Adams v. State

• Citation: 726 N.E.2d 390
• Decision Date: 11 April 2000
• Docket Number: No. 49A04-9903-CR-130.,49A04-9903-CR-130.
• Parties: Dante ADAMS, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

726 N.E.2d 390

Dante ADAMS, Appellant-Defendant,
v.
STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff

No. 49A04-9903-CR-130.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

April 11, 2000.

Rehearing Denied June 1, 2000.

As Amended, June 2, 2000.

726 N.E.2d 391

Robert W. Hammerle, Joseph M. Cleary, Hammerle, Foster, Allen & Long-Sharp, Indianapolis, Indiana, Attorneys for Appellant

Jeffrey A. Modisett, Attorney General of Indiana, Michael McLaughlin, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana, Attorneys for Appellee.

OPINION

ROBB, Judge

Case Summary

Dante Adams appeals the denial of his motion to suppress cocaine that was found at his residence pursuant to a tax warrant and subsequent search warrant. We reverse.

Issues

Adams raises four issues for our review which we consolidate and restate as whether the trial court erred when it denied Adams' motion to suppress.¹

Facts and Procedural History²

On August 15, 1997, Detective Michael Turner obtained a warrant to search safe deposit boxes registered to Adams. Cocaine was discovered inside the boxes and Adams was charged with dealing in cocaine. However, the warrant to search the boxes was obtained based on information that the room had smelled like marijuana and this information had been obtained

726 N.E.2d 392

weeks prior to the issuance of the warrant. Thus, on March 18, 1998, the trial court judge granted Adams' motion to suppress the cocaine because the search was unreasonable and unconstitutional

On March 23, 1998, the Indiana Department of Revenue issued a Jeopardy Tax Assessment Notice against Adams based on the cocaine that was obtained as a result of the illegal search. The next day, March 24, 1998, the State filed its motion to dismiss the charges related to the cocaine found in the safe deposit boxes. On March 26, 1998, the prosecutor sent a letter to the Indiana Department of Revenue ("IDR") informing IDR that Adams was not being prosecuted for the cocaine seized from the boxes.

On March 31, 1998, a tax warrant was issued on the Jeopardy Tax Assessment in order to seek to collect a civil tax debt for the cocaine under Indiana's Controlled Substance Excise Tax ("CSET") Act. After receiving notice of the tax assessment, Adams filed a protest letter with IDR. On April 13, 1998, IDR, units from the Marion County Civil Sheriff's Office, and sheriffs from the narcotics branch of the Sheriff's Office executed the tax warrant by entering Adams' home to search for money or property that could satisfy Adams' tax debt.

During the search, cocaine was discovered "in the stove," r. 174, and "in a bedroom drawer." R. 163.³ Although a search warrant was thereafter sought, all of the cocaine for which Adams is now being prosecuted was found prior to the search warrant being obtained and served.

Based upon the cocaine found on April 13, 1998, Adams was charged with dealing in cocaine,⁴ a Class A felony, and possession of cocaine,⁵ a Class C felony. Adams filed a motion to suppress the cocaine which was found during the search, arguing that the cocaine was fruit of the poisonous tree, found solely as a result of the tax warrant issued because of the prior charges that were dismissed. Adams further argued that the tax warrant was invalid and that he was being subjected to double jeopardy. After a hearing on the motion, the trial court denied Adams' motion to suppress. Adams then properly instituted this interlocutory appeal.

Additional facts will be provided as necessary.

Discussion and Decision

Adams argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the State violated his right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure.

Unreasonable Search and Seizure— Should the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule Apply to the CSET?

Adams asserts that he was subjected to an unreasonable search and seizure because the tax warrant upon which the search was initiated was solely based upon judicially determined illegally obtained evidence from the case which was dismissed. We note initially that this is a case of first impression in this state, and Adams acknowledges that no Indiana cases address "the applicability of a defendant's federal Fourth Amendment, or Art. One, Sec. 11, rights to the CSET." Brief of Appellant at 4. However, Adams asserts that his rights to be free from unreasonable search and

726 N.E.2d 393

seizure do apply to the CSET, that the tax warrant was invalid because it was based entirely on judicially determined illegally obtained evidence, and that the cocaine discovered in his apartment as a result is fruit of the poisonous tree and must also be suppressed

A. Application of the Exclusionary Rule

The Indiana Supreme Court has concluded that the assessment of the CSET does invoke jeopardy. Bryant v. State, 660 N.E.2d 290 (Ind.1995), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 926, 117 S.Ct. 293, 136 L.Ed.2d 213 (1996). "[A]ssessing a defendant with a CSET and subsequently prosecuting him or her with the underlying crime (related to delivery, possession or manufacture of a controlled substance) violate[s] double jeopardy." State v. Mohler, 694 N.E.2d 1129, 1132 (Ind.1998) (citation omitted). Thus, Adams asserts that because the CSET invokes the constitutional protections against double jeopardy, his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure should be invoked as well. The State disputes that the exclusionary rule should be extended to this situation.

Adams cites Lynn v. West, 134 F.3d 582 (4th Cir.1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 813, 119 S.Ct. 47, 142 L.Ed.2d 36 (1998), arguing that it was held therein "that when a state levies a criminal penalty, such as CSET, it must accord the defendant all of his relevant constitutional rights, including the right to be free from unreasonable searches." Brief of Appellant at 4-5.

We must agree with Adams. Because the CSET triggers double jeopardy under Bryant, and because of the criminal implications involved in situations such as this one, it is necessary to extend Fourth Amendment constitutional protections to the CSET. Of particular import in this case is that the cocaine which was the basis for the tax warrant was judicially...