Adams v. State, 34659

• Citation: 192 So.2d 762
• Decision Date: 14 December 1966
• Docket Number: No. 34659,34659
• Parties: Arthur ADAMS, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 762

192 So.2d 762

Arthur ADAMS, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 34659.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Dec. 14, 1966.

Sholts & Adams, West Palm Beach, and Henry H. Arrington, Miami, for appellant.

Earl Faircloth, Atty. Gen., and T. T. Turnbull, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

ERVIN, Justice.

The case before us is an appeal from a judgment of guilty and a sentence of death entered as a result of an indictment by a Palm Beach County Grand Jury, a plea of not guilty, a verdict of guilty with no recommendation of mercy and after a denial of a motion for a new trial.

The basic facts set forth for our consideration reveal that Arthur Adams, Jr., Appellant herein, entered a women's wear store in downtown West Palm Beach, accosted the cashier with a gun and demanded the money in the cash register. It is related that the cashier attempted to persuade the Appellant not to go through with the robbery and a scuffle ensued. During the scuffle two shots were fired from the pistol which Appellant had in his possession--one shot killing the cashier and the other striking Appellant's foot, inflicting a minor injury. The Appellant thereupon fled the scene and was apprehended several hours later at a local bus station. He had in his possession at the time of his apprehension a sum of money approximating the amount of the money missing from the cash register.

This Court is presented with several points on appeal, among which are two warranting a reversal of the conviction and an entry of an order for a new trial.

We are not unmindful of the abominable nature of the offense of which Appellant was convicted below--but neither should we be unmindful of, or shut our eyes to violations of constitutional concepts of due process, the benefits of which cloak every person in our courts of law. It is the duty of this Court to make a determination as to whether the Appellant received what may be considered a fair trial. In view of the circumstances related hereafter we find that this question must be answered in the negative.

We focus our attention at this time upon the contention made by Appellant, viz., that the court erred in allowing the state in its closing argument to make remarks equating the victim of the homicide to wives and relatives of the jurors. We cite as examples the following remarks by the State Attorney and do feel that the same are unduly prejudicial to Appellant's cause.

'* * * Let me say a few words here about capital punishment. Can a woman, Can your wife, your sister, or employees * * * in West Palm Beach, make a living honestly and sincerely without being percepted (sic) to danger of death day by day?'

'When you go home tonight, I ask you to just think If your wife wasn't there because she had been murdered by a robber, and I ask you what you would feel about that? Or your daughter, who is working for a living trying to live * * *' (emphasis added)

That remarks of such a nature have been held to be prejudicial and inflammatory and do constitute sufficient grounds for reversal and new trial is beyond question. See Coley v. State, Fla. 185 So.2d 472; Collins v. State, Fla., 180 So.2d 340; Barnes v. State, Fla., 58 So.2d 157, and Stewart v. State, Fla., 51 So.2d 494.

In Coley v. State, supra, the defendant was convicted of rape and appealed, contending that the court committed fatal error in making certain remarks to the jurors. The statement under attack (made to the jurors by the trial judge regarding capital punishment) was:

'* * * I realize that some people don't believe in it, and I also realize that some of those people that say they don't believe in it, If their little daughter or their wife was raped, they would believe in it fast. Or If their wife was murdered, or some member of their family murdered * * *' (emphasis added) (at 473)

We reversed the conviction and remanded for new trial, finding the remarks prejudicial and equating them with those made by the State Attorney in Barnes v. State, supra. We might add that in Coley, supra, we related that we were persuaded to adhere to the pronouncements in Pait v. State, 112 So.2d 380, prepared by Mr. Justice Thornal, which held:

'We think that in a case of this kind the only safe rule appears to be that unless this court can determine from the record that the conduct or improper remarks of the prosecutor did not prejudice the accused, the judgment must be reversed.' (at 385)

In Collins v. State, supra, the defendant was convicted of rape and appealed, alleging that a certain remark by the prosecutor in final argument was fatal error. The remark under attack, set forth at 342, was: 'I ask you gentlemen, those of you who have daughters, if one of your daughters was violated * * * ". At this point objection by defense was sustained. We held that since the objection was sustained it would be mere speculation on the part of the jury, and of this Court, as to what was to be added to the statement. We went on to add, however, that if the question in the remark had been completed in an improper manner this Court would declare the question improper and reverse.

Barnes v. State, supra, involved the conviction of defendants on a charge of assault with intent to murder in the second degree. At trial, in his closing argument to the jury, the State Attorney made the statement to the jury: 'What if it was your wife or your sister or your daughter, that this beast was after?' We held the foregoing statement highly prejudicial and improper and of such a nature as to unduly create, arouse and inflame the prejudice, sympathy and passion of the jury to the detriment of the accused. We...