Adams v. Roark
| Decision Date | 04 March 1985 |
| Citation | 686 S.W.2d 73 |
| Parties | Jake B. ADAMS, Appellant, v. Charles ROARK, d/b/a Cherokee Dragway, and Cherokee Dragway, Inc., Appellees. |
| Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
Jim W. Stambaugh, Kenneth E. Douthat, Stambaugh and Associates, Morristown, for appellant.
David W. Blankenship, Kingsport, for appellees.
Permission to appeal was granted to review the action of the Court of Appeals in affirming a summary judgment order, which dismissed plaintiff's suit for damages for personal injuries allegedly due to the negligence of the defendant in the operation of a motorcycle dragway. The Court of Appeals held that plaintiff had signed a release and waiver which freed the defendant from liability. Plaintiff argues that he did not read the release and thought he was registering for a race; that he had no knowledge of the specific risk that caused his injuries and could not have assumed such risk; and that the defendant was guilty of gross negligence for which liability cannot be contracted away. We hold that there is a disputed factual issue as to whether defendant was guilty of gross negligence, and we reverse and remand.
Plaintiff, Jake B. Adams, was seriously injured while racing at Cherokee Dragway when he lost control of his motorcycle and struck a steel photo-electric cell reflector located near the finish line. The reflector was used to determine which driver won a race by being first to break the beam of light reflected off the device. It was one foot by eight inches at the base, and a one-fourth inch thick piece of metal extended eighteen inches into the air.
Adams brought suit against Charles Roark, doing business as Cherokee Dragway and Cherokee Dragway, Incorporated. He alleged that the photo-electric cell reflector should have been constructed of plastic or some other non-rigid material as a safety precaution "because of the known dangers by the operators of the tracks that as motorcycles hit their maximum speed, that they are liable to be slightly out of control."
Defendants moved for summary judgment on the ground that they owed no duty to Adams based on the signed release and waiver. In response, Adams filed his own affidavit and those of nine other experienced motorcycle racers. The affidavits stated, generally, that the racers did not know that steel reflectors were in use, that the device was unique and dangerous, and that they would not have raced had they known of this danger. The Circuit Court for Hawkins County granted the motion for summary judgment.
The document signed by Adams was entitled "RELEASE AND WAIVER OF LIABILITY AND INDEMNITY AGREEMENT." The top half of the document contained the provisions of the release and waiver and stated, in part, that the undersigned
1. HEREBY RELEASES, WAIVES, DISCHARGES AND COVENANTS NOT TO SUE the ... track operator, track owner, ... from all liability ... for any and all loss or damage and any claim or demands therefore on account of injury to the person or property or resulting in death of the undersigned, whether caused by the negligence of the releasees or otherwise....
2. HEREBY AGREES TO INDEMNIFY AND SAVE AND HOLD HARMLESS the releasees ... from any loss, liability, damage, or cost they may incur due to the presence of the undersigned ... whether caused by the negligence of the releasees or otherwise.
3. HEREBY ASSUMES FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR AND RISK OF BODILY INJURY, DEATH OR PROPERTY DAMAGE due to the negligence of releasees or otherwise ....
In addition, the document stated that each signator acknowledged the dangerousness of the event and the risk of serious injury or death.
The bottom half of the release and waiver consisted of two columns of lines with spaces for signatures. Embossed in red upon each space, and beneath the signature of Jake Adams, was the statement "I HAVE READ THIS RELEASE."
Plaintiff does not deny signing the document, but takes the position it is not binding since he did not read it prior to signing and did not know it was a release from liability; that he thought he "was just registering to race and leaving the track something to keep up with the season points race."
In this state, parties may contract so as to release one of the parties from liability for damages resulting...
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