Adams v. Strong

• Decision Date: 17 December 1934
• Docket Number: 31485
• Citation: 171 Miss. 510,158 So. 204
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Parties: ADAMS v. STRONG (LAMAR LIFE INS. CO., GARNISHEE)

158 So. 204

171 Miss. 510

ADAMS v. STRONG (LAMAR LIFE INS. CO., GARNISHEE)

No. 31485

Supreme Court of Mississippi

December 17, 1934

Division B

1 EXEMPTIONS.

Insurer's monthly payments to beneficiary under life policy held not subject to garnishment where there was no showing of agreement by insurer giving beneficiary right to anticipate benefits, and no such indorsement was ever made on policy as required thereby (Code 1930, sec. 5172).

2 EXEMPTIONS.

Under statute relating to payment to beneficiary under annuity contract or life policy, legislative purpose was to permit insured to provide for wife and dependents in such manner as to prevent proceeds of policies from being applied to their debts, and to prevent anticipation of installments (Code 1930, sec. 5172).

3 EXEMPTIONS.

Statutes granting exemption in favor of families are liberally construed.

HON. J. I. STURDIVANT, Judge.

APPEAL from the circuit court of Noxubee county HON. J. I. STURDIVANT, Judge.

Action by C. V. Adams, guardian of Abbie Simmons, against Mrs. Charles Strong and the Lamar Life Insurance Company, garnishee. From judgment quashing the garnishment, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Affirmed.

Chas. Richardson, of Macon, for appellant.

Appellee did not contend that this insurance was exempt under section 1756 of the Code of 1930, or section 1757 of the same code, and the same would not be exempt under either section, because of the fact that the debt incurred was the debt of the appellee, herself, rather than the deceased (see Goza v. Provine, 105 So. 534), but the appellee contended in the lower court that section 5172 of the 1930 Code applies in this cause and therefore that the proceeds of this insurance policy were exempt. If this section has ever been construed by this court we have been unable to find the citation.

It is further the contention of the appellant that section 5172 could not be pleaded by the beneficiary in this insurance policy, but that this section was not intended that the debts of the beneficiary should not be exempt from execution unless this was specifically set out in the contract.

It is further the contention of the appellant that section 5172, could not be pleaded by the beneficiary in this insurance policy, but that this section was not passed for the benefit of the beneficiary but that this section was passed for the benefit of the various insurance companies, so that various beneficiaries would not be assigning and commuting monthly payments or parts thereof to various and sundry persons, and the clause referred to, on page 15 of the record is for the benefit of the insurance company rather than the benefit of the said beneficiary or appellee.

Jno. F. Frierson, of Columbus, for appellee.

The title of the statute, section 5172, Code of 1930, shows that it is intended to include a prohibition against subjecting the proceeds of the insurance policy to judicial process. The title to the statute reads as follows: "Proceeds of life insurance policy not subject to judicial process or assignment while in the hands of the company."

If the statute would permit the funds in the hands of the insurance company to be regarded as liable to judicial processes, then the beneficiary under the insurance policy could submit to a judgment on a matter of debt, and the statute would be entirely annulled or avoided.

Furthermore by all the rules of interpretation and construction and the general rule of reason just set out, the phrase "so provides" does not refer to the subsequent main clause of the sentence, but must refer to what precedes.

58 C. J. 779; Kephart v. Buddecke, 80 P. 501; Newell v. Brill, 83 P. 76; 58 C. J. 780; 4 Words and Phrases (2 Ed.) 609; Blanton v. State, 24 P. 439, 441; Elmer v. Burgin, 2 N. J. Law 186, 193.

The provision of the contract of insurance is the equivalent of a spendthrift trust.

Without the statute it is doubtful if the contract between the insurer and the insured would have been valid. With the statute there is a sound provision made for the benefit of a beneficiary that many times an insured earnestly desires to secure for the protection of a loved one.

OPINION

Ethridge, P. J.

The appellant, having obtained a judgment against the appellee, suggested and caused a writ of garnishment to be issued against the Lamar Life Insurance Company.

The insurance company answered the writ, setting up that it did not owe the appellee, Mrs. Strong, any sum but that she was the holder and beneficiary in a certain life insurance policy issued by it to Charles Strong, deceased, under the terms and provisions of which policy it was provided that six hundred dollars should be paid at the death of Charles Strong to the beneficiary, Mrs. Strong, and same had been paid to her prior to the issuance of the writ of garnishment, and further provided for monthly...