Sirleaf v. Clarke
| Decision Date | 16 March 2020 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 3:18CV311 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia |
| Parties | PRIEST MOMOLU V.S. SIRLEAF, JR., Plaintiff, v. HAROLD W. CLARKE, et al., Defendants. |
Priest Momolu V.S. Sirleaf, Jr., a Virginia inmate proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, raising seven claims stemming from his religious practices while incarcerated.1 The matter proceeds on Sirleaf's Particularized Complaint ("Complaint," ECF No. 14).2 Sirleaf names as Defendants: Harold W. Clarke, Director, Virginia Department of Corrections ("VDOC"); David Robinson, Chief of Corrections Operations, VDOC; Eddie Pearson, Warden, Greensville Correctional Center ("GCC"); Cynthia Putney, Assistant Warden, GCC; Louise Goode, Assistant Warden, GCC; Mark Engelke,3Director of Food Services, GCC; and, Chaplain Hollenbaugh, Chaplain, GCC, (collectively "Defendants").4
Defendants have moved to dismiss this action for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), (the "Motion to Dismiss") (ECF No. 22). Despite the provision of notice pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975),5 and an extension of time, Sirleaf has not responded to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will GRANT IN PART and DENY IN PART the Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 22.).
Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA") this Court must dismiss any action filed by a prisoner if the Court determines the action (1) "is frivolous" or (2) "fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The first standard includes claims based upon "an indisputably meritless legal theory," or claimswhere the "factual contentions are clearly baseless." Clay v. Yates, 809 F. Supp. 417, 427 (E.D. Va. 1992) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989)), aff'd, 36 F.3d 1091 (4th Cir. 1994). The second standard is the familiar standard for a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
"A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of a complaint; importantly, it does not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses." Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992) (citing 5A Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1356 (1990)). In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a plaintiff's well-pleaded allegations are taken as true and the complaint is viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993); see also Martin, 980 F.2d at 952. This principle applies only to factual allegations, however, and "a court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "require[] only 'a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,' in order to 'give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (omission in original) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). Plaintiffs cannot satisfy this standard with complaints containing only "labels and conclusions" or a "formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action." Id. (citations omitted). Instead, a plaintiff must assert facts that rise above speculation and conceivability to those that "show" a claim that is "plausible on its face." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2);Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). In order for a claim or complaint to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, the plaintiff must "allege facts sufficient to state all the elements of [his or] her claim." Bass v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 324 F.3d 761, 765 (4th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted).
Lastly, while the Court liberally construes pro se complaints, Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978), it does not act as the inmate's advocate, sua sponte developing statutory and constitutional claims the inmate failed to clearly raise on the face of his or her complaint, see Brock v. Carroll, 107 F.3d 241, 243 (4th Cir. 1997) (Luttig, J., concurring); Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
Sirleaf's Complaint is lengthy, repetitive, and conclusory, and it is hardly a model of clarity. Because Sirleaf proceeds pro se, the Court liberally construes Sirleaf to raise seven claims based on Defendants' allegedly discriminatory conduct.
To begin, Sirleaf claims that he "is a Liberian national, with permanent resident alien status," (Compl. ¶ 1), and during the time period relevant to this suit, Sirleaf was incarcerated at GCC. (See id. ¶ 7.) Sirleaf states that he "is a priest and co-founder of the Yahvist sect called the Commonwealth of Israel," (id. ¶ 5). He avers that "[t]he House of Yahveh is on the approved religion list, and the Yahvists are a legitimate religion." (Id. ¶ 4.) Sirleaf alleges that he "qualifies for and is serving as the coordinator for the VDOC's House of Yahveh religious program." (Id. ¶ 3.) He also states that he "zealously holds to the major tenets of his religion, which are his sincerely held religious beliefs." (Id. ¶ 6.) Sirleaf filed the instant complaintalleging that Defendants discriminated against him based on his disability and that Defendants denied him his rights to practice his religion.
Sirleaf alleges that Defendants conspired to burden his religious practices to retaliate against him for prior lawsuits that he filed. Sirleaf avers that the House of Yahveh was historically granted rights at GCC, which he alleges were taken away after he filed a prior lawsuit against Defendants. Specifically, Sirleaf alleges that "the House of Yahveh had been observing Hanukkah, Purim, Tish B'Av, and the Fast of Esther at GCC prior to 2015 - i.e., prior to Sirleaf the Priest's lawsuits against the Defendants." (Id. ¶ 42.) Sirleaf contends that one of his lawsuits, which he filed on August 31, 2017 in this Court, "(#3:17CV539)," involved a similar "retaliation claim . . . against some of these above-named Defendants." (Id. ¶ 9.) Sirleaf states that he filed other lawsuits in this Court in 2015. (See id. ¶ 45.)
(Id. ¶ 43.) Additionally, Sirleaf alleges that Defendants "conspired to refuse, continue to refuse, and thereby deprive Sirleaf the Priest (and the House of Yahveh) of the [following] religious exercises they had petitioned the Government to redress their being denied in the first place":
[(i)] their inability to eat a Kosher diet per their religious scruples; . . . (ii) not accommodating the House of Yahveh with the ecumenical services required bytheir sincerely held religious beliefs while providing the same for the religious programs of the Arabic and European/Western religious programs at the prison; [and,] (iii) not accommodating the House of Yahveh religious program with their sincerely held religious belief of the religious exercises of observing the Birth and Coronation Days of Emperor Haille Selassie I.
(Id. ¶ 44). Further, Sirleaf claims that "Defendants conspired to retaliate against [him] . . . [by] discriminating against the stewardship of Sirleaf the Priest as a coordinator, who qualifies, and has a record of being disabled" and refused to provide Sirleaf "with the reasonable accommodations, necessary and requested, for his essential function as coordinator during his free exercise of his religion." (Id. ¶ 36.) Specific examples of Defendants' alleged conduct discriminating against Sirleaf based on his disability are enumerated above.
Sirleaf also states that Defendant "Engelke came to a meeting of the minds with two or more of his co-conspirators to target, discriminate, retaliate, violate and actually deprive Sirleaf the Priest (and the House of Yahveh) of their rights secured under [the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act], and the First, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments . . . by failing to comply with O.P. 803.1," which sets forth VDOC's policies and procedures for reasonably accommodating inmates with disabilities. (Id. ¶ 26; see ECF No. 14-1, at 1.) Sirleaf claims that Defendants conspired "to target, discriminate, retaliate, violate, and did violate," Sirleaf's rights "by amending, adopting, and enforcing O.P. 841.3 in a retaliatory and discriminatory manner meant to persecute Sirleaf the Priest and the House of Yahveh for petitioning the government for a redress of grievances." (Compl. ¶ 37.)
Based on the foregoing allegations, the Court construes Sirleaf to raise the following claims for relief:
To continue reading
Request your trial