellent jail record. He's never received an assignment in isolation, never been punished for his behavior in jail, and I think that if anything, without any foundation, the efforts of the Prosecutor are designed to create a setting to portray to a jury that there is some danger of risk or escape here.

You know, we have four deputies here with guns. There is only one way out of this courtroom, and we have three deputies on both side[ ]s of the door that serves as an exit.

Trial counsel also expressed concern as to whether the stun belt would negatively impact Adams's epilepsy:

One of the major reasons in addition to those that I have already mentioned, and the record has to be absolutely clear on this, [Adams] suffers from epileptic seizures

since age 7. He is prescribed daily medication, twice daily for these epileptic seizures. I want to know what happens if somebody triggers this device, superimposed on his present neurological condition, do you—can somebody foresee that it may cause him more harm than what will happen to a normal person?

In addition, trial counsel openly worried about how the presence of a stun belt would affect Adams's state of mind if someone triggered the stun belt during his testimony, if he decided to testify. Trial counsel also asked whether counsel would be affected...