Adams v. Luzerne Cnty.

• Decision Date: 06 August 2014
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 3:13–CV–01102.
• Citation: 36 F.Supp.3d 511
• Parties: Rebecca ADAMS and James J. McFarland, Plaintiffs, v. LUZERNE COUNTY, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania

36 F.Supp.3d 511

Rebecca ADAMS and James J. McFarland, Plaintiffs

v.LUZERNE COUNTY, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 3:13–CV–01102.

United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania.

Signed Aug. 6, 2014.

William E. Vinsko, Jr., Brian M. Vinsko, Vinsko & Associates, P.C., Wilkes–Barre, PA, for Plaintiffs.

John G. Dean, Elliott Greenleaf & Dean, Scranton, PA, Mark W. Bufalino, Paul A. Galante, Elliott Greenleaf & Dean, Wilkes–Barre, PA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM

KAROLINE MEHALCHICK, United States Magistrate Judge.

Plaintiffs Rebecca Adams and James J. McFarland filed this action pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (PHRA), 43 P.S. § 951 et seq. They name as defendants the County of Luzerne, Luzerne County 911 Emergency Services, aka Luzerne County Department of Public Safety, and Luzerne County Commissioners Stephen A. Urban, Thomas Conney, and Maryanne C. Petrilla. Pending before the Court is Defendants' motion to dismiss. (Doc. 11).

I. Background and Procedural History

Plaintiff Rebecca Adams was employed by the Luzerne County 911 Call Center for approximately five years as a dispatcher and dispatch shift supervisor prior to her resignation on October 20, 2010. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 11, 79). Plaintiff McFarland was the Executive Director of Luzerne County 911 Call Center for seven months prior to his termination on November 18, 2010. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 83, 103–105).

In the spring of 2010, Edward Casaldi was appointed as Acting Executive Director of the Luzerne County 911 Call Center by the Luzerne County Commissioners. (Doc. 1, ¶ 14). In May 2010, a petition was circulated among the staff at the 911 Call Center to keep Casaldi as the Executive Director permanently. (Doc. 1, ¶ 15). Adams and her colleague, Thomas Farrell, both dispatch supervisors, chose not to sign the petition. (Doc. 1, ¶ 16). Adams alleges that because of her refusal to sign the petition, phone calls between Farrell and her were recorded without permission at the direction of Casaldi. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 17–19). Adams alleges that a recording of several phone conversations were spliced together to appear as though Adams and Farrell had engaged in a two-hour personal phone conversation on the County Supervisor Line. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 20–22). Adams avers that this recording was made because neither Adams nor Farrell signed the petition to retain Casaldi as the Executive Director. (Doc. 1, ¶ 34). Adams further alleges that the treatment of her was “harsher and more direct, as she was a female,” than the treatment of Farrell. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 38, 47, 50).

McFarland was directly responsible for the shift supervisors, including Adams and Farrell. (Doc. 1, ¶ 39). McFarland alleges that he refused to “write up” Adams for insubordination. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 40–42). Plaintiffs allege that part of McFarland's termination was based on the fact that McFarland had “resisted the targeted discrimination of Adams and Farrell and the implementation of constant reprimands.” (Doc. 1, ¶ 99).

On April 25, 2013, Plaintiffs filed the instant complaint. In the complaint, Adams alleges a First Amendment retaliation claim; a Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim; violations of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act; violations of the Pennsylvania Wiretap Act; violations of the Federal Wiretap Act; and a defamation claim. (Doc. 1). McFarland alleges a First Amendment retaliation claim, a Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim; a violation of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act; and a defamation claim. (Doc. 1). On October 25, 2013, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on the following claims: Adams' First Amendment retaliation claim; McFarland's First Amendment retaliation claim; McFarland's Equal Protection claim; McFarland's PHRA claim; Adams' Pennsylvania and Federal wiretap claims; Adams' defamation claim; and McFarland's defamation claim. (Doc. 11). On November 8, 2013, Defendants filed a brief in support. (Doc. 14). On December 27, 2013, Plaintiffs filed a brief in opposition (Doc. 28), and on January 13, 2014, Defendants filed a reply brief. (Doc. 29). The parties have consented to proceed before a United States magistrate judge in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73. (Doc. 17; Doc. 18). This matter is ripe for disposition.

II. Discussion

A. Legal Standard

Rule 12(b)(6) provides that a complaint should be dismissed for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has noted the evolving standards governing pleading practice in federal court, stating that:

Standards of pleading have been in the forefront of jurisprudence in recent years. Beginning with the Supreme Court's opinion in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), continuing with our opinion in Phillips [v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224 (3d Cir.2008) ]and culminating recently with the Supreme Court's decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1955, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009), pleading standards have seemingly shifted from simple notice pleading to a more heightened form of pleading, requiring a plaintiff to plead more than the possibility of relief to survive a motion to dismiss.

Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 209–10 (3d Cir.2009).

In considering whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the court must accept as true all allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are to be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir.1994). However, a court “need not credit a complaint's ‘bald assertions' or ‘legal conclusions' when deciding a motion to dismiss.” Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir.1997). A court need not assume that a plaintiff can prove facts that the plaintiff has not alleged. Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526, 103 S.Ct. 897, 74 L.Ed.2d 723 (1983). A plaintiff must provide some factual grounds for relief which “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009), the Supreme Court held that, when considering a motion to dismiss, a court should “begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. In deciding the motion, the Court may consider the facts alleged on the face of the complaint, as well as “documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice.” Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322, 127 S.Ct. 2499, 168 L.Ed.2d 179 (2007).

A. Luzerne County 911 Emergency Services

Plaintiffs withdraw their claims against Luzerne County 911 Emergency Services, on the stipulation that in the event that during the course of litigation it is discovered that Luzerne County 911 Emergency Services is a separate entity or agency, Defendant Luzerne County will assume full and complete liability for Luzerne County 911 Emergency Services. (Doc. 28, p. 18). As such, Luzerne County 911 Emergency Services is DISMISSED from this action without prejudice.

B. Adams and McFarland's First Amendment Claims

To state a First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff must allege two things: (1) that the activity in question is protected by the First Amendment, and (2) that the protected activity was a substantial factor in the alleged retaliatory action. Campbell v. W. Pittston Borough, 498 Fed.Appx. 186, 189 (3d Cir.2012) (citing Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 241 (3d Cir.2006) ). The first factor is a question of law; the latter factor is a question of fact. Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 241 (3d Cir.2006). A public employee's statement is protected activity only where (1) the employee spoke as a citizen, (2) about a matter of public concern, and (3) the government employer did not have “an adequate justification for treating the employee differently from any other member of the general public” as a result of the statement he made. Hill, 455 F.3d at 241–42 (quoting Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418, 126 S.Ct. 1951, 164 L.Ed.2d 689 (2006) ).

In Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 126 S.Ct. 1951, 164 L.Ed.2d 689 (2006), the Supreme Court held that speech by a public employee made within the scope of employment was not protected by the First Amendment. In Garcetti, the Court held “when public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline.” Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421, 126 S.Ct. 1951. In reaching this conclusion, the Court reiterated that “public employees do not surrender all their First Amendment rights by reason of their employment. Rather, the First Amendment protects a public employee's right, in certain circumstances, to speak as a citizen addressing matters of public concern.” Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 417, 126 S.Ct. 1951 (citing, inter alia, Pickering v. Board of Education of Township High School Dist. 205, Will County, 391 U.S. 563, 568, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968), Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983), Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 384, 107 S.Ct. 2891, 97 L.Ed.2d 315 (1987) ).

An employee's speech addresses a matter of...