Griffin v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc., Civ. A. No. 19550.

• Citation: 384 F. Supp. 1070
• Decision Date: 07 November 1974
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 19550.
• Parties: Marvin Ray GRIFFIN v. PIEDMONT AVIATION, INC.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia

384 F. Supp. 1070

Marvin Ray GRIFFIN v. PIEDMONT AVIATION, INC.

Civ. A. No. 19550.

United States District Court, N. D. Georgia, Atlanta Division.

November 7, 1974.

Robert J. Martin, Jr., of Adair, Goldthwaite, Stanford & Daniel, Atlanta, Ga., for plaintiff.

R. Lawrence Ashe, Jr., of Kilpatrick, Cody, Rogers, McClatchey & Regenstein, Atlanta, Ga., for defendant.

ORDER

EDENFIELD, Chief Judge.

The plaintiff in this action is an ex-employee of the defendant. He alleges that he was discharged in retaliation for his union organizing activity and that his discharge was a violation of the Air Carriers Labor Act (ACLA), 45 U.S.C. § 181 et seq. The plaintiff seeks back pay and reinstatement and contends that jurisdiction to hear his suit and grant the relief sought is derived from the ACLA coupled with either general federal question jurisdiction, 28 U. S.C. § 1331, or § 1337, which confers jurisdiction over all actions "arising under any Act of Congress regulating commerce". The defendant contends that the ACLA creates no private right of action and that plaintiff's only remedy is to be found in state court. Plaintiff, however, expressly disclaims reliance on any state law breach of contract theory,¹ and strenuously contends the ACLA should be held to create a private right of action for a litigant in his precise situation. The question of whether or not this court has jurisdiction over this action is squarely presented. There is little doubt that plaintiff's cause of action, if any, arises under an act of Congress regulating commerce. The actual questions presented are (1) is plaintiff's claim one that is within the exclusive jurisdiction of one of the airline adjustment boards, and (2) if it is not, is plaintiff without a federal remedy or does the ACLA create a private right of action?

On October 21, 1974, the court held a hearing on the jurisdictional issue. At that hearing the defendant conceded that the plaintiff could not obtain the relief he seeks from any adjustment board as there is no adjustment board with jurisdiction to hear grievances presented by ramp agents employed by Piedmont. There can be no doubt that the plaintiff has alleged that he was discharged in violation of the Air Carriers Labor Act. The crucial question is, therefore, whether the plaintiff should be left without any federal remedy for a violation of his federally created rights under the Act. This court is convinced he should not. The question, however, is a novel one which has apparently never been asked in this circuit.

The Fifth Circuit case which comes closest to facing this issue is Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Central of Georgia Ry., 305 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1962). In that case the employee in question was covered by a collective bargaining agreement. The employee had taken a leave of absence to work full time for his union. The railroad attempted to bring him before a disciplinary hearing on charges that his union activity constituted "gross disloyalty" to the carrier. The employee and the union brought suit alleging that (1) the disciplinary hearing was illegal (because an employee on a leave of absence was not subject to punishment for the offense charged), and (2) the disciplinary hearing was part of a plot to "hamper, impede and hinder" the union's activity and this plot violated the Railway Labor Act. The district court dismissed the suit for failure to state a claim. The Fifth Circuit, in reversing in part, held that the first claim must be presented to the Railway Adjustment Board because it arose under the existing collective bargaining agreement, but that the federal courts would hear the claim that the company was attempting to defeat the intent of the Act. As the court based its refusal to entertain the employee's personal claim on the existence of the agreement rather than upon the existence of the Act, it appears that the jurisdictional question presented by this suit remains an open one in this circuit.

There is only one case which is directly on point. In Burke v. Compania Mexicana de Aviacion, 433 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir. 1970), the court was presented with a situation virtually identical to the present case. Burke, a salesman for Mexicana Airlines, attempted to organize his fellow workers...