Adams v. King County
| Decision Date | 25 September 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. 81028-1.,81028-1. |
| Citation | 192 P.3d 891,164 Wash.2d 640 |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | Nancy ADAMS and Matthew, Adams, wife and husband, Appellants, v. KING COUNTY, a municipal corporation; Stanley Medical Research Institute, a foreign corporation; and E. Fuller Torrey, Respondents. |
Grant Steven Degginger, June Kaiser Campbell, Ryan P. McBride, Lane Powell PC, Seattle, for Respondents.
¶ 1 This case presents the issue of whether a person who makes an undesignated anatomical gift by signing an organ donor card authorizes only a hospital to accept such a gift. We hold that the former Washington Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (WAGA), RCW 68.50.520-.620, repealed by Laws of 2008, ch. 139, § 31, .901-.903, allows only hospitals to accept an undesignated anatomical gift. Furthermore, we hold that while the WAGA does not provide a statutory cause of action, unauthorized use of an organ is actionable under common law theories of recovery.
¶ 2 Jesse Smith unexpectedly died of heart problems shortly after his 21st birthday. Shortly before he died, Jesse had renewed his driver's license and signed an attached card indicating his intent to make an anatomical gift of his organs. The card did not ask him to designate a donee for such a gift. Clerk's Papers (CP) at 268-69.
¶ 3 Given the suddenness of death, Jesse's body was sent to the King County Medical Examiner for an autopsy. At the time of the autopsy, the medical examiner apparently had not determined if Jesse made an anatomical gift of any kind.
¶ 4 Pursuant to agreement, the medical examiner shared its autopsy information with the Stanley Medical Research Institute (SMRI), a nonprofit organization located in Maryland and dedicated to supporting research of certain brain disorders. SMRI procures brain tissue for research at various facilities. The agreement between the King County Medical Examiner and SMRI (collectively Respondents) provided that SMRI would fund a pathologist position in the medical examiner's office in exchange for the procurement of brain tissue from corpses received by the medical examiner. CP at 252-57. Dr. Nabila Haikal held SMRI's funded position at the medical examiner's office at the time Jesse's body arrived for an autopsy.
¶ 5 On the day that Jesse died, Dr. Haikal called Jesse's mother, Nancy Adams, to ask for permission to take Jesse's brain tissue for research purposes. The parties dispute the nature of this conversation. According to Adams, Dr. Haikal requested a small sample of Jesse's brain tissue for research.1 Adams did not consent immediately. Dr. Haikal then spoke for several minutes with Adams's husband, Matthew Adams (Jesse's stepfather), during which Dr. Haikal assured him that SMRI did not want to remove Jesse's entire brain. Adams got back on the phone and verbally consented to donate a sample of Jesse's brain to SMRI for the purpose of medical research. Dr. Haikal completed and signed a consent form at the medical examiner's office indicating that Adams had agreed to "the removal of brain tissue" for purposes of SMRI's research support. CP at 234.
¶ 6 The medical examiner performed the autopsy the next day. During the autopsy, the medical examiner removed Jesse's brain along with his other organs for measurement. All the organs were replaced except for the brain, which was retained in whole and sent to SMRI. SMRI also collected tissue from Jesse's spleen and liver as well as blood and cerebral fluid samples for related research on the brain. The autopsy report stated that "[t]he brain . . . is donated to the Stanley Foundation by the family's permission for neuropathological research." CP at 274. Adams made no inquiry about the autopsy.
¶ 7 Over a year later, Adams learned through a Seattle television news report about SMRI's procurement activities at the medical examiner's office. Through this investigation, Adams learned that SMRI had taken Jesse's entire brain and other body samples. Upon learning of this information, Adams allegedly suffered from grief and depression, requiring psychological and psychiatric treatment.
¶ 8 Adams filed suit against Respondents in 2006, claiming a violation of the WAGA as well as tortious interference with a dead body, invasion of privacy, conspiracy, and fraud, among other claims.2 Respondents moved for summary judgment of all claims. Respondents argued that SMRI was authorized to accept Jesse's gift, which foreclosed all liability. The trial court granted Respondents' motion and dismissed the entire case. Adams appealed to the Court of Appeals. The commissioner transferred the case to this court. See RAP 4.4.
¶ 9 This court reviews an order granting summary judgment de novo. City of Seattle v. Mighty Movers, Inc., 152 Wash.2d 343, 348, 96 P.3d 979 (2004). Under CR 56(c), a court may grant summary judgment if the record presents no genuine issue of material fact and the law entitles the moving party to judgment. Id. "In conducting this inquiry, this court must view all facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Hisle v. Todd Pac. Shipyards Corp., 151 Wash.2d 853, 860, 93 P.3d 108 (2004). Such facts must move beyond mere speculative and argumentative assertions. Retired Pub. Employees Council of Wash. v. Charles, 148 Wash.2d 602, 612-13, 62 P.3d 470 (2003). The court should grant summary judgment "only if reasonable persons could reach but one conclusion." Id. at 613, 62 P.3d 470.
¶ 10 The issue for review requires us to determine the scope of Jesse's anatomical gift. The parties agree that if the WAGA effectively authorized SMRI to accept Jesse's gift, then Adams has no cause of action against Respondents. Br. of Appellant at 28. Alternatively, if Respondents violated the WAGA, then we must consider Adams's theories of liability.3
¶ 11 The WAGA authorizes a qualifying donee to accept an anatomical gift for certain purposes. The donor can make such a gift simply by signing an organ donor card attached to a driver's license form. Former RCW 68.50.540(3) (2003). A gift becomes irrevocable upon the death of the donor. Former RCW 68.50.540(8).
¶ 12 The WAGA limits the donees who may accept an anatomical gift and limits the purpose for which a gift may be made:
(1) The following persons may become donees of anatomical gifts for the purposes stated:
(a) A hospital, physician, surgeon, or procurement organization for transplantation, therapy, medical or dental education, research, or advancement of medical or dental science;
(b) An accredited medical or dental school, college, or university for education, research, or advancement of medical or dental science; or
(c) A designated individual for transplantation or therapy needed by that individual.
(2) An anatomical gift may be made to a designated donee or without designating a donee. If a donee is not designated or if the donee is not available or rejects the anatomical gift, the anatomical gift may be accepted by any hospital.
Former RCW 68.50.570 (1993) (emphasis added). While subsection (1) lists all qualifying donees who may accept a gift, subsection (2) expressly authorizes only hospitals to accept such an undesignated anatomical gift.
¶ 13 In this case, Jesse indicated his intent to make an anatomical gift of any organ but did not designate a donee for such a gift. The donor card signed by Jesse simply provided: 4 CP at 269. Jesse checked the "[a]ny organ" box and did not write in any specific body part that he intended to donate. As Jesse did not designate a donee, his anatomical gift is governed by former RCW 68.50.570(2), which authorizes only a hospital to accept such a gift. SMRI is not a hospital as defined under the WAGA. Former RCW 68.50.530(6) (2003). Therefore, the WAGA did not authorize SMRI to accept Jesse's undesignated anatomical gift.
¶ 14 Respondents do not claim that SMRI is a hospital. Instead, they claim that Jesse's undesignated gift permitted any qualifying donee, including SMRI, to receive his gift.5 Respondents point out that under former RCW 68.50.570(2) a gift "may be accepted by any hospital," which they contend permits hospitals to accept donations but does not prohibit any other qualifying donee from accepting the gift. (Emphasis added.)
¶ 15 The canons of statutory construction do not permit such an interpretation. This court recognizes that "[o]missions are deemed to be exclusions." In re Det. of Williams, 147 Wash.2d 476, 491, 55 P.3d 597 (2002) (); State v. Delgado, 148 Wash.2d 723, 729, 63 P.3d 792 (2003). Hospitals are one of several qualifying donees under subsection (1), but hospitals are the only donee listed in subsection (2) as authorized to accept an undesignated gift. If the legislature did not intend to limit undesignated gifts to hospitals, then we assume that subsection (2) would have stated that any qualifying donee could accept such gifts.6
¶ 16 Respondents further claim that subsection (2) applies only when a person dies in a hospital and it does not limit the ability of other donees to accept gifts procured outside of a hospital. While subsections (1) and (2) do not mention anything about the place of death as determining the scope of the gift, Respondents look to the history of the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA), 8A U.L.A.7 to support its interpretation. The original version of the UAGA authorized the "attending physician" to accept a donor's undesignated gift. UAGA § 4(c), 8A U.L.A. 130 (1968). Respondents propose that a situation in which the attending physician would accept a gift logically...
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