Adams v. Seaboard Coast Line R. Co.

• Decision Date: 22 May 1974
• Docket Number: No. 44036,44036
• Citation: 296 So.2d 1
• Parties: Alvin ADAMS, Petitioner, v. SEABOARD COAST LINE RAILROAD COMPANY, a corporation, Respondent.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 1

296 So.2d 1

Alvin ADAMS, Petitioner, v. SEABOARD COAST LINE RAILROAD COMPANY, a corporation, Respondent.

No. 44036.

Supreme Court of Florida.

May 22, 1974.

Rehearing Denied July 5, 1974.

Edward A. Perse, Horton & Perse, and Beckham & McAliley, Miami, for petitioner.

J. Edwin Gay, Rogers, Towers, Bailey, Jones & Gay, Jacksonville, for respondent.

ADKINS, Chief Justice.

By petition for writ of certiorari, we have for review a decision of the District Court of Appeal, First District (Adams v. Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Company, 277 So.2d 578), which allegedly conflicts with prior decisions of District Courts of Appeal and this Court relating to the evidence required to support proof of negligence and causation under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. We have jurisdiction. Fla.Const., art. V, § 3(b)(3), F.S.A.

The parties will be referred to as they appeared in the lower court: Petitioner, Alvin Adams, was 'plaintiff,' and respondent, Seaboard Coastline Railroad Company, was 'defendant.'

Plaintiff was injured in the regular course of his duties as a car inspector for the Railroad in the Albany, Georgia, yards. He brought suit under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (F.E.L.A.). He was 63 years of age at the time of the accident and had been employed by the defendant or its predecessor, the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad, since 1924. Since 1926, he had served as a car inspector at the Albany yard and for several years prior to this incident worked on the 'graveyard shift.'

Just as other car inspectors, plaintiff made his headquarters during working hours at a shack located between tracks seven and nine. When reporting to work, he usually parked his car south of track nine in an area between tracks ten and eleven. To reach the shack it was necessary for him and the other car inspectors to cross over track nine.

During the daylight shifts the cars on track nine were left uncoupled so employees could easily walk from the parking lot across track nine to work. Track nine was the repair track upon which defective cars were placed until repairs could be accomplished. During the daylight shifts cars were 'spotted,' i.e., they were uncoupled and separated with space between them so that the cars could be worked on and so that employees on their way from the parking area could merely walk on the ground across track nine.

During the plaintiff's nighttime shift, however, for reasons which are not entirely clear, but which related to the saving of some small time and effort on the part of defendant, the cars on track nine were left coupled with no space between them. It had become customary for plaintiff and those working with him on the graveyard shift to make their way from the parking lot to the shack by climbing and crawling between the coupled cars. The alternative was to walk around the coupled cars which was a distance of approximately seven or eight freight-car lengths to the last car and seven or eight car lengths back.

On the night during which plaintiff was injured, he parked his automobile between tracks ten and eleven, and, as usual, climbed between the coupled cars to the shack. Later, during the early morning hours, plaintiff and an apprentice workman rode in plaintiff's car to a restaurant for a coffee break. In going to his car, plaintiff again climbed between the coupled railroad cars and, on his return, parked his car as usual and began his trip across track nine to the inspector's shack. He was again confronted with a string of cars. While crawling through or between them, he pulled his body slightly too hard and struck his head heavily on a law-hanging brake platform which extended into the inter-car area. Three days later he suffered a severe stroke which resulted in his eventual permanent paralysis.

Plaintiff brought suit under the F.E.L.A., 45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq., and secured a favorable jury verdict. The verdict was set aside by the trial court and, upon appeal, judgment in favor of defendant was affirmed.

The landmark decision under the F.E.L.A. is the case of Rogers v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 77 S.Ct. 443, 1 L.Ed.2d 493 (1957). In this decision, the United States Supreme Court set forth the so-called Rogers' Rule which held that the test of a jury case is whether the proofs justify with reason the conclusion that employer negligence played any part, even the slightest, in producing the employee's injury. The cases cited hereinafter by plaintiff, with the exception of Loftin v. Joyner, 60 So.2d 154 (Fla.1952), are post-Rogers' rule cases which apply the Rogers' test.

In the case Sub judice, plaintiff says the affirmance by the District Court of Appeal conflicts with several prior decisions of this Court and the District Courts of Appeal. The decisions of this Court cited for conflict are: Wale v. Barnes, 278 So.2d 601 (Fla.1973); Foerman v. Seaboard Coastline Railroad Co., 279 So.2d 825 (Fla.1973); McCalley v. Seaboard Coastline Railroad Co., 265 So.2d 11 (Fla.1972); Atlantic Coastline Railroad Co. v. Barrett, 101 So.2d 37 (Fla.1958); Martin v. Tindell, 98 So.2d 473 (Fla.1957), and Loftin v. Joyner, supra. The decisions of the District Courts of Appeal cited for conflict are: Atlantic Coastline Railroad Co. v. Cameron, 190 So.2d 34 (Fla.App.1st, 1966); McCloskey v. Louisville and Nashville Railroad Co., 122 So.2d 481 (Fla.App.1st, 1960); Butler v. Gay, 118 So.2d 572 (Fla.App.3d, 1960). We have jurisdiction pursuant to Fla.Const., art. V, § 3(b)(3), F.S.A.

In Nielsen v. City of Sarasota, 117 So.2d 731 (Fla.1960), this Court clearly stated the principal situations which would justify the invocation of our jurisdiction to review decisions of the District Courts of Appeal because of alleged conflicts. The situations were:

'(1) the announcement of a Rule of law which conflicts with a rule previously announced by this Court, or (2) the application of a rule of law to produce a different result in a case which involves substantially the same controlling facts as a prior case disposed of by this Court. Under the first situation the facts are immaterial. It is the announcement of a conflicting rule of law that conveys jurisdiction to us to review the decision of the Court of Appeal. Under the second situation the controlling facts become vital and our jurisdiction may be asserted only where the Court of Appeal has applied a recognized rule of law to reach a conflicting conclusion in a case involving substantially the same controlling facts as were involved in allegedly conflicting prior decisions of this Court.' (p. 734)

Depending on the interpretation given the decision of the District Court of Appeal in the case Sub judice, we have jurisdiction under either one of the two situations outlined in Nielsen v. City of Sarasota, Supra.

If the rule of law announced and applied in the case Sub judice by the District Court of Appeal is the rule of law which was followed in Loftin v. Joyner, Supra, then we have conflict with the line of post-Rogers' rule cases cited. The Loftin v. Joyner case, Supra, is a pre-Rogers' rule case in which the degree of negligence necessary to establish liability on the part of the employer is much higher than that degree of employer negligence, as set forth in the post-Rogers' rule cases in which liability is established where it can be shown that 'employer negligence played any part, even the slightest, in producing the injury or death for which damages are sought.'

If the District Court of Appeal decision is interpreted as applying the less stringent Rogers' rule and not the rule of law announced in Loftin v. Joyner, Supra, which requires a much higher degree of negligence in order to establish employer liability, our conflict jurisdiction would vest under the second situation described in Nielsen v. City of Sarasota, Supra, that is, the application of a rule of law to produce a different result in a case which involves substantially the same controlling facts as the prior case disposed of by this Court. The District Court of Appeal in its opinion in the case Sub judice carefully set out the facts which led to plaintiff's being injured when he hit his head while climbing between coupled railroad cars to reach his work station. The crucial fact to be remembered is that plaintiff was injured while attempting to reach his work station. In the several cases cited for conflict, the respective opinions carefully set out facts from which a jury could have concluded that the employer was negligent. In its opinion, Sub judice, the District Court of Appeal alluded to the fact that the plaintiff in order to arrive at his place of work had to climb between certain coupled freight cars or walk about seven or eight car lengths. He chose to climb between the coupled cars and was injured.

In one of the cases cited for conflict, Atlantic Coastline Railroad Co. v. Cameron, Supra, an action was brought under the Federal Employers' Liability Act which the District Court recognized as having the effect of 'broaden(ing) the scope of liability of the railroad while at the same time narrowing the requisite proof of negligence to sustain recovery by an employee of the railroad.' The facts were that the railroad provided a vertical ladder which afforded little toe-hold, which necessarily required the employee to grasp a wire cable, which broke, in order to climb the ladder and reach his place of work. The District Court of Appeal in holding that there were sufficient facts to support negligence on the part of the railroad under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, stated that the trial court was close to being correct when saying that: 'A mere inference of negligence is sufficient to sustain a verdict.' In the case Sub judice the facts set out in the District Court's opinion amounted to more than a 'mere inference of negligence.'

We find that the District Court of Appeal, in applying and recognizing the standard of negligence embodied in the Rogers' rule...