Adams v. Shelton
Decision Date | 12 March 2018 |
Docket Number | Case No. 15-3219-JAR |
Parties | KENNETH D. ADAMS, Petitioner, v. JAY SHELTON, ET AL., Respondents. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Kansas |
This matter comes before the Court on Petitioner Kenneth D. Adams' Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1), Respondents' Answer and Return (Doc. 19), Petitioner's Traverse (Doc. 20), his Amended Petition (Doc. 24), and the state court records (Doc. 13). Adams, proceeding pro se, alleges twenty-four grounds for relief, including ineffective assistance of counsel, jury instruction errors, and sentencing errors. This matter is fully briefed,1 and the Court is prepared to rule. After a careful review of the record and the arguments presented, the Court denies Petitioner's Amended Petition without need for an evidentiary hearing.2
The Court reviews Petitioner's challenges to state-court proceedings pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA").3 The AEDPA requires that federalcourts give "significant deference to state court decisions" adjudicated on the merits.4 Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), a federal court may not grant habeas relief on any claim adjudicated in state court, unless the petitioner establishes the state court decision "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," or "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding."5
A state court's decision is "contrary to" an established federal law if the state court reaches a different result than the Supreme Court has "done on a set of materially indistinguishable facts" or "if the state court applies a rule different from the governing law" set forth in Supreme Court cases.6 A decision is an "unreasonable application" of clearly established federal law if a "state court correctly identifies the governing legal principle from [the Supreme Court's] decisions but unreasonably applies it to the facts of [a petitioner's] case."7 Additionally, "an unreasonable application may occur if [a] state court either unreasonably extends, or unreasonably refuses to extend, a legal principle from Supreme Court precedent to a new context where it should apply."8 Courts employ an objective standard in determining what is unreasonable.9
A federal court must presume the state court's factual findings, including credibility findings, are correct in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.10 The law"stops just 'short of imposing a complete bar on federal court relitigation of claims already rejected in state proceedings.'"11 Courts may not issue a writ of habeas corpus if "'fairminded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state court's decision."12 Even when a petitioner has a strong case for relief, this "does not mean that the state court's contrary conclusion was unreasonable."13
Because Adams proceeds pro se, the Court must construe his pleadings liberally and apply a less stringent standard than what is applicable to attorneys.14 However, the Court may not provide additional factual allegations "to round out a plaintiff's complaint or construct a legal theory on a plaintiff's behalf."15 The Court need only accept as true plaintiff's "well-pleaded factual contentions, not his conclusory allegations."16
A federal court may not grant a writ of habeas corpus unless the petitioner has exhausted the available state court remedies.17 Under the exhaustion doctrine, "[a petitioner] must give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State's established appellate review process."18 "[A]ny claims not included in a petition for discretionary review are unexhausted."19 Ordinarily, when a petitioner does notbring claims to the state's highest court, a claim is unexhausted.20 However, if a petitioner's claims are barred under state law and it is too late to pursue relief in state court, a claim will be deemed exhausted because there are no state remedies available to the petitioner.21
Even where the claim is considered exhausted because there are no state remedies available, the claim may be subject to dismissal for procedural default.22 For the Court to review a claim that has been procedurally defaulted, the petitioner must: 1) allege sufficient cause for failing to raise the claim and resulting prejudice, or 2) demonstrate that the failure to consider the procedurally defaulted claim will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice because the petitioner made a credible showing of actual innocence.23 "Cause" requires the petitioner show that some objective external factor impeded efforts to comply with state procedural rules.24 "Prejudice" requires the petitioner to demonstrate "actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law."25
The Supreme Court set forth the standard to review ineffective assistance of counsel claims in Strickland v. Washington.26 Strickland requires a petitioner to show both that hiscounsel's performance "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness" and that "the deficient performance prejudiced the defense."27 Failure under either prong is dispositive.28
In reviewing counsel's performance, courts presume that counsel rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.29 30 Petitioner bears a heavy burden of overcoming the presumption that counsel's actions were sound trial strategy.31 This burden increases doubly at the § 2254 proceeding level as federal courts defer not only to the attorney's decision in how to best represent a client, but also to the state court's determination that counsel' s performance was not deficient.32
The Court presumes the state court's factual determinations are correct, unless the petitioner rebuts the presumption with clear and convincing evidence.33 Adams has not proffered any evidence in support of that burden. Thus, the Court adopts the following facts from the Kansas Supreme Court ("KSC") opinion affirming his conviction.34
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