Adams v. Norsworthy Ranch, Ltd.

Decision Date31 August 1998
Docket NumberNo. 03-97-00550-CV,03-97-00550-CV
Citation975 S.W.2d 424
PartiesL.T. ADAMS and Marjorie Adams, Appellants, v. NORSWORTHY RANCH, LTD., Appellee.
CourtTexas Court of Appeals

W. Thomas Buckle, Scanlan, Buckle & Young, P.C., Austin, for Appellants.

Philip D. Mockford, Small, Craig & Werkenthin, P.C., Austin, for Appellee.

Before YEAKEL, C.J., and ABOUSSIE and JONES, JJ.

YEAKEL, Chief Justice.

Appellants L.T. and Marjorie Adams (the Adamses) filed suit against appellee Norsworthy Ranch, Ltd. alleging a right to access their property by three routes crossing the adjoining Norsworthy Ranch: express easement, easement by implication, and easement by prescription. 1 Appellee filed a counterclaim seeking a declaration that the Adamses' right of access was limited to one route expressly provided in a written easement agreement executed by the previous owners of Norsworthy Ranch in favor of the Adamses. At the conclusion of a bench trial, the court rendered judgment in favor of appellee. We will affirm the trial court's judgment.

BACKGROUND

In 1941, John and Mayme Ruth Hunnicutt sold to the Adamses 24.86 acres of land out of approximately 450 acres they owned in far west Travis County and Hays County. The property purchased by the Adamses, bordered on the west by Roy Creek, the north by the Pedernales River, and the south and east by the remainder of the Hunnicutt property, is beautiful but rugged, with springs, large cypress trees and a canyon which at the property's south end is fifty to sixty feet deep, full of boulders, and becomes progressively deeper as it approaches the Pedernales River to the north. At the time of the purchase, the closest public road was the Austin and Hamilton Pool Road, 2 which ran along the northern boundary of the Hunnicutt property. Thus, to have access to their property the Adamses had to cross the Hunnicutt property.

About two months after the sale, the Hunnicutts executed and delivered to the Adamses a written easement expressly granting the Adamses access to their property from the Austin and Hamilton Pool Road. At that time, the Hunnicutt property was traversed by an old mail route running from the Austin and Hamilton Pool Road along the eastern and southern edges of the Adams property toward Dripping Springs. This road has now been paved and is known as the Improved Ranch Road. Since their purchase of the property, the Adamses' primary access to it has been from the Austin and Hamilton Pool Road along the Improved Ranch Road to a second road, the Adams Ranch Road, which runs west from the Improved Ranch Road, then over the Adams Access Road and onto their property at its northern end.

In the 1980s, Betty Norsworthy acquired the remainder of the Hunnicutt property and an adjacent tract of land to the south, the whole of which is now referred to as Norsworthy Ranch. She and her son later transferred Norsworthy Ranch to appellee Norsworthy Ranch, Ltd.

In 1993, appellee installed a fence along the boundary between Norsworthy Ranch and the Adams property, but gated the fence at the location where the Adams Access Road crosses onto the Adams property. The Adamses thus now have access to their property over Norsworthy Ranch by way of but a single route.

The Adamses, however, claim three routes through Norsworthy Ranch and sued appellee asserting the various easement claims and requesting damages and other ancillary relief. Appellee counterclaimed seeking a declaratory judgment limiting the Adamses to the single route which existed after the construction of the fence. A bench trial was held, after which the trial court rendered judgment in favor of appellee, holding that a single route had been granted in 1941 by express easement over the Improved Ranch Road to its intersection with the Adams Access Road and then over the Adams Access Road to the Adams property. The trial court further held that this is the only easement the Adamses are entitled to use to cross Norsworthy Ranch to and from their property. Pursuant to the Adamses' request, the trial court made findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Adamses also filed a motion to modify the judgment and a motion for new trial, both of which were overruled by operation of law.

DISCUSSION
Easement Rights

In points of error one and two, the Adamses contend that they were granted an implied easement to use the Improved Ranch Road to access the south portion of their property as well as the north. In the alternative, they argue that the language of the original written easement signed by the Hunnicutts expressly provides for more than one right of ingress and egress to their property off the Improved Ranch Road.

An easement by "implied grant" is created when the dominant estate is conveyed by the grantor. Daniel v. Fox, 917 S.W.2d 106, 110 (Tex.App.--San Antonio 1996, writ denied) (citing George v. Phillips, 642 S.W.2d 275, 277 (Tex.App.--Texarkana 1982, no writ)). In this case, the dominant estate (the Adams property) was conveyed by the Hunnicutts to the Adamses in 1941. The situation of the parties at the time of the conveyance constitutes the operative facts to support a claim of a grant by implication. See id. at 111; see also Hoak v. Ferguson, 255 S.W.2d 258, 260 (Tex.Civ.App.--Fort Worth 1953, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

However, an express written easement exists in this case. Although there was a two-month gap between the sale of the property to the Adamses and the execution of the written easement, the parties do not dispute that at the time the easement was created, its language accurately reflected the intention of the parties to the transaction--the Adamses and, as predecessors in title to appellee, the Hunnicutts. We do not find the short span of time between the Hunnicutts' execution of the deed and the written easement agreement to be significant. Moreover, although the deed and the express easement agreement were signed two months apart, they were filed and recorded on the same day. Therefore, we hold both instruments to be part of but one transaction and their respective executions were for all practical purposes simultaneous.

When an express easement exists there can be "no implied easement incidental to the grant of the express easement except that which is reasonably necessary to the fair enjoyment of the express easement." Coleman v. Forister, 514 S.W.2d 899, 903 (Tex.1974). Accordingly, we must first look to the plain language of the written easement agreement to determine the rights of ingress and egress expressly granted the Adamses before we can determine whether the Adamses have met the requirements for an easement by "implied grant." See id.; see also Capitol Rod & Gun Club v. Lower Colorado River Auth., 622 S.W.2d 887, 893-94 (Tex.App.--Austin 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Wall v. Lower Colorado River Auth., 536 S.W.2d 688, 691 (Tex.Civ.App.--Austin 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

"The scope of an express easement is determined by the same rules which are applicable to deeds and other written instruments." Wall, 536 S.W.2d at 691 (citing Armstrong v. Skelly Oil Co., 81 S.W.2d 735 (Tex.Civ.App.--Amarillo 1935, writ ref'd)). Unless cause exists for going outside the language of the express easement or there is a finding that such language is ambiguous, the Adamses must rely on that document alone. See Coleman, 514 S.W.2d at 903. In the case of an unambiguous writing, courts In this case, neither party pleaded that the written easement is ambiguous. The parties do acknowledge that it lacks definite terms and descriptive language, such as metes and bounds describing the right of access to the Adams property, which make it difficult and cumbersome to determine the rights expressly granted. However, "the fact that an easement clause is vague, indefinite, or uncertain will not necessarily authorize the court to completely ignore the valuable right thereby granted if the clause is susceptible of a reasonable construction as to the true intent of the parties." Elliott v. Elliott, 597 S.W.2d 795, 802 (Tex.Civ.App.--Corpus Christi 1980, no writ) (citing 21 Tex. Jur.2d Easements § 13, pp. 132-33 (1961)). Furthermore, "[a]n express grant of a right-of-way set out in general terms without specifying the exact place for its location can be made certain by the act of the grantee in selecting the easement." Id. Once selected, the grantee's easement rights become fixed and certain. Id. (citing Houston Pipe Line Co. v. Dwyer, 374 S.W.2d 662, 666 (Tex.1964); 21 Tex. Jur.2d Easements § 45, pp. 173-74 (1961)).

will give effect to the intention of the parties as expressed by or as apparent from the writing. See Wall, 536 S.W.2d at 691.

We agree with the reading of the express language of the easement as determined by the trial court. The only right conferred upon the Adamses was by way of what the trial court defined as the "Easement Road": over the Improved Ranch Road to the Adams Access Road and along the Adams Access Road to the gate on the north end of the Adams property. The grant expressly provides an "easement of passing in and along a certain way or road ... across all of said [Norsworthy] Ranch ... along the route or routes that will render the land [of Adamses] ... most conveniently accessible to the Austin and Hamilton Pool road ... together with free ingress, egress and regress to and for ... Adams ... as shall be necessary or convenient at all times and seasons forever." The Adamses contend that the easement language contemplates the possibility that the Adamses may use multiple points along the Improved Ranch Road to access their property. They argue that "route or routes" can be interpreted to allow the Adamses multiple access routes off the Improved Ranch Road to their property. However, we find that a reading of the easement's plain language also supports the trial court's holding an express grant of only one means of accessing the Adams property--by way of a route along the Improved Ranch Road to the Adams...

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