Adams v. Estrada
| Decision Date | 23 January 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 2 CA-CV 2013-0074,2 CA-CV 2013-0074 |
| Parties | SONNY ADAMS AND TESS ADAMS, HUSBAND AND WIFE, Counter-Defendants/Appellees, v. DANIEL A. ESTRADA, A SINGLE MAN, Counter-Claimant/Appellant. |
| Court | Arizona Court of Appeals |
THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND
MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c); Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 28(c).
Appeal from the Superior Court in Cochise County
The Honorable Charles A. Irwin, Judge
AFFIRMED IN PART;
REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART
Bayham Law Office, PLLC, Tucson
By Thomas M. Bayham
Flagler Law, PLLC, Bisbee
By Jana E. Flagler
Chief Judge Howard authored the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Vásquez concurred and Judge Miller dissented.
¶1 Appellant Daniel Estrada appeals the trial court's order granting a directed verdict in favor of Sonny and Tess Adams on Estrada's counter-claim for malicious prosecution and intentional infliction of emotional distress. He also argues the trial court erred in its ruling on certain evidentiary matters. We affirm the trial court's ruling on the evidentiary issues and the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. Because the jury could have found Estrada established the elements of malicious prosecution, the court erred by granting a directed verdict to the Adamses on that claim. We therefore reverse and remand in part.
¶2 On appeal from a directed verdict we view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Monaco v. HealthPartners of S. Ariz., 196 Ariz. 299, ¶ 6, 995 P.2d 735, 738 (App. 1999). Daniel Estrada and Sonny Adams were involved in an altercation, at night, in the road in front of their neighboring homes in January 2009. At trial, Estrada testified that Adams had snuck up and, without provocation, struck him in the shoulder and knocked him to his knees. Adams then threatened to kill Estrada, and a fight ensued. Estrada testified that Adams had continued to advance toward him, swinging at him and hitting him, despite Estrada's repeated blows. He further testified that he had continued to back up trying to get away from Adams and that he had feared for his safety. Finally, Adams grabbed Estrada's shirt, and Estrada threw Adams to the ground. At that point the fight ended, and Estrada called an ambulance to assist Adams.
¶3 The fight left Estrada with an injured fist and Adams with a broken rib, fracture to his sinus area, cuts requiring stitches in his mouth and above his eye, and cuts on the back of his head requiring staples. Estrada was arrested and charged with aggravated assault and assault.
¶4 After a jury trial, Estrada was later acquitted of the criminal charges. The Adamses then sued Estrada for personal injuries arising out of the incident. Estrada counter-claimed for malicious prosecution and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Before trial, the parties settled the Adamses' claims but went to trial on Estrada's counter-claims. After three days of trial, the court granted the Adamses' motion for judgment as a matter of law, made pursuant to Rule 50, Ariz. R. Civ. P., concluding that Adams had probable cause to act as the complaining witness in the criminal prosecution against Estrada. We have jurisdiction over Estrada's appeal pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1) and 12-2101(A)(1).
¶5 Estrada first argues the trial court erred in granting a directed verdict in favor of the Adamses on the malicious prosecution claim because he produced sufficient evidence that Adams had acted without probable cause when he told a police officer that Estrada attacked him. We review a trial court's ruling granting a directed verdict de novo. A Tumbling-T Ranches v. Flood Control Dist. of Maricopa Cnty., 222 Ariz. 515, ¶ 14, 217 P.3d 1220, 1229 (App. 2009). A motion for directed verdict should be granted "only if the facts presented in support of a claim have so little probative value that reasonable people could not find for the claimant." Shoen v. Shoen, 191 Ariz. 64, 65, 952 P.2d 302, 303 (App. 1997).
¶6 The tort of malicious prosecution1 requires that the plaintiff establish the defendant, as complaining witness, institutedor continued criminal proceedings against the plaintiff, which terminated in the plaintiff's favor, without probable cause and with malice. Lantay v. McLean, 2 Ariz. App. 22, 23, 406 P.2d 224, 225 (1965); see also Bearup v. Bearup, 122 Ariz. 509, 510, 596 P.2d 35, 36 (App. 1979). The existence of probable cause is a complete defense to a malicious prosecution claim, and is a question of law to be determined by the court. Hockett v. City of Tucson, 139 Ariz. 317, 320, 678 P.2d 502, 505 (App. 1983). But if the evidence is conflicting, and probable cause would exist under one set of facts but not the other, then the jury must determine the true set of facts and apply the law given to it by the trial judge. Id.
¶7 Bradshaw v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 157 Ariz. 411, 417, 758 P.2d 1313, 1319 (1988) (citations and emphasis omitted). Under the subjective element, "the [accuser must] actually believe[] that the accused was guilty of the crime." Id. If the accuser does not, "'it is immaterial that the facts . . . were such that reasonable men might have regarded them as proof of the guilt of the accused.'" Id., quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 662 cmt. c (1977).2 Under theobjective element, the initiator must "'reasonably believe[] that he has a good chance of establishing [his case] to the satisfaction of the court or the jury.'" Chalpin v. Snyder, 220 Ariz. 413, ¶ 38, 207 P.3d 666, 676 (App. 2008), quoting Bradshaw, 157 Ariz. at 417, 758 P.2d at 1319. Put another way, "'would a reasonably prudent [man] have instituted or continued the proceeding?'" Id., quoting Carroll v. Kalar, 112 Ariz. 595, 596, 545 P.2d 411, 412 (1976).
¶8 Aggravated assault, as relevant here, is an assault that causes serious physical injury or is committed using a "deadly weapon or dangerous instrument." A.R.S. § 13-1204(A)(1), (2). But "a person is justified in threatening or using physical force against another when and to the extent a reasonable person would believe that physical force is immediately necessary to protect himself against the other's use or attempted use of unlawful physical force." A.R.S. § 13-404(A). Actions taken in self-defense do not constitute "criminal or wrongful conduct." A.R.S. § 13-205(A).
¶9 In considering whether the directed verdict should have been granted, we accept as true Estrada's version of events. See Monaco, 196 Ariz. 299, ¶ 6, 995 P.2d at 738. Estrada and Adams had a history of bitter disputes with one another. In Estrada's version of events, Adams was the aggressor in the fight, attacking Estrada without provocation and threatening to kill him. Estrada, fearing for his safety, continued to back up and defend himself because Adams would not stop coming toward him, swinging at him and hitting him, until Estrada finally threw Adams to the ground.
¶10 Therefore, according to his version of events, Estrada's actions would have been justified as self-defense and not criminal or wrongful conduct. See §§ 13-404(A), 13-205(A). And, under that version, Adams necessarily would have lied when he told police that Estrada attacked him, unprovoked, with a wooden board andproceeded to beat him. Adams also claimed that he never fought back or said anything to Estrada. If the jury accepted Estrada's version of events, it further could have found that Adams did not believe that Estrada had committed the crime and therefore did not have the subjective belief that Estrada had committed aggravated assault. See Bradshaw, 157 Ariz. at 417, 758 P.2d at 1319; see also Estate of Reinen v. N. Ariz. Orthopedics, Ltd., 198 Ariz. 283, ¶ 12, 9 P.3d 314, 318 (2000) ().
¶11 Furthermore, if it accepted Estrada's version of events, the jury could have found that Adams did not have an objectively reasonable belief that he had a good chance of establishing his case to the satisfaction of the jury. See id. Accordingly, under both the objective and subjective tests, the jury could have found Adams did not have probable cause to act as the complaining witness in the criminal prosecution for aggravated assault. Although Adams gave a different version of events, the trial court erred in granting the directed verdict in favor of the Adamses. The ultimate determination of the underlying facts should have been decided by the jury, and the jury then should have applied the law given to it by the trial judge. See Hockett, 139 Ariz. at 320, 678 P.2d at 505. Accordingly, we reverse the order granting the Adamses a directed verdict and remand for further proceedings consistent with this decision.
¶12 The Adamses claim however the trial court could have found that Estrada exceeded any justification because he was trained in martial arts. But they cite no authority for the proposition martial artists do not have a right to defend themselves. Although the jury could have found that he exceeded any reasonable self-defense claim, it also could have found that he did not. Under Estrada's version, Adams continued to advance and throw punches despite being struck and injured. We are unable to conclude that Estrada's training, even coupled with Adams's injuries, provides probable cause as a matter of law.
¶13 The Adamses additionally claim that Adams could not have instituted the criminal proceedings against Estrada because thepolice...
To continue reading
Request your trial