Adams v. Law Offices of Stuckert & Yates, 95-CV-4267.
Decision Date | 08 May 1996 |
Docket Number | No. 95-CV-4267.,95-CV-4267. |
Citation | 926 F. Supp. 521 |
Parties | David ADAMS, Plaintiff, v. LAW OFFICES OF STUCKERT & YATES and Stephen L. Needles, Esquire, Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
Helene B. Podell, Mattleman, Greenberg, Shmerelson, Weinroth and Miller, P.C., Philadelphia, PA, for Plaintiff.
Steven H. Sailer, Stuckert and Yates, Newtown, PA, for Defendants.
We address today the cross-motions for summary judgment filed by the parties in this case arising under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692 — 1692o (1982 & Supp.1996) (the "FDCPA") and Pennsylvania's Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, 73 Pa.Cons.Stat. Ann. §§ 201-1-201-9.2 (1993) (the "CPL").
The defendants are the law firm of Stuckert & Yates and one of its attorneys, Stephen L. Needles, Esquire, who was retained by the Plastic and Reconstructive Surgery Center (the "Center") to collect delinquent accounts. The plaintiff, David Adams, received medical treatment at the Center on August 18, 1994. Based on Mr. Adams's representation that his medical insurance carrier would pay for the treatment, the Center provided services without insisting on pre-payment. For reasons unexplained by the parties, however, the bill remained unpaid as of February 1995. Thus, on February 10, 1995, Mr. Needles addressed a letter on the Center's behalf to Mr. Adams, mailing one copy to his home and one to his place of business, requesting payment in the amount of $85.00. The letter provides, in full, as follows:
After receiving the letter, Mr. Adams contacted his insurance carrier, which promptly paid the amount due.
Mr. Adams filed the instant complaint on July 10, 1995, alleging various violations of the FDCPA and the CPL. After a brief discovery period, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that they are entitled to judgment on the grounds that the account in question is not a "debt" and Mr. Adams is not a "consumer" as those terms are defined in the FDCPA. Mr. Adams has countered with his own motion for summary judgment, in which he argues that the undisputed facts lead to the conclusion that Defendants violated the FDCPA in a number of respects.
This Court is authorized to award summary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Thus, the Court's responsibility is not to resolve disputed issues of fact, but to determine whether there exist any factual issues to be tried. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-49, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2509-11, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The non-moving party must raise "more than a mere scintilla of evidence in its favor" in order to overcome a summary judgment motion. Williams v. Borough of W. Chester, 891 F.2d 458, 460 (3d Cir.1989) (citing Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. at 2510-11). Further, the non-moving party cannot survive a summary judgment motion by relying on unsupported assertions, conclusory allegations, or mere suspicions. Id. (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553-54, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)). Boiled to its essence, the summary judgment standard requires the non-moving party to create a "sufficient disagreement to require submission of the evidence to a jury." Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 251-52, 106 S.Ct. at 2511-12. Of course, the mere fact that the parties have filed cross-motions under Rule 56(c) does not mean that the case will necessarily be resolved at the summary judgment stage. The court must consider the motions separately. Each side must still establish that no genuine issue of fact exists and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. United States v. Hall, 730 F.Supp. 646, 648 (M.D.Pa.1990) (citing Home for Crippled Children v. Prudential Ins. Co., 590 F.Supp. 1490, 1495 (W.D.Pa.1984)).
15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5). The Third Circuit has held that the type of transaction giving rise to a "debt" is "a transaction in which a consumer is offered or extended the right to acquire money, property, insurance, or services which are primarily for household purposes and to defer payment." Zimmerman, 834 F.2d at 1168-69 (internal quotations omitted).
Defendants contend that the account was not a "debt" because the health insurance carrier was the party responsible for paying the debt. We reject this argument. First, the present circumstances appear to fit within the statutory definition of debt. Mr. Adams contracted with the Center to receive personal medical services in exchange for cash. Moreover, the Center allowed Mr. Adams to receive treatment without having to render payment contemporaneously. Thus, Mr. Adams was the party in privity of contract with the Center, and — as Defendants conceded in their letter to Mr. Adams — the party against whom the Center would have brought an action had the debt remained unsatisfied. The result does not change merely because Mr. Adams was looking to a third party to make the payment on his behalf. Mr. Adams was the party ultimately liable for retiring the debt. Whether he retires the debt with funds from his checking account or pursuant to his contract with a health insurance carrier is of no moment. Thus, we decline to award summary judgment to Defendants on the ground that the account at issue is not a "debt."
Defendants also contend that they are entitled to summary judgment because Mr. Adams is not "the type of debtor that Congress intended to protect when it enacted the FDCPA." Defs.' Mem. at 5. Of course, the most reliable indicator of Congressional intent is the plain meaning of the statute's language. Singh v. Daimler-Benz AG, 800 F.Supp. 260, 261 (E.D.Pa.1992), aff'd, 9 F.3d 303 (3d Cir.1993). The FDCPA defines "consumer" as "any natural person obligated or allegedly obligated to pay any debt." 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(3). Thus, as we have determined Mr. Adams was allegedly obliged to pay a "debt," we must conclude that he is a "consumer" for purposes of the FDCPA. Accordingly, Defendants' motion, in this respect as well, must be denied.
In his motion for summary judgment, Mr. Adams argues that Defendant violated the FDCPA in a number of respects. Although Defendants have not filed a cross-motion for summary judgment as to the particular alleged violations of the FDCPA, they contend in their opposition to Mr. Adams's motion that under the undisputed facts presented, Defendants cannot be liable under the FDCPA. In such a situation, the district court possesses the discretion to award summary judgment to the non-moving party as long as the original movant "`has had an adequate opportunity to show that there is a genuine issue and that his opponent is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'" National Expositions, Inc. v. Crowley Maritime Corp., 824 F.2d 131, 133-34 (1st Cir. 1987) (Breyer, J.) ( ); see McLaughlin v. Compton, 834 F.Supp. 743, 746 (E.D.Pa.1993) (, )rev'd in part on other grounds, 57 F.3d 270 (3d Cir.1995). Mr. Adams has had that opportunity here. The facts of the case are straightforward and undisputed. The only issues presented concern whether Defendants violated the FDCPA in the manners alleged. Mr. Adams has presented his arguments regarding these issues in both his own motion and his opposition to Defendants' motion. Accordingly, we will treat Defendants' opposition to Plaintiff's motion as a motion for summary judgment as to the alleged violations of the FDCPA.
Mr. Adams contends that Defendants violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692g in that certain language in the letter overshadows and contradicts the validation notice. Specifically, Mr. Adams argues that by raising the possibility of both a lawsuit and damage to Mr. Adams's...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Pollice v. National Tax Funding, L.P.
...that it has met this standard. See Fox v. Citicorp Credit Servs., Inc., 15 F.3d 1507, 1514 (9th Cir.1994); Adams v. Law Offices of Stuckert & Yates, 926 F.Supp. 521, 529 (E.D.Pa.1996). However, the application of this standard to mistake of legal error, rather than the traditional clerical ......
-
Foster v. D.B.S. Collection Agency
...improper conduct that the FDCPA fails to address specifically.'" Edwards, 136 F.Supp.2d at 806 (quoting Adams v. Law Offices of Stuckert & Yates, 926 F.Supp. 521, 528 (E.D.Pa.1996)). Thus, the Court hereby dismisses Plaintiffs § 1692f claims to the extent that they have been squarely addres......
-
Drossin v. National Action Financial Services
...collector must have in place some ongoing policy that operates to detect, correct and prevent errors." Adams v. Law Offices of Stuckert & Yates, 926 F.Supp. 521, 529 (E.D.Pa.1996); see also, Crawford v. Credit Collection Servs., 898 F.Supp. 699, 703 (D.S.D.1995) (no testimony as to any proc......
-
Humes v. LVNV Funding, L.L.C. (In re Humes)
...§ 1692f arises where a debt collector abuses its superior economic position and level of sophistication. Adams v. Law Offices of Stuckert & Yates, 926 F.Supp. 521, 528 (E.D.Pa.1996); see Williams v. Javitch, Block & Rathbone, LLP, 480 F.Supp.2d 1016, 1023 (S.D.Ohio 2007) (noting two “hallma......