Adams v. Iten Biscuit Co.
| Decision Date | 09 January 1917 |
| Docket Number | 7984. |
| Citation | 162 P. 938,63 Okla. 52,1917 OK 47 |
| Parties | ADAMS v. ITEN BISCUIT CO. |
| Court | Oklahoma Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
Chapter 246, Sess. Laws 1915, p. 574, known as the "Workmen's Compensation Law," is not an amendment of the Constitution nor does said chapter submit an amendment to the people for adoption by them.
Said chapter 246 of Sess. Laws 1915, which requires all employers engaged in certain hazardous occupations therein enumerated to provide compensation according to certain schedules for all accidental injuries without regard to fault upon the part of said employer arising out of or in the course of employment, and such diseases or infections as may naturally and unavoidably result therefrom, by one of three methods prescribed in the act, and places the supervision and administration thereof under the State Industrial Commission provides penalties for violations of the act, and abrogates the right of action to recover damages not resulting in death, except a right of action reserved to the State Industrial Commission for the benefit of an injured employé is within the authority of the Legislature, and the enactment thereof was a legitimate exercise of the police power of the state.
Said chapter does not violate section 1, art. 5, Williams Ann Const., which declares that the legislative authority of the state shall be vested in the Legislature, consisting of a Senate and House of Representatives, nor section 36, art. 5 declaring that the authority of the Legislature shall extend to all rightful subjects of legislation, nor sections 1 and 2, art. 24, which prescribe the procedure for amending the Constitution.
Neither is said act void because the title thereof does not contain any reference to the provisions making the compensation thereby provided exclusive and abrogating the right of action in the courts by an injured employé to recover damages. The act treats of one general subject, and all of its provisions are properly referable to and cognate therewith.
Section 6, art. 2, Williams Ann. Const., relates to the judiciary, and does not constitute a limitation upon the power of the Legislature to abolish the rules by which heretofore the liability of a master for injuries to his servant was determined, nor the defenses of fellow servants' contributory negligence and assumption of risk.
The citizen has no property in a rule of law, and while rights which have accrued to him under the operation of existing laws and have thereby become vested may not be taken away by a change of the rules, he cannot be heard to complain if the rule is changed before any rights have accrued to him thereunder.
Said chapter 246 of Sess. Laws 1915, does not deprive an employé, injured after its passage, of property without due process of law, nor does it deprive such employé of the equal protection of the law.
The seventh amendment to the United States Constitution was not intended to guarantee a trial by jury to a litigant in a civil action in the courts of the several states.
Const. § 19, art. 2, providing that the right of trial by jury shall be and remain inviolate, except as modified by the Constitution itself, means the right as it existed at the time the Constitution was adopted, but said provision does not operate to prevent the Legislature from abrogating the common-law right of action for injuries not resulting in death by persons employed in certain hazardous occupations, and substituting therefor the scheme embraced in chapter 246, Sess. Laws 1915, in which the compensation awarded is determined without a trial by jury, where the injury did not occur until after the passage of said act.
Said chapter 246 of Sess. Laws 1915 provides for compensation for all accidental injuries, not resulting in death, whether occurring from the negligence of the employer or not arising out of or in the course of employment, but does not include willful or intentional injuries inflicted by the employé or resulting from an intent upon the part of the employé to injure himself or another, or for a willful failure to use a guard or other protection against accident, required by statute or furnished pursuant to an order of the state labor commissioner, and for willful injuries inflicted by the employer leaves the employé to his remedy by an action as heretofore.
The injuries alleged in plaintiff's petition held to be within the purview of the act.
Error from District Court, Oklahoma County; John W. Hayson, Judge.
Action by B. L. Adams against the Iten Biscuit Company, a corporation. Judgment for defendant sustaining demurrer to amended petition, and plaintiff brings error. Judgment affirmed.
J. T. Dortch and Giddings & Lillard, all of Oklahoma City, for plaintiff in error.
Everest & Campbell, of Oklahoma City, for defendant in error.
S. P. Freeling, Atty. Gen., and Smith C. Matson, Asst. Atty. Gen., amici curiæ.
Plaintiff in error as plaintiff below commenced this action against the defendant in error, defendant below, for damages for personal injuries alleged to have been occasioned by the negligence of the defendant while in its employment as a baker. On January 22, 1916, an amended petition was filed, to which demurrer was sustained upon the ground that the injuries complained of were covered by the Workmen's Compensation Law, passed at the 1915 session of the Legislature, being chapter 246, p. 574, Session Laws 1915. From the judgment sustaining demurrer to his amended petition, plaintiff brings the case here, and urges that the Workmen's Compensation Law is unconstitutional because in conflict with various provisions of the state and federal Constitutions, and that even though valid and constitutional, the act does not cover the injuries alleged in plaintiff's petition to have been received by him. The act is too long to set out in detail, but provides a system of compulsory compensation to injured employés in hazardous industries, and places the administration of the act under a commission therein created, and designated the "State Industrial Commission," and also fixes a schedule of awards and provides penalties for the violation of the act. It requires all employers who are engaged in certain hazardous occupations therein enumerated and defined to secure compensation to their employés for all accidental injuries arising out of or in the course of employment, and such diseases or infections as may naturally and unavoidably result therefrom, by one of three methods, prescribed in the act as follows: (a) By insurance with some stock corporation or mutual association or by exchanging contracts of indemnity or interinsurance under the reasonable regulation of the Industrial Commission providing for and securing the payment of the compensation provided by the act. (b) The employer may, with the approval of the Commission, enter into or continue an agreement with his employés to promote a scheme for compensation in lieu of the insurance above mentioned, such compensation to be no less than that prescribed by the act, and not to be variant therefrom as to terms of payment, and provides that where such scheme requires contributions from the employés, the benefits shall be consistent therewith. (c) If the employer shall furnish satisfactory proof of his ability to pay compensation, the Commission may, in its discretion, require the deposit with the Commission as security an indemnity bond in an amount and kind to be determined by the Commission to secure the payment of the compensation provided by the act. The right of action to recover damages for personal injuries not resulting in death arising and occurring in hazardous employments as defined in the act, except a right of action reserved to the State Industrial Commission for the benefit of an injured employé, is abrogated, and jurisdiction of the courts of the state over such causes, except as to the cause reserved to the State Industrial Commission for the benefit of injured employés, is abolished.
The validity of this legislation is challenged by plaintiff upon the ground that it is not a valid exercise of the legislative power, and that it was beyond the jurisdiction or authority of the Legislature as defined by section 1, art. 5, Const., which declares that the legislative authority of the state shall be vested in the Legislature, consisting of a Senate and House of Representatives, but reserving to the people themselves the powers of the initiative and referendum, and of article 5, § 36, declaring that the authority of the Legislature shall extend to all rightful subjects of legislation, and also of article 24, §§ 1, 2, regulating the procedure for amending the Constitution. That the act was not an amendment to the Constitution, and that it did not submit an amendment to the people for adoption, seems too plain for argument. That the changes made are important and far-reaching cannot be questioned, and while they may appear to be revolutionary, yet such legislation has been enacted in Great Britain and various British colonies and in some of the principal countries of Continental Europe, and at the time this case was submitted had been adopted in 31 states of the Union and in the territories of Alaska and Hawaii. The statutes in the different states vary somewhat from those in Europe and in England, and are different from each other in certain particulars, but all of them are based upon the underlying principle that the proper regulation of such hazardous occupations and the payment of just compensation for injuries received therein is a matter of public concern. Many of the laws are optional, while those in New York, Washington, Montana, California, and this state are compulsory. Numerous decisions in states where the statutes are...
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