Adams v. Carlson, Civ. No. 72-153.

• Decision Date: 29 April 1974
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 72-153.
• Citation: 375 F. Supp. 1228
• Parties: Eddie ADAMS et al., Plaintiffs, v. Norman CARLSON, Director, Federal Bureau of Prisons, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Illinois

375 F. Supp. 1228

Eddie ADAMS et al., Plaintiffs, v. Norman CARLSON, Director, Federal Bureau of Prisons, et al., Defendants.

Civ. No. 72-153.

United States District Court, E. D. Illinois.

April 29, 1974.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Michael Deutsch, National Lawyers Guild, Jeffrey H. Haas, Dennis D. Cunningham, G. Flint Taylor, Jr., Chicago, Ill., Arpriar G. Saunders, Washington, D. C., for plaintiffs.

Henry A. Schwarz, U. S. Atty., Frederick J. Hess, Asst. U. S. Atty., East Saint Louis, Ill., for defendants.

ORDER

FOREMAN, District Judge:

This is an action for declaratory and injunctive relief and monetary damages, brought on behalf of a class of inmates at the United States Penitentiary, Marion, Illinois (hereinafter "Marion"), raising significant questions under the United States Constitution concerning inter alia cruel and unusual punishment, due process safeguards for men placed into punitive segregation, and the Constitutional rights of those inmates in segregation. The Court has jurisdiction of this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) and had previously certified this matter to be a class action.

The Plaintiff class, including the four-named plaintiffs, were inmates who had been placed in the segregation units at Marion on or about July 23, 1972.

Defendant, Norman A. Carlson, is Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons, United States Department of Justice and, as such, has direct responsibility for and control over the policies and practices of the Federal Bureau of Prisons. Defendant, George W. Pickett, was Warden of Marion. Defendant Fenton was formerly an Associate Warden and Defendant Buzzard is the Chief Correctional Supervisor at that institution. The events leading to this litigation began with work stoppages and disturbances within the prison on July 17, 1972, and July 24, 1972, and a subsequent fire and general disturbance in the segregation unit on August 17 and 18, 1972. For a more complete description of the events which preceded this litigation, see this Court's earlier opinion at 352 F.Supp. 882.

The Court first heard this matter upon the Plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restraining order, for which a hearing was held and the motion was denied. Subsequently, a two-day hearing was held on November 2 and 3, 1972, upon Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. This Court rendered its opinion on January 15, 1973, granting in part and denying in part the relief sought.

Plaintiffs appealed that decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit which on August 23, 1973, remanded the case for further proceedings. Adams v. Carlson, 488 F.2d 619 (7th Cir., 1973).

This Court issued a subsequent order on September 7, 1973, further interpreting the Due Process requirements enunciated by the Seventh Circuit and requiring that prison officials hold new hearings to conform with the newly announced standards for all members of the Plaintiff class still in the segregation units. The order also required the prison officials to remove the partition and phones from the present attorney-client visiting room or provide a new room without a partition for the Plaintiffs to confer with their attorneys. It also required that all legal material be returned to the members of the Plaintiff class.

Pursuant to the order of September 7, 1973, the prison officials held new hearings for the 49 Plaintiffs then remaining in segregation. These hearings which were held September 17-21, 1973, encompassed 112 alleged rule infractions. The 49 Plaintiffs were found to have committed all 112 rule infractions and all Plaintiffs were retained in segregation. At the new hearings, the Plaintiffs requested a total of 143 witnesses. Only one or two were actually called as witnesses before the Adjustment Committee. In addition, one member of the Committee did interview several other prospective witnesses. In requesting witnesses, each accused inmate submitted a brief statement of the expected testimony of his prospective witnesses. The usual practice of the Committee was to find that it was unnecessary to call the witnesses and to accept the summary of testimony as if it were a sworn statement. Prison employees did not testify at the hearings and inmates were not allowed to confront or cross-examine their accusors. Plaintiffs were given 24 to 36 hours notice of the charges against them prior to the time of the hearing. Plaintiffs were not represented by counsel at the hearings, although some Plaintiffs requested such representation. The attorneys for the Plaintiffs in this litigation wrote the Defendants and asked that they be permitted to represent members of the class without payment, but this request was denied.

There was a written memorandum report of each hearing. Notes were taken in longhand and later typed by one of the prison personnel. There were no verbatim records of the proceedings before the Adjustment Committee. The record of the proceedings for each Plaintiff consisted of a copy of the incident report, the decision memorandum, the investigator's report, and the inmate's list of requested witnesses. The hearing memorandum shows the manner, time and date on which these inmates were given notice of the charges which they would be required to answer. The reports also indicate the approximate time and date each Plaintiff appeared before the Committee.

The members of the Adjustment Committee were Associate Warden Johnson, in charge of Custody and Operations, Associate Warden Frey, and Lt. Shields. All Plaintiffs were given indefinite sentences for the offenses they were found to have committed.

Lt. Wilcott was the investigator for all 112 charges for the 49 rehearings, despite the fact that at the hearing there was unrebutted testimony that Wilcott had been involved in the August disturbances at H Unit, one of the two segregation units. Those disturbances formed the basis of some of the charges which he investigated.

The report of the investigator did leave much to be desired. For his report concerning one of the charges against Rafael Miranda, the investigator's sole notation under the comments and conclusion section was "as per the reporting officer Miranda must have been agitating or otherwise there would have been no reason to write a report." For one of the charges against Leon Bates, he wrote, in part, ". . . obviously a report would not have been written if the officer had not believed the incident would happen." For another report he concluded, "Since the inmate elected to discuss this report with the Committee it must at this time be concluded the report is true until proven false by him." Wilcott occasionally talked to prison employees, but does not appear to have contacted any of the witnesses requested by the inmates. His interview with prison officials appears to be little more than an affirmation of the incident report. There is no indication that the investigator asked any probing questions or sought any supporting facts. On several occasions, the investigator interviewed only the accused inmate and after listening to that inmate's denials, concluded that the inmate was guilty.

Each inmate who attended the new hearing was allowed to make a statement in his defense. There was no showing that any of the committee members had reported, investigated, or was in any other way involved in any of the charges against the inmates.

The Court held a hearing on the Plaintiffs' motion for a permanent injunction in Benton, Illinois, on November 26-29, 1973.

Subsequently, in orders dated December 6 and 13, 1973, this Court ordered that all members of the Plaintiff class still confined in the segregation units be released to the general population of the prison because their continued confinement constituted punishment disproportionate to the offenses charged during the rehearings and was, thus, in contravention of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Adams v. Carlson, 368 F.Supp. 1050 (E.D.Ill., 1973).

This Court preliminarily enjoined the Defendants from rejecting for mailing certain letters written by the Plaintiffs generally depicting prison conditions and giving their opinions concerning how they felt they were being treated, merely because the Defendants did not deem the letters to be truthful. Neither party has offered any new evidence regarding this issue. Thus, the Court feels that the preliminary injunction should become permanent. Accordingly, it is ordered that the Defendants, their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, and those persons in active concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of this order, be and they are hereby permanently enjoined from rejecting for mailing, letters, not otherwise objectionable, by members of the Plaintiff class to family and friends, which contain the inmate's depiction of conditions and events in the prison, and his own thoughts about them, merely for the reason that the Defendants do not deem the letters to be truthful.

The Court also reaffirms its prior order that the attorneys of members of the Plaintiff class shall not be required to confer with their clients in a partitioned room.

The issues remaining for determination are as follows: (1) what shall constitute the appropriate class for this litigation and does this Court retain jurisdiction over those members of the Plaintiff class who have been transferred to other institutions beyond the jurisdiction of this Court; (2) whether the Defendants complied with the Due Process standards for in-prison disciplinary hearings enunciated by the Seventh Circuit in Miller v. Twomey, 479 F.2d 701 (7th Cir., 1973) and as supplemented by this Court in its September 7, 1973, order, and whether those standards should be further supplemented or clarified; (3) whether it is necessary to expunge the prison records for any members of the Plaintiff class; and (4) whether the Court should grant the request of the attorneys...