Adams v. Federal Exp. Corp.

• Decision Date: 26 April 1979
• Docket Number: Civ. No. C-75-141.
• Citation: 470 F. Supp. 1356
• Parties: Charles ADAMS, Larry Washington, George Andrews, Billy Lovett, and International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Plaintiffs, v. FEDERAL EXPRESS CORPORATION, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Tennessee

470 F. Supp. 1356

Charles ADAMS, Larry Washington, George Andrews, Billy Lovett, and International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Plaintiffs, v. FEDERAL EXPRESS CORPORATION, Defendant.

Civ. No. C-75-141.

United States District Court, W. D. Tennessee, W. D.

April 26, 1979.

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Howard R. Paul, Memphis, Tenn., Robert M. Baptiste, Roland P. Wilder, Jr., Gary S. Witlen, Washington, D. C., for plaintiffs.

Scott F. May, Watson, Cox, Arnoult & May, Memphis, Tenn., for defendant.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

BAILEY BROWN, Chief Judge.

This action was filed on April 4, 1975 by two of the individual plaintiffs and the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America (hereinafter "Teamsters"). Subsequently, two other individual plaintiffs were added. The suit arose in conjunction with an organizing effort by the Teamsters at defendant's Memphis facility. Plaintiffs allege that defendant unlawfully interfered with and coerced its employees in connection with the selection of a collective bargaining representative in violation of § 2 (Third) and (Fourth) of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 152 (Third) and (Fourth).¹ Defendant is a carrier by air and thus is covered by § 2 of the Railway Labor Act as provided in 45 U.S.C. § 181.

Plaintiffs Charles Adams, Larry Washington and George Andrews were all discharged by defendant in the early part of 1975. They claim they were unlawfully discharged because of their union activities, and seek reinstatement, back pay and restored seniority. Plaintiff Billy Lovett was transferred between departments in early 1975, shortly before he was scheduled to go into military service. He claims that he was transferred because of his union activities. He has since been reinstated in his previous job, but seeks any back pay and seniority rights which he would have received had he never been transferred. In addition, all plaintiffs seek to have this court enjoin defendant from doing a number of things connected with union activity including: (1) threatening employees, (2) interrogating employees, (3) engaging in surveillance of employees, (4) discharging or transferring employees, (5) withholding promised benefits, and (6) conferring additional benefits.

On September 10, 1975, we entered an order denying plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction and dismissing the claims of the Teamsters. We dismissed the Teamsters as a plaintiff because we concluded that an uncertified labor union does not have standing to bring an action under the Railway Labor Act. Our order was affirmed in its entirety by the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, leaving only the individual claims for resolution. Adams v. Federal Express Corporation, 547 F.2d 319 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 915, 97 S.Ct. 2177, 53 L.Ed.2d 225 (1977). The Sixth Circuit further concluded that this court had jurisdiction of claims under 45 U.S.C. § 152 (Third) and (Fourth) without requiring plaintiffs to present them first to the National Mediation Board. Id., at 321. We note at the outset that this court has the power to grant the relief sought. The Railway Labor Act implicitly authorizes this court to award back pay and reinstatement in an appropriate case. Burke v. Compania Mexicana de Aviacion, S. A., 433 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir. 1970); Griffin v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 384 F.Supp. 1070 (N.D.Ga.1974). This court also has the authority to enjoin an employer from violating the provisions of the Act at issue here. Texas & New Orleans Railroad Company v. Brotherhood of Railway & Steamship Clerks, 281 U.S. 548, 567-570, 50 S.Ct. 427, 74 L.Ed. 1034 (1930). If any of the individual plaintiffs are entitled to relief, then we believe it would be within this court's power to grant the additional injunctive relief necessary to prevent any further coercion of their rights to select a bargaining representative under the Act.² We now turn to the claims of the individual plaintiffs. We first will address their prayers for individual relief and then will address their prayers for general injunctive relief.

I. Plaintiff Charles Adams

Plaintiff Charles Adams was employed by defendant from September 23, 1974 until March 12, 1975 to perform janitorial and building maintenance work. It is undisputed that Adams' discharge on March 12 was precipitated by his failure to remove a "Go Teamsters" button after being ordered to do so by Tucker Taylor who was then Senior Vice President for Industrial Relations. Adams contends that he was entitled to wear the button and that his discharge for failure to remove the button amounted to coercion in the choice of a bargaining representative in violation of the Railway Labor Act. Defendant counters that Adams was subject to immediate discharge for insubordination pursuant to company policy (Ex. 22, p. 15) and that, in any event, his refusal to remove the button amounted to a third disciplinary infraction which also authorized his discharge under company policy (Ex. 22, p. 16). Adams' previous two reprimands involved tardiness to and absences from work (Ex. 2, pp. 1-3). Defendant further contends that there was good reason to order Adams to remove his button, independent of the fact that the button displayed support for the Teamsters, in that there was a danger that a loose metal object could cause foreign object damage to defendant's jet aircraft engines by being sucked into one of them.

Despite all of the testimony about the foreign object damage that a metal button could cause to an aircraft, it is clear that this was not the reason that Vice President Taylor ordered Adams to remove his button. Taylor candidly testified that he told Adams to remove the button because he felt that it was "inflammatory," that it would be disruptive to other employees, and that it would offend defendant's investors, lenders and directors who were on the premises that day. (Tr. 997-998.) Taylor further stated that he did not mention any potential foreign object damage to Adams. (Tr. 1006-1007.) The fact that Taylor was concerned about the button being "disruptive" and not about foreign object damage is confirmed by his memorandum of March 13, 1975 in which he described his conversation with Adams. (Ex. 2, p. 4.) In fact, Taylor acknowledged that he would not have asked Adams to remove a "Church of Christ" button because such a button would not have been as controversial. (Ex. 2, p. 4; Tr. 999, 1005.) We find, therefore, that Taylor ordered Adams to remove his "Go Teamsters" button solely because Taylor felt it was inflammatory.

We conclude that Taylor's order to Adams to remove the Teamster button and Adams' subsequent discharge for refusing to remove the button unlawfully coerced Adams and other employees in their selection of a bargaining representative in violation of § 152 (Third) and (Fourth). We reach this conclusion because the admitted purpose of Taylor's order was to cover up visible expressions of support for the Teamsters simply because such expressions of support might be "disruptive" or "inflammatory." We believe that employees have the right to visibly demonstrate their support or opposition to a particular bargaining representative absent some exceptional reason for curtailing such expression. Here, the suggested reason of potential foreign object damage was clearly an afterthought and was not the basis of the order or the decision to terminate Adams.

Although very few cases interpreting the Railway Labor Act have dealt with the kinds of activity that may be found coercive under § 152, our conclusion is buttressed by cases interpreting § 8(a)(1) and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) and (3). Those provisions of the NLRA prohibit an employer covered by that Act from interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their organizational rights and from "discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization." While employers covered by the Railway Labor Act are not subject to the provisions of the NLRA, the NLRA and cases interpreting it nevertheless provide some guidance in the interpretation of certain provisions of the Railway Labor Act. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 383, 89 S.Ct. 1109, 22 L.Ed.2d 344 (1969), reh. denied, 394 U.S. 1024, 89 S.Ct. 1622, 23 L.Ed.2d 51 (1969)

The right of employees to wear union insignia, including buttons, has long been protected under the NLRA, and discharge of employees for wearing such insignia normally is held to violate 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) and (3). Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 802-803, 65 S.Ct. 982, 89 L.Ed. 1372 (1945); Larand Leisurelies, Inc. v. NLRB, 523 F.2d 814, 818-819 (6th Cir. 1975). The Sixth Circuit has carved out an exception to this rule "where there are `special considerations relating to employee efficiency and plant discipline.'" Larand Leisurelies, supra at 819. Defendant has not demonstrated that the wearing of Teamster buttons made its operation any less efficient and, despite Taylor's belief that the buttons were "disruptive," defendant has not demonstrated that any disciplinary problems were attributable to the buttons.

Adams' discharge cannot be justified by the mere fact that he may have been guilty of "insubordination" or that he had two reprimands in his file pertaining to unrelated subjects. An employee is under no obligation to obey an order that unlawfully coerces him in the exercise of his rights under § 152, and he cannot lawfully be discharged for his failure to obey such an order. Adams was clearly discharged because of his refusal to obey an unlawful order and for no other reason.

Accordingly, we conclude that Taylor's...