Adams v. Commonwealth
| Decision Date | 30 September 1938 |
| Parties | Adams v. Commonwealth. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky |
1. Criminal Law. — In prosecution of wife for murder of her husband, testimony of witness for prosecution that he had talked to deceased husband, who had told witness that he was willing to support his wife, but could not live with her, that she was dangerous and went to sleep with a hammer under her pillow, and that he had never had any home life, was incompetent.
2. Homicide. — In prosecution of wife for murder of her husband, wherein wife testified that her husband had attempted to take a pistol from his desk drawer, but that she was able to get the pistol first and shot her husband in self-defense, testimony of
commonwealth's attorney that he had gone to husband's office where shooting had occurred shortly after the shooting to make an investigation, and that there was not room for a pistol in the drawer at place where wife had said that it was lying, was substantially prejudicial in absence of showing that drawer was in same condition when examined as it was immediately after the homicide.
3. Homicide. — In prosecution of wife for murder of her husband, court prejudicially erred in permitting prosecution to introduce letter written by wife to a relative several years before the homicide wherein she stated that if she caught any woman in her husband's automobile she intended to kill the woman.
4. Homicide. — In prosecution of wife for killing her husband with a pistol, testimony of witnesses that shortly before the shooting wife had dropped her purse, which made a loud noise as though something heavy was in it, was irrelevant but not substantially prejudicial where witnesses did not say that wife had a pistol in her purse.
5. Criminal Law. — In prosecution of wife for murder of husband, who had brought a divorce suit against her, testimony of witness, that the reason his attempt to effect a reconciliation between the husband and wife was unsuccessful was because of husband's complaint about the wife, was incompetent, since witness could not state competently what husband's reasons for rejection were and it was therefore improper for witness to give his conclusions.
6. Homicide. — In prosecution of wife for murder of her husband, who had filed suit for divorce, testimony of a witness that husband had told him that the wife had promised many times to quit drinking but had broken her promise so many times that he was not going to withdraw divorce suit, and that husband told witness a circumstance regarding a pistol, was incompetent.
7. Homicide. — In prosecution of wife for murder of husband, court should have rejected evidence relating to alleged meretricious conduct on wife's part or isolated acts of alleged immorality, since they were irrelevant, and did not tend to indicate that wife had any intention of killing her husband.
8. Criminal Law. — In prosecution of wife for killing her husband with a pistol which wife claimed was his and had been obtained in a struggle with husband when he allegedly attempted to kill her, conduct of commonwealth's attorney in closing argument to jury in taking side off pistol so as to disclose three initials, the first and last of which were the same as those of wife's brother, and in repeating wife's brother's first and last names and asking jury to see whether she had her brother's pistol, was prejudicial error.
Appeal from McCracken Circuit Court.
C.C. GRASSHAM, C.B. CROSSLAND, W.F. McMURRY, DAVID R. REED, W.A. MIDDLETON and ROY G. GARRISON for appellant.
General, and J.M. CAMPBELL, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
OPINION OF THE COURT BY MORRIS, COMMISSIONER.Reversing.
Appellant, charged by indictment with the murder of her husband, Ben Adams, upon trial was convicted of voluntary manslaughter, the jury fixing the penalty at imprisonment for sixteen years, and from a judgment following the verdict this appeal is prosecuted.
In appellant's behalf there are urged as grounds for reversal substantially the following:
(a) Much incompetent prejudicial evidence on part of appellee was allowed to be introduced, and in many instances the court failed to properly admonish the jury as to the purpose and effect thereof, if any was competent for any purpose.
(b) Both the commonwealth's attorney and employed counsel indulged in misconduct by making inflammatory arguments to the jury, and in going beyond proven facts in arguing the case.
(c) Misconduct on the part of some of the jurors who had on voir dire examination denied the formation or expression of opinion as to guilt or innocence of accused, it being charged that they had heard sufficient facts to form, and had theretofore formed opinions.
(d) The court erred in not granting appellant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal at the close of the commonwealth's evidence, and upon the close of all the evidence. It is also urged that the verdict of the jury was flagrantly contrary to the evidence.
A presentation of the facts, since the plea of appellant was solely one of self-defense, may be best made by giving her version of the tragedy.
The homicide occurred in the law office of deceased, in an office building in Paducah, early in the morning of July 15, 1936, and at a time when only accused and deceased were present. Appellant was a native of Virginia, and was married to deceased at the home of her parents when she was about fourteen or fifteen years of age, and deceased was about twenty-seven. After the marriage they went to Bardwell, the home of deceased to reside. He was then or afterwards became county attorney of Carlisle County, later elected Commonwealth's Attorney of his judicial district, and at the time of his death was actively engaged in the practice of law in McCracken County.
During their life in Bardwell their relations were affectionate, continuing so until their removal to Paducah some time in 1926 or 1927. The cordiality seems to have ceased soon thereafter; the conclusion being inescapable, according to testimony, that this strained situation arose from the entry of another woman into the life and affections of the husband. Appellant first became aware of this when the husband was called to the home of the alleged interloper about midnight at one time.
It is also developed that deceased had obtained a divorce judgment for Mrs. Walker, and had represented her in other litigation; that upon the death of her child deceased had sent $10 worth of flowers, over appellant's protest. Later, Mrs. Walker and accused had a stormy meeting. Afterwards Mrs. Walker (who later had her name of Mrs. Nanney restored) was employed by deceased. She remained most of the time in his private office. Appellant complained that she had watched and seen the two in embrace. She also noted circumstances which led her to believe that the relations between the two had progressed further than mere embrace. Appellant accused deceased, and she says he admitted the charge, and promised to desist. Appellant says that this promise was not kept; that later she came upon them in the office under such circumstances as satisfied her that the relationship still existed. She begged the woman to refrain from attempting to break up her home. Later the two met in the office of another attorney and engaged in a personal encounter. On these various occasions appellant makes it appear that deceased sided with the third party, and had struck appellant on more than one occasion. This happened not only at the home but at other places, including the office of deceased. This situation continued for some time. At one time, not essential to mention, Mrs. Adams went back to Virginia. She later returned to Paducah and says she was convinced by certain evidence that the relations between her husband and the third party were continuing. In the meantime, during her stay in Virginia deceased had begun, and notified her of, divorce proceedings. She wrote him that she desired to continue to live with him. The divorce suit was filed in March; she returned to Paducah about the first week in April. She went to his office and expressed and emphasized her desire to continue their marital relations, and told him that the third party was the cause of their domestic troubles.
She relates that she and the husband, after April 3, frequently ate their meals together, she continually begging him to give up the third party. He had asked accused not to do anything about the divorce suit; that he would "see her." The matter moved along under similar circumstances and conditions until the serving of notice of taking depositions in the divorce proceedings. The following morning the two breakfasted together at a coffee shop. There they discussed the situation. She assured him that she was going to fight the divorce. She had in her possession some personal effects and documents, which she conceived would be strong evidence against deceased in the prosecution of his divorce case. She says he insisted on her going to his office and turning over this evidence to him. This she refused to do; later upon his insistence, she went with him. When they arrived deceased proposed that she surrender to him the evidence which she had in her possession, and sign an agreement not to contest the divorce action upon consideration that he give her $150 per month during her life. She vehemently rejected the proposal, and deceased then became very much enraged. He jumped up from his desk; walked to his safe and opened it, came back to the desk and said: "You are going to write that damn agreement, and write it right now." She replied: "Mr. Adams, I am never going to agree for another woman to take you from me, and there is no use arguing."
Accused said that her husband then jumped up and grabbed her by the arm, jerked her out of her chair and angrily demanded that she sign the agreement; she refused and he said: "If you don't...
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