Adams v. NaphCare, Inc.

• Decision Date: 24 March 2017
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:16cv229
• Citation: 244 F.Supp.3d 546
• Parties: Roxanne ADAMS, Administrator of the Estate of Jamycheal M. Mitchell, Plaintiff, v. NAPHCARE, INC., et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia

244 F.Supp.3d 546

Roxanne ADAMS, Administrator of the Estate of Jamycheal M. Mitchell, Plaintiff,

v.NAPHCARE, INC., et al., Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:16cv229

United States District Court, E.D. Virginia.

Signed March 24, 2017

Mark J. Krudys, Esquire, Sun Trust Center, John F. Preis, Esquire, Henrico, VA, for Plaintiff.

Nicholas F. Simopoulos, Esquire, Adam J. Yost, Esquire, Alexander K. Page, Esquire, Office of the Attorney General, Edward J. McNelis Ill, Esquire, Christopher F. Quirk, Esquire, Grace Morse–McNelis, Mark R. Colombell, Esquire, William W. Tunner, Esquire, Michael G. Matheson, Esquire, William D. Prince IV, Esquire, David P. Corrigan, Esquire, Jeremy D. Capps, Esquire, Maurice S. Fisher, Jr., Esquire, Richmond, VA, Jeff W. Rosen, Esquire, Jeffrey A. Hunn, Esquire, Virginia Beach, VA, Ryan F. Furgurson, Esquire, Gregory F. Holland, Esquire, Glen Allen, VA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM ORDER

REBECCA BEACH SMITH, CHIEF JUDGE

This matter comes before the court on the Motion to Dismiss ("Motion") and Memorandum in Support filed by Defendant Natalya Thomas ("Thomas") on August 15, 2016. ECF Nos. 109, 110. The Plaintiff filed a Response on September 12, 2016, ECF No. 129, and on September 30, 2016, Thomas filed a Reply. ECF No. 135.

On October 3, 2016, this court referred the Motion to United States Magistrate Judge Lawrence R. Leonard, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b), to conduct hearings, including evidentiary hearings, if necessary, and to submit to the undersigned District Judge proposed findings of fact, if applicable, and recommendations for the disposition of the Motion. ECF No. 137.

Having conducted a hearing regarding the Motion on October 19, 2016, ECF No. 139, the Magistrate Judge filed the Report and Recommendation ("R & R") on February 22, 2017. ECF No. 164. The Magistrate Judge recommended denying the Motion. R & R at 1. By copy of the R & R, the parties were advised of their right to file written objections to the findings and recommendations made by the Magistrate Judge. See id. at 17–18. On March 8, 2017, Thomas filed Objections to the R & R. ECF No. 168. On March 20, 2017, the Plaintiff filed a Response to the Objections. ECF No. 170. The matter has been fully briefed and is ripe for review.

I.

This action was brought by the Plaintiff in her capacity as the administrator of the estate of Jamycheal Mitchell ("Mitchell"), who died as a pretrial detainee in the Hampton Roads Regional Jail ("HRRJ"). Compl. ¶¶ 1, 20. During Mitchell's period of pretrial detention, Defendant Thomas was "a licensed registered nurse and the Health Services Administrator at HRRJ," employed by Defendant NaphCare, Inc. ("NaphCare"). Id. ¶ 27. Under a contract with HRRJ, NaphCare provided on-site medical services to the HRRJ inmates, including Mitchell, and supervised, directed, and controlled health care personnel at the jail. Id. ¶ 21. Throughout the Complaint, Defendant Thomas and other Defendants who worked for NaphCare are collectively referred to as the "NaphCare Defendants." Id. ¶ 32. The Complaint alleges the following claims against Defendant Thomas in particular: negligence, gross negligence, and willful and wanton negligence under Virginia law (Count One), id. ¶¶ 202–211; deprivation of civil rights through the denial, delay, and withholding of medical care, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count Two), id. ¶¶ 212–223; deprivation of civil rights due to conditions of detention, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count Three), id. ¶¶ 224–238; and a general deprivation of civil rights, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count Five), id. ¶¶ 252–258.

In the instant Motion, filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), Thomas seeks dismissal of the aforementioned claims due to the Plaintiff's failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Mot. at 1. The Magistrate Judge, accepting the facts as alleged in the Plaintiff's Complaint as true, found that the Plaintiff has sufficiently stated these claims against Thomas, and recommended denying the Motion. See R & R at 13–17.

II.

Pursuant Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b), the court, having reviewed the record in its entirety, shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the R & R to which a party has specifically objected. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). The court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, or recommit the matter to him with instructions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C).

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint must be dismissed when a plaintiff's allegations fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). "A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of a complaint; importantly, it does not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses." Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin , 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992). "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). Facial plausibility means that a "plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (citing Twombly , 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). It is, therefore, not enough for a plaintiff to allege facts demonstrating a "sheer possibility" or "mere[ ] consist[ency]" with unlawful conduct. Id. (citing Twombly , 550 U.S. at 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ).

The Supreme Court has offered the following guidance to courts evaluating a motion to dismiss:

[A] court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.

Id. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937. That is, the court accepts facts alleged in the complaint as true and views those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See, e.g. , Venkatraman v. REI Sys., Inc. , 417 F.3d 418, 420 (4th Cir. 2005). After doing so, the court should not grant the defendant's motion if the plaintiff "demonstrate[s] more than ‘a sheer possibility’ " that the defendant has violated his rights, by "articulat[ing] facts, when accepted as true, that ‘show’ that the plaintiff has stated a claim entitling him to relief ...." Francis v. Giacomelli , 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 ) (as only quoting "a sheer possibility").

III.

Thomas has submitted four (4) Objections to the R & R.¹ ECF No. 168. Having reviewed the record in its entirety, the court herein makes a de novo determination of those portions of the R & R to which a party has specifically objected. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). The court will address each of the Objections in turn.

A. First Objection

In the First Objection, Thomas argues that Counts Three and Five are duplicative of Count Two, constituting "the same cause of action arising out of the same set of facts labelled by three different names," and that "claims that are ... essentially the same cause of action against the same defendant are duplicative and should be dismissed." Objs. at 5 (citing Love–Lane v. Martin , 355 F.3d 766, 783 (4th Cir. 2004) ). Specifically, Thomas asserts that the claim in Count Three, alleging unconstitutional conditions of confinement, is "substantively the same" as the claim in Count Two, alleging unconstitutionally deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. Id. at 6. Thomas further asserts that the Magistrate Judge misconstrued applicable law, in particular Hill v. Nicodemus , 979 F.2d 987, 991 (4th Cir. 1992), and that, because "the standard to show a violation under the Fourteenth Amendment for medical care that amounts to an unconstitutional condition of confinement (Count [Three] ) is the same as the standard for the failure to provide medical care under the Eight[h] Amendment (Count [Two] )," the court should dismiss Count Three as "duplicative" of Count Two. Id. at 7–8. Moreover, Thomas argues that because Count Five "cannot be construed as more than a restatement of Plaintiff's deliberate indifference claim in Count [Two]," it should also be dismissed. See id. at 8–9.

In response, the Plaintiff argues that Thomas lacks legal support for the proposition of duplicative counts, see Pl.'s Resp. to Objs. at 2, and that the Magistrate Judge was correct in observing that Thomas "failed to cite any authority for the proposition that a claim which overlaps another should be dismissed solely on th[is] ground, or for the proposition that counts which seek duplicative relief are appropriately dismissed at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage." Id. at 8 (quoting R & R at 17) (alteration to match language in R & R). The Plaintiff further argues that the cases cited by Thomas are "inapposite," because they "concern the implication of suing a public official in his/her official capacity," not the instant matter, id. at 13, and that the language of Thomas's objection "concedes that a failure to provide medical care claim is different from a conditions-of-confinement/detention claim." Id. at 14.

The court agrees with the Plaintiff, and the Magistrate Judge was correct in recommending not to dismiss claims based on Thomas's argument that the claims are "duplicative." Counts Two, Three, and Five present different claims, and the standard of proof for each claim, shared or not, does not make the claims themselves the...