Adams v. South Carolina
Decision Date | 12 December 1983 |
Docket Number | No. 83-5547,83-5547 |
Citation | 464 U.S. 1023,78 L.Ed.2d 730,104 S.Ct. 558 |
Parties | Sylvester Lewis ADAMS v. SOUTH CAROLINA |
Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
On petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of South Carolina.
The petition for writ of certiorari is denied.
Adhering to my view that the death penalty is under all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, I would vacate the judgment of the Supreme Court of South Carolina insofar as it left undisturbed the death sentence imposed in this case. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 231, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2973, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). However, even if I believed that the death penalty could be imposed constitutionally under certain circumstances, I nevertheless would grant certiorari because this petition presents an important issue of federal con- stitutional law, upon which State supreme courts and a federal court of appeals are divided.
At petitioner's trial, the judge made the following comments on the reasonable doubt standard:
These instructions guided the jury when it found petitioner guilty of murder and again at the sentencing hearing when it found beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of two statutory aggravating circumstances.
Petitioner objected to the reasonable-doubt instruction at trial and sought to challenge its constitutionality on appeal to the South Carolina Supreme Court.1 Having recently upheld similar reasonable-doubt instructions in capital cases, see, e.g., State v. Copeland, 278 S.C. 572, 300 S.E.2d 63 (1982); State v. Butler, 277 S.C. 452, 290 S.E.2d 1, cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 103 S.Ct. 242, 74 L.Ed.2d 191 (1982), the South Carolina Supreme Court denied petitioner an opportunity to brief or argue the issue, and the Court's decision affirming petitioner's convictions and death sentence summarily disposed of petitioner's challenge to the trial court's reasonable-doubt instruction. State v. Adams, --- S.C. ----, 306 S.E.2d 208 (1983).
Last Term, in Butler v. South Carolina, --- U.S. ----, 103 S.Ct. 242, 74 L.Ed.2d 191 (1982) ( ), I outlined my objections to what apparently has become the standard instruction on reasonable doubt in South Carolina. I continue to believe that trial courts err when they instruct juries that a reasonable doubt means "a substantial doubt" or "a strong and well-founded doubt" or "a doubt for which you give a reason." The Fourteenth Amendment requires prosecutors to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every element of a crime. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970). When a criminal defendant is convicted by proof beyond a strong or substantial doubt, that defendant has not been afforded the full protections of the federal Constitution. Moreover, when a jury is told that a reasonable doubt is a doubt that can be articulated, the prosecutor's burden of proof is unconstitutionally eased.
For substantially these reasons, the First Circuit struck down a reasonable doubt instruction virtually identical to the one given by the trial court in this case.2 Dunn v. Perrin, 570 F.2d 21, cert. denied, 437 U.S. 910, 98 S.Ct. 3102, 57 L.Ed.2d 1141 (1978); see also United States v. Flannery, 451 F.2d 880, 883 (CA1 1971). The First Circuit noted:
570 F.2d, at 24 (footnote and citations omitted).
Though reviewing a state conviction on collateral review, the Dunn panel concluded that the defect in the trial court's instruction was of sufficient magnitude to warrant a retrial. Id., at 25.
The First Circuit's analysis of the reasonable-doubt instructions in Dunn directly conflicts with rulings of the South Carolina Supreme Court applied in this case as well as recent decisions of several other State supreme courts.3 Since this conflict is the culmination of chronic disagreement over the correct definition of reasonable doubt,4 I find this petition an appropriate candidate for review. See S.Ct.R. 17.1(b).
I would grant the petition.
1 The State argues that petitioner waived his right to object to the reasonable-doubt instruction because, following petitioner's initial objection, the trial court issued a supplementary instruction to which petitioner failed to file a second objection. I discount this argument because South Carolina does not strictly enforce its contemporaneous objection rule to assignment of legal error in capital cases. See State v. Adams, 277 S.C. 115, 283 S.E.2d 582 (1981). Indeed, the Court in this case ignored petitioner's failure to object to the trial court's supplementary instruction, and dealt with the claim on the merits. Under these circumstance, I see no barrier to reviewing South Carolina's disposition of this federal issue.
2 The instruction at issue in Dunn read as follows:
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...condemned such an instruction. See both state and federal cases cited in Adams v. South Carolina, 464 U.S. 1023, 1025-26 & nn. 3-4 (1983) (Marshall and Brennan, JJ., dissenting from denial of certiorari review), wherein Justice Marshall "`I continue to believe that trial courts err when the......
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McGowan v. State, No. CR-95-1775 (Ala. Crim. App. 12/12/2003)
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Smith v. State
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