Adams v. Greenbrier Minerals, LLC, Civil Action No. 2:17-cv-03127
| Decision Date | 13 November 2018 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 2:17-cv-03127 |
| Parties | MICHAEL ADAMS, Plaintiff, v. GREENBRIER MINERALS, LLC; JOHN DOE INDIVIDUALS (1-10); and JOHN DOE CORPORATIONS (1-10), Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of West Virginia |
Pending are the parties' cross motions for summary judgment, each filed on September 14, 2018.
Plaintiff Michael Adams is a former employee of Cliffs Logan County Coal, LLC ("Cliffs"). He began working for Cliffs in January 2011 at their Chilton mine as an underground laborer until he was transferred to a communications position there a few months later. (Defendant's Mot. Summ. J., "ECF # 64," Ex. 1 at 12). The communications position was in an office setting, requiring Adams to Id. at 14. In 2014, the Chilton mine closed and Cliffs moved its Chilton employees to the Lower War Eagle Mine. Id. at 13. There, Adams worked first as an outside utility worker, then briefly in communications until a fellow-employee, Ms. Abbott, was placed in the communications position in order to accommodate difficulty she was having with her eyesight, at which point Adams returned to his outside utility position. Id. at 14-17. Adams remained there until November 2014, when he was placed on short-term disability after he "had a slight heart attack and [had to have stents put in.]" Id. at 20. On December 30, 2014, he was released by his physician to return to "an office job[,]" with the limitation of "avoid[ing] moderate to severe exertion[.]" (ECF # 64 Ex. 10).
During Adams' leave, Cliffs was in discussions with Greenbrier Minerals, LLC ("Greenbrier") over the acquisition of Cliffs' mining assets in Logan County. (ECF # 64 Ex. 3 at 9-10). As part of the acquisition, Greenbrier agreed to hire "at least 80 percent of the employees that were employed by Cliffs[.]" Id. at 11. While the discussions were ongoing, Greenbrier contemplated which employees/positions it would retain, and which would be terminated. Id. at 12. It held meetings for Cliffs' employees where they could complete a new application, learn about the application process, and "meet and greet" Greenbrier. (Plaintiff's Mot. Summ. J. "ECF # 66," Ex. 1at 30). The acquisition was finalized on December 31, 2014. (ECF # 64 Ex. 4).
Greenbrier ultimately replaced many of the management-level employees, terminated excessive positions, and provisionally terminated all forty-seven inactive employees who "were off work due to illness or injury and were receiving some sort of wage replacement from Cliffs[.]" (ECF # 64 Ex. 3 at 23-24, ECF # 66 Ex. 4 at 3). It chose not to retain the inactive employees because as an "asset purchase agreement, [instead of a stock purchase agreement], Greenbrier did not have a responsibility to assume the liabilities of Cliffs[.]" Id. at 11. Greenbrier decided not to assume the "liability [from the inactive employees] because [Greenbrier] had no way to determine whether or not [those] people would ever return to work." Id. at 24.
Each of the inactive employees received two letters: a notice of eligibility for severance benefits from Cliffs that included a severance agreement containing a liability release; and a letter from Greenbrier indicating that upon an inactive employee's receipt of a physician's release to return to work, the employee should contact Greenbrier within 24 hours to determine if a position is open, as it was Greenbrier's intent "to offer employment first to as many of Cliff's formeremployees as possible[.]" (See ECF # 64 Ex. 6 at 1, ECF # 64 Ex. 7 at 1, and ECF # 64 Ex. 3 at 24). The letter from Greenbrier indicated that the inactive employees would "be required to go through the same hiring process as all other Cliffs' former employees, including the completion of an employment application." (ECF # 64 Ex. 7). At least three of the forty-seven inactive employees came to Greenbrier in or around January 2015 with physician's releases and were offered positions. (ECF # 64 Ex. 3 at 42, ECF # 64 Ex. 9 at 15-16, and 21-22).
Mr. Adams received each of the letters sent to the inactive employees. (ECF # 64 Ex. 6 and ECF # 64 Ex. 7). On December 23, 2014, Cliffs sent Mr. Adams the notice of eligibility for severance benefits, accompanied by a severance agreement which, inter alia, released from liability Cliffs and their "predecessors, successors, and assigns[.]" (ECF # 64 Ex. 6, as supplemented by ECF # 93, "Joint Stipulation"). Greenbrier is mentioned in neither the notice of eligibility for severance benefits nor the accompanying severance agreement. Id. Also around that time, Greenbrier sent Adams the letter provisionally terminating all inactive employees. (ECF # 64 Ex. 7). However, Mr. Adams also received a letter from Greenbrierat the end of December that offered him a communications position. (ECF # 64 Ex. 8).
On or around December 31, 2014, Adams went to Greenbrier with his physician's release and the offer letter to ask for the position in communications.1 Upon his arrival, he was informed that the offer letter was sent by mistake and that all the communications positions were filled, but that he was nonetheless welcome to apply to Greenbrier. (ECF # 64 Ex. 1 at 63-64, ECF # 64 Ex. 9 at 20). The communications positions were in fact filled by those already holding them prior to the acquisition. (ECF # 64 Ex. 3 at 36).
Adams signed the Cliffs severance agreement and release on January 2, 2015. (ECF # 64 Ex. 6, as supplemented by ECF # 93 Ex. 1 at 21). That same month he started a new job as a car salesman. (ECF # 64 Ex. 13 at 3). By the middle of 2015, Adams had fully recovered from his surgery. (ECF # 64 Ex. 1 at 107).
Plaintiff filed this action in the Circuit Court of Logan County on December 23, 2016, alleging an assortment ofstate and federal statutory and common law violations against Greenbrier, Cliffs, Greenbrier's Vice President of Human Resources Gary Groves, as well as "John Doe" individuals and corporations who are either employees of Greenbrier or Cliffs, or were corporations allegedly associated with or "alter egos" of Greenbrier or Cliffs. (Compl., ECF # 1 Ex. 2). Cliffs removed the action to federal court on June 1, 2017, pursuant to the court's federal question and supplemental jurisdiction. . On January 29, 2018, the plaintiff filed an abbreviated amended complaint alleging only two counts against Greenbrier and the John Does: one for "Discrimination" and one for "Failure to Accommodate Plaintiff's Request[,]" both under the West Virginia Human Rights Act, § 5-11-9 ("WVHRA"). (Am. Compl., ECF # 27 Ex. 1). The claims against Cliffs and Groves were voluntarily dismissed by the defendant, as reflected in orders entered January 8, 2018 and March 14, 2018. .
Summary judgment is appropriate only "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The court's review is guided by the principle that it must "construe the evidence, and allreasonable inferences that may be drawn from such evidence, in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Dash v. Mayweather, 731 F.3d 303, 310 (4th Cir. 2013) (citing PBM Prods., LLC v. Mead Johnson & Co., 639 F.3d 111, 119 (4th Cir. 2011)).
In his motion for partial summary judgment, the plaintiff asserts that he is entitled to summary judgment on Count I of his amended complaint, WVHRA discrimination, for three reasons: first, Greenbrier made pre-employment disability-related inquiries; second, Greenbrier discriminated against him "through disparate treatment of the Plaintiff due to his disability;" or, third, alternatively, Greenbrier "regard[ed] the Plaintiff as disabled at the time the decision was made [not to offer him employment.]" (ECF # 67 at 1) (emphasis omitted).
In its motion for summary judgment, Greenbrier asserts that it is entitled to summary judgment for three reasons: first, it was released from liability through the Cliffs severance agreement; second, Adams cannot prove that he is disabled or regarded as disabled under the WVHRA; and third, the WVHRA did not require it to provide Adams with the filled communications job. (ECF # 65 at 1).
Although there is no evidence that Greenbrier ever hired or discharged Adams, or otherwise owed him any duty, the court nonetheless considers the alternate arguments presented by the parties. The court first considers the merits of the plaintiff's WVHRA discrimination claim. To prevail under the WVHRA, a plaintiff must initially establish a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination. See Bartos v. PDC Energy, Inc., 275 F. Supp. 3d 755, 760 (N.D.W. Va. 2017) (). The plaintiff must show: " (1) he meets the definition of 'disabled' within the law's meaning; (2) he is a 'qualified disabled person'; and (3) he was discharged from his job." Lindenmuth v. Lab. Corp. of Am., No. 2:15-CV-13368, 2016 WL 5109159, at *3 (S.D.W. Va. Sept. 19, 2016) (citing Hosaflook v. Consolidation Coal Co., 201 W. Va. 325, 330 (1997)).
Although the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has noted that the WVHRA "represents an independent approach to the law of disability discrimination that is not mechanically tied to federal disability discrimination jurisprudence[,]" Stone v. St. Joseph's Hosp. of Parkersburg, 538 S.E.2d 389, 404 (W. Va. 2000), the WVHRA is often analyzed under its federal equivalent, the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). Seee.g., Lindenmuth v. Lab. Corp. of Am., No. 2:15-CV-13368, 2016 WL 5109159, at *2 (S.D.W. Va. Sept. 19, 2016);...
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