Adams v. City of Detroit, Docket Nos. 110121

Decision Date23 August 1990
Docket Number115093,Docket Nos. 110121
Citation184 Mich.App. 589,458 N.W.2d 903
PartiesJames T. ADAMS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF DETROIT, Detroit Fire Department, and Mayor of Detroit, Defendants-Appellees. James T. ADAMS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF DETROIT, Defendant-Appellee. 184 Mich.App. 589, 458 N.W.2d 903
CourtCourt of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

[184 MICHAPP 590] Matheson, Parr, Schuler, Ewald, Ester & Cooke by John A. Stevens, Troy, for plaintiff-appellant.

Donald Pailen, Corp. Counsel, Abigail Elias, Deputy Corp. Counsel, and Thomas L. Walters and John H. Willems, Asst. Corp. Counsels, for defendant-appellee.

Before DANHOF, C.J., and BRENNAN and ALLEN, * JJ.

PER CURIAM.

In Docket No. 110121, plaintiff appeals, by delayed application for leave granted, the trial court's order entered April 15, 1988, granting defendant's motion for summary disposition presumably under MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (10). In Docket No. 115093, plaintiff appeals as of right the trial court's order entered on January 30, [184 MICHAPP 591] 1989, denying plaintiff's request for superintending control. The appeals were heard together. We affirm.

Plaintiff, an honorably discharged war veteran, was employed by the Detroit Fire Department as a Civil Defense Coordinator until his discharge on February 19, 1982. 1 On January 22, 1982, Delores Stewart filed an employee complaint against plaintiff alleging that plaintiff had verbally abused and threatened her. Plaintiff responded to Stewart's complaint by submitting a written statement generally denying the allegations. Deputy Fire Commissioner Phillip F. Gorak, assigned to handle the complaint, found plaintiff's response inadequate and called a meeting for February 10, 1982. Gorak also asked plaintiff to submit another statement. Also submitted to Gorak was a statement from another employee Alvin Martin, that on the day before the Stewart incident plaintiff had pulled a gun on Martin.

At the two-hour meeting held February 10, Gorak reviewed plaintiff's second statement and the statements of Superintendents Bojalad and Dolley, both of whom were witnesses to the Stewart incident. Present were plaintiff, Gorak, Bojalad, and Administrative Assistant Quinton Watkins. Following review of the matter with Fire Commissioner Melvin D. Jefferson, Gorak found plaintiff guilty of conduct "bringing disgrace and discredit to the [Detroit Fire] Department" and suspended plaintiff for fifteen days. By letter dated February 10, 1982, and sent by registered mail to plaintiff's home and office, plaintiff was notified of his fifteen-day suspension.

On February 15, Gorak was informed that one of the two registered letters could not be delivered [184 MICHAPP 592] and the other was refused. Accordingly, Gorak decided to personally take the suspension notice to plaintiff at plaintiff's office. When Gorak attempted to give the notice to plaintiff, plaintiff refused to accept it, whereupon Gorak walked down the hall to Superintendent Richard Dolley's office to ask Dolley to witness the attempted service. When Gorak and Dolley went to plaintiff's office, the door was closed and locked. Gorak knocked and got no response.

On February 16, plaintiff was advised by Watkins of his suspension and the requirement that he leave his office. On February 18, Gorak telephoned plaintiff and told him that if he did not vacate the premises "he was liable to discharge." Plaintiff replied that Gorak was not to contact him again and that all future communications should be through his attorney. Plaintiff did not name his attorney and hung up on Gorak.

Following this incident, Gorak contacted Commissioner Jefferson. Together they decided to discharge plaintiff. Notice of discharge dated February 19, 1982, was prepared together with a letter explaining in detail the reasons for the discharge. The notice and attached letter were sent by registered mail, unsuccessfully. In addition, two telegrams were sent--one to plaintiff's home and the other to his office. The telegrams were not accepted. On February 23, Administrative Assistant John King and two Detroit police officers were dispatched to contact plaintiff. King gave plaintiff the notice and accompanying letter. Soon thereafter, plaintiff cleaned out his office and left the premises.

On March 4, 1982, plaintiff filed a grievance with the Civil Service Commission and sent a letter to Mayor Young requesting a veteran's preference act (VPA) hearing pursuant to M.C.L. Sec. 35.402; [184 MICHAPP 593] M.S.A. Sec. 4.1222. Following a series of conferences and meetings, the details of which are not necessary to spell out herein, a preconference hearing was held April 22, 1982. At that hearing, attended by plaintiff, his attorney Kenneth Cockerel, the VPA hearings officer Kay Schloff, city attorney Kenneth King, and Michael Jozwik, plaintiff requested that the VPA and civil service hearings be jointly held, but if that were not possible, then the transcripts of one hearing should be submitted in the other. Final decision on this matter was not reached but eventually plaintiff decided to have the civil service hearing held first.

The civil service hearing was conducted on June 24 and June 28, 1982, before mutually agreed upon arbitrator Stanley Brahms. Over six hundred pages of transcript were taken. On August 9, 1982, the arbitrator issued his written decision upholding plaintiff's discharge.

The VPA hearing was held in August and September, 1983. By agreement, the transcripts of the civil service hearing were admitted instead of actual testimony. Plaintiff, however, did call two additional witnesses. Hearings Officer Schloff's findings upholding the discharge were presented to Mayor Young by letter on April 17, 1984. On November 18, 1985, Mayor Young upheld plaintiff's discharge by letter.

On July 25, 1986, plaintiff filed a complaint for writ of mandamus in the Wayne Circuit Court, alleging that plaintiff's due process and equal protection rights under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 had been violated and that the city had violated the provisions of the veterans preference act, M.C.L. Sec. 35.402; M.S.A. Sec. 4.1222. At a hearing held April 15, 1988, on the parties' cross-motions for summary disposition, the court ruled on two issues. First, the court held that plaintiff was not denied due process or equal [184 MICHAPP 594] protection in violation of Cleveland Bd. of Ed. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985). Second, the court held that the provisions of the VPA were not violated and that a hearing examiner's findings of fact may not be challenged in a mandamus action, but only by appeal. Accordingly, the court granted summary disposition in favor of defendant and dismissed the complaint for mandamus.

While the action for mandamus was pending, on February 10, 1988, plaintiff filed a complaint for superintending control in the Wayne Circuit Court. The complaint alleged that Mayor Young's written decision was legally deficient, that plaintiff's due process rights under the VPA had been violated, and that the mayor's decision was not supported by competent evidence. At a hearing held January 13, 1989, before the same judge who ruled on the mandamus proceedings, the court granted defendant's motion for summary disposition. In so ruling, the court again rejected plaintiff's claim that his due process rights had been violated contrary to Loudermill, supra, and ruled against plaintiff on five additional claims of error.

In Docket No. 110121 plaintiff's application for delayed appeal in the mandamus action was granted November 16, 1988. 2 In Docket No. 115093 plaintiff appealed as of right the order denying the order of superintending control. By order of this Court the appeals were heard together. Only the Loudermill issue is raised in Docket No. 110121. Five additional grounds for reversal are raised in Docket No. 115093.

I

[184 MICHAPP 595] Plaintiff contends that the due process and equal protection rights articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Loudermill, supra, were violated by defendant city in five respects: (1) failure to notify plaintiff that administrative or disciplinary action would be taken against him because of charges brought against him by Ms. Stewart; (2) failure to afford plaintiff a pretermination hearing; (3) failure to hold a "full VPA hearing" before suspension or discharge; (4) inordinate and undue delay before and after conducting the VPA hearing; and (5) failure to comply with OAG, 1930-1932, p. 584 (May 18, 1932), issued by then-Attorney General Paul Voorhies.

The plaintiff in Loudermill was a classified civil service employee in the Cleveland school system who was discharged for falsifying his employment application. The Ohio statute provided that a classified employee could not be suspended or terminated except for good cause shown. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 535-536, 105 S.Ct. at 1489-90. When plaintiff's discharge was upheld by the Cleveland Civil Service Commission, suit was filed in the United States District Court which dismissed for failure to state a claim. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 536-537, 105 S.Ct. at 1490-91. On appeal, the United States Supreme Court held that plaintiff was entitled to " 'some kind of a hearing' prior to the discharge," Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 542, 105 S.Ct. at 1493, that the required pretermination hearing is to determine whether "there are reasonable grounds to believe that the charges against the employee are true and support the proposed action," Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 545-546, 105 S.Ct. at 1495, and that due process is satisfied if the plaintiff is given "oral or written notice of the charges against him, an explanation of the employer's evidence, and an opportunity to present his side of the story." Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 546, 105 S.Ct. at 1495. (Emphasis added.)

[184 MICHAPP 596] While Loudermill mandates that a plaintiff be notified...

To continue reading

Request your trial
3 cases
  • Sherrod v. City of Detroit
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US
    • 5 Abril 2001
    ...Defendants argue that plaintiff's postsuspension hearing satisfied the act's requirement. Defendants rely on Adams v. Detroit, 184 Mich.App. 589, 597, 458 N.W.2d 903 (1990), where this Court expressed strong disagreement with the plaintiff's argument that the VPA required his employer to ho......
  • In re Grant
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US
    • 31 Mayo 2002
    ...and privileges of this act...." M.C.L. § 35.402. Relying on this language, as well as this Court's decision in Adams v. Detroit, 184 Mich.App. 589, 458 N.W.2d 903 (1990), defendant argues that the posttermination hearing held at plaintiff's request was sufficient to meet the requirements of......
  • Jackson v. Detroit Police Chief
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US
    • 16 Agosto 1993
    ...v. McDonald, 371 Mich. 138, 147, 123 N.W.2d 227 (1963). Reversed. 1 We disagree with the conclusion reached in Adams v. Detroit, 184 Mich.App. 589, 597-600, 458 N.W.2d 903 (1990), that holding a hearing before taking action is not ...

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT