Adams v. Shelton

Decision Date12 March 2018
Docket NumberCase No. 15-3219-JAR
PartiesKENNETH D. ADAMS, Petitioner, v. JAY SHELTON, ET AL., Respondents.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Kansas
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on Petitioner Kenneth D. Adams' Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1), Respondents' Answer and Return (Doc. 19), Petitioner's Traverse (Doc. 20), his Amended Petition (Doc. 24), and the state court records (Doc. 13). Adams, proceeding pro se, alleges twenty-four grounds for relief, including ineffective assistance of counsel, jury instruction errors, and sentencing errors. This matter is fully briefed,1 and the Court is prepared to rule. After a careful review of the record and the arguments presented, the Court denies Petitioner's Amended Petition without need for an evidentiary hearing.2

I. Federal Habeas Standards
A. Generally

The Court reviews Petitioner's challenges to state-court proceedings pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA").3 The AEDPA requires that federalcourts give "significant deference to state court decisions" adjudicated on the merits.4 Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), a federal court may not grant habeas relief on any claim adjudicated in state court, unless the petitioner establishes the state court decision "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," or "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding."5

A state court's decision is "contrary to" an established federal law if the state court reaches a different result than the Supreme Court has "done on a set of materially indistinguishable facts" or "if the state court applies a rule different from the governing law" set forth in Supreme Court cases.6 A decision is an "unreasonable application" of clearly established federal law if a "state court correctly identifies the governing legal principle from [the Supreme Court's] decisions but unreasonably applies it to the facts of [a petitioner's] case."7 Additionally, "an unreasonable application may occur if [a] state court either unreasonably extends, or unreasonably refuses to extend, a legal principle from Supreme Court precedent to a new context where it should apply."8 Courts employ an objective standard in determining what is unreasonable.9

A federal court must presume the state court's factual findings, including credibility findings, are correct in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.10 The law"stops just 'short of imposing a complete bar on federal court relitigation of claims already rejected in state proceedings.'"11 Courts may not issue a writ of habeas corpus if "'fairminded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state court's decision."12 Even when a petitioner has a strong case for relief, this "does not mean that the state court's contrary conclusion was unreasonable."13

Because Adams proceeds pro se, the Court must construe his pleadings liberally and apply a less stringent standard than what is applicable to attorneys.14 However, the Court may not provide additional factual allegations "to round out a plaintiff's complaint or construct a legal theory on a plaintiff's behalf."15 The Court need only accept as true plaintiff's "well-pleaded factual contentions, not his conclusory allegations."16

B. Exhaustion and Procedural Default

A federal court may not grant a writ of habeas corpus unless the petitioner has exhausted the available state court remedies.17 Under the exhaustion doctrine, "[a petitioner] must give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State's established appellate review process."18 "[A]ny claims not included in a petition for discretionary review are unexhausted."19 Ordinarily, when a petitioner does notbring claims to the state's highest court, a claim is unexhausted.20 However, if a petitioner's claims are barred under state law and it is too late to pursue relief in state court, a claim will be deemed exhausted because there are no state remedies available to the petitioner.21

Even where the claim is considered exhausted because there are no state remedies available, the claim may be subject to dismissal for procedural default.22 For the Court to review a claim that has been procedurally defaulted, the petitioner must: 1) allege sufficient cause for failing to raise the claim and resulting prejudice, or 2) demonstrate that the failure to consider the procedurally defaulted claim will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice because the petitioner made a credible showing of actual innocence.23 "Cause" requires the petitioner show that some objective external factor impeded efforts to comply with state procedural rules.24 "Prejudice" requires the petitioner to demonstrate "actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law."25

C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

The Supreme Court set forth the standard to review ineffective assistance of counsel claims in Strickland v. Washington.26 Strickland requires a petitioner to show both that hiscounsel's performance "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness" and that "the deficient performance prejudiced the defense."27 Failure under either prong is dispositive.28

In reviewing counsel's performance, courts presume that counsel rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.29 "To be deficient, the performance must be outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance. In other words, it must have been completely unreasonable, not merely wrong."30 Petitioner bears a heavy burden of overcoming the presumption that counsel's actions were sound trial strategy.31 This burden increases doubly at the § 2254 proceeding level as federal courts defer not only to the attorney's decision in how to best represent a client, but also to the state court's determination that counsel' s performance was not deficient.32

II. Factual Background

The Court presumes the state court's factual determinations are correct, unless the petitioner rebuts the presumption with clear and convincing evidence.33 Adams has not proffered any evidence in support of that burden. Thus, the Court adopts the following facts from the Kansas Supreme Court ("KSC") opinion affirming his conviction.34

Adams was arrested following an investigation that began with a routine traffic stop of Adams' housemate, Rachel Nelson. Nelson was stopped in Protection, Kansas, after Police Chief Darren Konrade saw her run a stop sign. Nelson appeared to be intoxicated, so Konrade conducted field sobriety tests. Nelson failed the tests and admitted to drinking alcohol and smoking methamphetamine.
Konrade arrested Nelson and advised her of her rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, reh. denied 385 U.S. 890, 87 S.Ct. 11, 17 L.Ed.2d 121 (1966).
Konrade searched the pickup truck Nelson was driving and Nelson's purse. In the purse, he found a handwritten list of several items that he recognized were commonly used in the manufacture of methamphetamine: toluene, D batteries, lithium, starting fluid, and distilled water. Nelson admitted she had purchased some of these items with the purpose of manufacturing methamphetamine. She claimed the manufacturing process was done in Oklahoma, although she indicated that she lived in Protection with "Kenny Adams." After further questioning, Nelson admitted some of the items had been purchased the previous day and were at her home in Protection. Nelson was taken to the police station where she completed a written statement. In that statement, she provided additional details regarding her involvement in methamphetamine manufacturing and implicated George Pitcherello as the person responsible for manufacturing the methamphetamine.
Less than 3 hours after the initial traffic stop, law enforcement officers executed a search warrant on Nelson's home in Protection. On arrival at the home, officers saw three individuals standing by a parked car and a woman and a small child sitting inside the car. Adams was one of the three individuals standing by the car.
While outside the home, officers could smell odors they associated with methamphetamine manufacturing, and, upon entering the home, the officers observed a haze throughout the kitchen area and traced the strong chemical odor to a bottle sitting in a skillet. Officers found a bedroom they suspected was being used for a methamphetamine lab and noticed several items commonly used in the manufacture of methamphetamine. The officers then called in agents for the Kansas Bureau of Investigation (KBI) to process a possible methamphetamine lab.
At that point, the officers detained several suspects, including Adams. Adams was given a recitation of his Miranda rights, after which Adams made several statements that indicated he was familiar with the pieces of paraphernalia being used in his house to manufacture methamphetamine and with the manufacturing process.
The KBI agents performed a complete search of the home and processed a large number of items used in the manufacture of methamphetamine. After these items were tested, methamphetamine was detected in at least eight different samples of liquids, powders, and other substances taken from the scene. Methamphetamine only was detected in at least four samples, while other samples contained a mix of methamphetamine and one or more of the following products: pseudoephedrine, toluene, and ethyl ether. Other samples did not test positive for methamphetamine but contained various chemicals either used duringmethamphetamine manufacturing or produced naturally by the process, including lithium metal, ammonia, ethanol, methanol, ethyl ether, hydrochloric acid, toluene, sodium chloride, and
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