Adams v. Golson

• Decision Date: 26 April 1937
• Docket Number: 34268,34267
• Citation: 187 La. 363,174 So. 876
• Parties: ADAMS v. GOLSON et al. (MASSACHUSETTS BONDING & INSURANCE CO., Intervener)
• Court: Louisiana Supreme Court

174 So. 876

187 La. 363

ADAMS v. GOLSON et al. (MASSACHUSETTS BONDING & INSURANCE CO., Intervener)

Nos. 34267, 34268

Supreme Court of Louisiana

April 26, 1937

Rehearing Denied May 24, 1937

Annulled in part and affirmed in part.

James J. Bailey and Joseph A. Loret, both of Baton Rouge, for relators.

Albritton & Hardin, of Baton Rouge, for respondents.

OPINION

FOURNET, Justice.

This is a suit to recover from Mrs. Willie McCoy Golson and her husband, Lamont P. Golson, individually and in solido, the sum of $ 7,866.39 for personal injuries and property damages sustained by the plaintiff, Charles L. Adams, in a collision between his motorcycle, which he was riding, and an automobile belonging to the defendant Lamont P. Golson, which was being driven by his wife, at the intersection of North and North Twelfth streets in the city of Baton Rouge, on the evening of March 7, 1934, about 6:30 o'clock. The collision was alleged to have been caused through the negligence and carelessness of the defendant Mrs. Willie McCoy Golson in making a left-hand turn from North street into North Twelfth street.

The demand against the defendant Lamont P. Golson is predicated upon the theory that Mrs. Golson, at the moment of the accident, was driving an automobile belonging to the community with the express or implied consent of her husband on an errand or mission with which the community was concerned and, therefore, was acting as an agent of the community and the husband, as head and master of the community, is liable for the tort committed by his wife while so operating the car.

The defendants answered, denying that Mrs. Golson was guilty of any negligence, and, in the alternative pleaded contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff. They also denied that Mrs. Golson was the agent of her husband in the operation of the automobile and denied that she was on an errand for the community. The defendant Lamont P. Golson filed a reconventional demand against plaintiff for damages to his automobile.

The Massachusetts Bonding & Insurance Company intervened, alleging that, as the insurer of the plaintiff's employer, it had paid the plaintiff compensation and medical expenses, under the Louisiana Workmen's Compensation Act (Act No. 20 of 1914, as amended), the sum of $ 730 and, therefore, was entitled to have judgment for said amount against the defendants, and prayed for judgment accordingly.

The trial judge rendered judgment, rejecting the plaintiff's demand and the reconventional demand filed by the defendant Lamont P. Golson, and also dismissed the intervention proceedings.

On appeal by the plaintiff and intervener, the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, annulled the judgment of the lower court and gave judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants, individually and in solido, in the full sum of $ 3,354.40, and allowed the claim of intervener in the sum of $ 730 to be paid out of the judgment. Adams v. Golson et al. (La.App.) 171 So. 403.

The judgment of the Court of Appeal is now before us for review upon writs of certiorari granted by us upon the aplications of the two defendants.

It is contended (1) that the Court of Appeal erred in holding that Mrs. Golson was guilty of negligence, but granting she was negligent, that the Court of Appeal further erred in holding that the plaintiff was not guilty of contributory negligence; and (2) that the Court of Appeal erred in holding that by the mere use by Mrs. Golson of her husband's car, with his knowledge and consent, for her ordinary social functions and pleasures -- she having decided to go to a restaurant for a meal -- made her the agent of the community, and that the husband, as head and master of the community, became liable for the torts committed by his wife while so engaged.

The Court of Appeal, after thoroughly analyzing the evidence and circumstances under which the accident occurred, together with the law applicable thereto, concluded that the plaintiff was not at fault and that the sole and proximate cause of the injuries sustained by the plaintiff was due to the negligence and carelessness of the defendant Mrs. Golson in making a left-hand turn from North street into North Twelfth street several feet before reaching the center of the intersection thereof; in other words, to use a motorist's common expression, "she cut the corner," contrary to and in violation of an ordinance of the city of Baton Rouge and the generally accepted law of the road of safe driving; and, further, that she was at fault in failing to keep a proper lookout for motor vehicles approaching from the opposite direction.

Without reciting in detail the testimony of the various witnesses for the plaintiff and the defendant and the other evidence and circumstances upon which the Court of Appeal based its conclusions, suffice it to say that our review and appreciation of the evidence convinces us of the correctness of the finding of the Court of Appeal on this point.

This leaves for our consideration, therefore, the question of whether or not the defendant Lamont P. Golson, as head and master of the community, is liable for the tort committed by his wife under the circumstances and facts of this case, which are substantially as follows: On the afternoon of the accident, Mrs. Golson, with the knowledge and consent of her husband, drove an Oakland Sedan automobile, which was purchased by the husband with community funds, to attend a style show and thereafter remained in town to attend a regular meeting of a fraternal organization of which she was an officer. Just prior to the accident, she had driven a friend with whom she attended the style show to her home and, at the moment of the accident, she was on her way to a restaurant on Third street in the city of Baton Rouge to partake of her evening meal before attending the meeting which was scheduled to begin at 7:30 o'clock p. m. of the same day.

It is said that the question presented here has never been passed upon by this court. The Courts of Appeal of this state, however, in disposing of cases wherein this issue was raised, have held that the husband, as head and master of the community, is liable for a tort which his wife committed while using an automobile with his knowledge and consent, upon the theory that she "was on a community errand" and "was just as much the agent of her husband as head and master of the community as would have been the family chauffeur." Paderas v. Stauffer, 10 La.App. 50, 120 So. 757, 120 So. 886, 887. See, also, Tarleton-Gaspard v. Malochee, 16 La.App. 527, 133 So. 409; Battalora et al. v. Carnahan Creamery et al. (La.App.) 157 So. 612.

There is no liability in this state for damages sounding in tort...