McDONALD v. SENN
Citation | 204 P.2d 990,53 N.M. 198,10 A.L.R.2d 966 |
Decision Date | 11 March 1949 |
Docket Number | No. 5022,5022 |
Parties | McDONALD v. SENN et al. |
Court | Supreme Court of New Mexico |
Frazier & Quantius, of Roswell, for appellant.
E. E. Young, of Roswell, for appellees.
The original opinion filed herein has been withdrawn and the following substituted in considering motion for rehearing.
The question for decision is whether the wife's interest in the community real estate may be sold under foreclosure of a purported lien arising on a money judgment against the wife alone for a personal tort committed during coverture in the operation of an automobile constituting her separate property.
The facts are as follows: The plaintiff (appellant) sued defendants Senn to recover damages for injuries alleged to have been inflicted upon him by defendants in the negligent operation of an automobile. The trial court dismissed the case as to the husband, to which the plaintiff did not object. The trial resulted in a personal judgment against defendant Mrs. Senn for upwards of $3500, from which judgment she appealed to this court, resulting in its affirmance. See McDonald v. Senn, 50 N.M. 222, 174 P.2d 564. A transcript of the judgment was filed, as provided by Sec. 19-906 N.M. Sts. 1941, which is as follows:
'Any money judgment rendered in the Supreme or district court shall be docketed by the clerk of the court in a book kept for the purpose, and shall be a lien on the real estate of the judgment debtor from the date of the filing of a transcript of the docket of such judgment in such book in the office of the county clerk of the county in which such real estate is situate.'
The evidence in the original suit disclosed that the car was owned by the defendant Mrs. Senn; was being driven, at the time of the accident in which plaintiff was injured, by her nephew, a member of their family, and that both defendants Senn were in the car at the time of the accident.
It was to foreclose the purported lien of the judgment mentioned that plaintiff in that action commenced this separate suit to foreclose the claimed lien against described real estate. In his complaint he alleged 'that Mrs. J. E. Senn owns a vested community interest' in such real estate.
It is the judgment in this second suit that is now before us for review. No testimony was taken at the trial, and the case was decided on the pleadings. They consisted of the plaintiff's complaint and the defendant's motion to dismiss, to which was attached Exhibit 'A', an affidavit of Mrs. J. E. Senn, the judgment debtor. In this affidavit, affiant recited that she was the wife of defendant J. E. Senn at the time of verifying the affidavit, and at the time the judgment was rendered against her. She also stated that the real estate sought to be foreclosed was community property of herself and her husband. The basis of the motion to dismiss was that no relief by way of foreclosure of the judgment lien could be granted because the judgment was against Mrs. Senn alone, andthe lien was sought to be foreclosed against real property which was a part of the community estate of defendant and her husband at the time the judgment was rendered. The right to sell Mrs. Senn's community interest in the property for the purpose of satisfying the judgment against her was challenged. The court found in substance that the judgment was for a personal tort of the wife committed in connection with the operation of an automobile owned by her, and that the tort was not committed for the benefit of the community. Accordingly, the court concluded:
'No suit may be brought by or against the community property, as such, for torts committed by the wife, unless the torts of the wife were committed for the benefit of the community.'
The judgment rendered was one dismissing the plaintiff's complaint.
We have not had occasion to decide the question, and the decisions of the courts of the original community property states (counting Washington as one) disclose that only California, Washington, and Arizona have decided it.
The law in this state regarding the property rights of husband and wife is statutory, but was modeled after the civil law of Spain and Mexico and those laws will be looked to for definitions and interpretations, Beals v. Ares, 25 N.M. 459, 185 P. 780; Levy v. Kalabich, 35 N.M. 282, 295 P. 296. These statutes are as follows: (1941 Compilation):
* * *'
'31-109. Upon the death of the husband one-half of the community property goes to the surviving wife and the other half is subject to the testamentary disposition of the husband, and in the absence of such disposition goes one-fourth to the surviving wife and the remainder in equal shares to the children of the decedent and further as provided by law. * * *,
The civil law of Spain, as translated by Schmidt, sets out the Spanish-Mexican laws in relation to the property of married persons.
Under that law the income from the separate property of the spouses belong to the community, and the husband can dispose of both the real and personal property without the wife's consent; otherwise, it is substantially like that of New Mexico. See Civil Laws of Spain and Mexico by Schmidt, Arts. 43 et seq.
We start with the established fact that the plaintiff has a judgment lien against the defendant's 'real estate'. It her interest in this community property is 'real estate of the judgment debtor', as contemplated by Sec. 19-906, N.M. Sts. 1941, supra, then it may be foreclosed as attempted here under the following statute:
'Any person holding a judgment lien on any real estate situated in this state may subject said real estate to the payment of his judgment by a foreclosure suit in any court of competent jurisdiction, such suit to be instituted and prosecuted in the same manner as ordinary suits for the foreclosure of mortgages, and the sale thereunder to be held...
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