Adams v. United Ass'n of Journeymen & Apprentices of the Plumbing & Pipefitting Indus. of the U.S. & Can., CIVIL ACTION NO. 98-400-JWD-RLB

• Citation: 469 F.Supp.3d 615
• Decision Date: 29 June 2020
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 98-400-JWD-RLB
• Parties: Charles ADAMS, et al. v. UNITED ASSOCIATION OF JOURNEYMEN AND APPRENTICES OF THE PLUMBING AND PIPEFITTING INDUSTRY OF THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA, AFL-CIO, LOCAL 198, et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Louisiana

469 F.Supp.3d 615

Charles ADAMS, et al.

v.UNITED ASSOCIATION OF JOURNEYMEN AND APPRENTICES OF THE PLUMBING AND PIPEFITTING INDUSTRY OF THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA, AFL-CIO, LOCAL 198, et al.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 98-400-JWD-RLB

United States District Court, M.D. Louisiana.

Signed June 29, 2020

RULING AND ORDER

JOHN W. deGRAVELLES, JUDGE

This matter comes before the Court on Defendant United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipefitting Industry of the United States and Canada, AFL-CIO, Local 198's ("Defendant" or "Local 198") Motions for Summary Judgment. (Docs. 737 and 804). There are 38 Plaintiffs (collectively "Plaintiffs") remaining in this matter.¹ (Doc. 773-1). The first motion for summary judgment was filed on October 31, 2019 ("MSJ 1"), and it applies to 19 Plaintiffs.² (Doc. 737). The second motion for summary judgment was filed on February 18, 2020 ("MSJ 2"), and it applies to 19 Plaintiffs.³ (Doc. 804). Plaintiffs submitted memoranda in opposition to the motions. (Docs. 770, 775, 781, 784, 795, 827, 831, and 842). Defendant replied. (Docs. 786, 789, 800, 810, 833, and 844). Oral argument is not necessary. The Court has carefully considered the law, the facts in the record, and the arguments and submissions of the parties and is prepared to rule. For the following reasons, Defendant's motions for summary judgment are granted in part and denied in part.

Also before the Court is Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike. (Doc. 793). Defendant opposed the motion to strike. (Doc. 801). For the following reasons, Plaintiffs' motion to strike is denied with prejudice.

I. Plaintiffs' Claims and Procedural Background

The original 99 Plaintiffs filed a "Class Action Complaint" on May 1, 1998. (Doc. 1). The proposed class of Plaintiffs are all African Americans who: are or have been members of the Local 198; have sought and been denied membership in the Local 198; have been or are currently enrolled in the Local 198's apprenticeship program; or have sought admittance and been denied admission to the Local 198 apprenticeship training program. (Id. , p. 7). The sole remaining Defendant is Local 198. Plaintiffs allege that Local 198 discriminates based on race in the following ways: job assignments; job referrals; lay-offs; board leadership; maintaining a hostile work environment; using racial slurs and epithets; training; compensation; hiring; benefits; representation; recalls; job opportunities; retaliation; preventing work in supervisory positions; lack of assistance in disputes and providing defense; and admissions. (Id. , pp. 9-19).

On July 28, 1998, Plaintiffs moved to certify the class. (Doc. 27). Magistrate Judge Dalby recommended that the action not be certified as a class action on August 31, 1999. (Doc. 185). The Court adopted this recommendation and denied the motion to certify the class on October 29, 1999. (Doc. 196).

Plaintiffs amended their original complaint on July 27, 2001, adding additional Plaintiffs. (Doc. 227). Two additional amending complaints were filed on December 3, 2001, naming additional Plaintiffs. (Doc. 274 and 283). On February 14, 2002, Plaintiffs amended the complaint again, naming additional Plaintiffs. (Doc. 335). Plaintiffs were added in the amended complaint filed on November 4, 2002. (Doc. 493). A final amended complaint was filed on April 15, 2003, (Doc. 518); however, no new Plaintiffs were named in the final amendment.

This case arises out of Local 198's alleged violations of: (1) the Civil Rights Act of 1866 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (" Section 1981 claims"); (2) Louisiana state law for acts of racial discrimination pursuant to La. Rev. Stat. 23:332(C)(1) and (2) and (D) ("discrimination claims under state law"); (3) Louisiana state law for acts of negligence, gross negligence and/or willful and wanton negligence ("negligence claims"); and (4) Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e ("Title VII claims"). Defendant's motions seek to dismiss Plaintiffs' Section 1981 claims, discrimination claims under state law, and Title VII claims. Defendant does not address Plaintiffs' negligence claims; therefore, the negligence claims are not presently before the Court and will remain pending.

II. Relevant Standard

"The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). If the mover bears his burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of fact, "its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts ... [T]he nonmoving party must come forward with ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’ " See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (internal citations omitted). The non-mover's burden is not satisfied by "conclusory allegations, by unsubstantiated assertions, or by only a ‘scintilla’ of evidence." Little v. Liquid Air Corp. , 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (citations and internal quotations omitted). The party opposing the motion for summary judgment may not sit on his hands, complacently relying on the pleadings. Weyant v. Acceptance Ins. Co. , 917 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1990). "Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’ " Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. , 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348. General allegations that fail to reveal detailed and precise facts will not prevent the award of summary judgment. Walton v. Alexander , 20 F.3d 1350, 1352 (5th Cir. 1994). Further:

In resolving the motion, the court may not undertake to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses, weigh the evidence, or resolve factual disputes; so long as the evidence in the record is such that a reasonable jury drawing all inferences in favor of the nonmoving party could arrive at a verdict in that party's favor, the court must deny the motion.

Int'l Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally's Inc. , 939 F.2d 1257, 1263 (5th Cir. 1991).

III. Discussion

A. Parties' Arguments

1. Defendant's Memoranda in Support (Docs. 737-2 and 804-1)

Defendant's motions are premised on the same basic tenet: when Plaintiffs filed their complaint, they alleged an "array of discriminatory conduct", but they did not specify which Plaintiffs experienced what conduct. (Doc. 737-2, p. 8). Although Plaintiffs amended their complaint numerous times, Defendant claims that they did not allege additional facts, rendering the complaint lacking in specificity as to each Plaintiff and his/her personal experience. (Id. ). Indeed, Defendant alleges that Plaintiffs do not satisfy the requirements of pleading under Rule 8. (Id. , n. 6).

Defendant also argues that Plaintiffs' claims should be dismissed on numerous other grounds: untimeliness, (id. , p. 9); failure to state a claim against Local 198 as Plaintiffs' complaints are regarding employers and contractors outside the agency of Local 198, (id. ); and/or a failure to allege or show disparate impact in order to prove his/her discrimination claim, (id. ). Defendant then organizes its arguments into four groups: (1) the acts of other entities or individuals for whom Local 198 cannot be found liable, (id. , pp. 11-17); (2) allegations for which there is no evidentiary support or legal basis, (id. , pp. 17-23); (3) "invalid" Title VII claims, (id. , pp. 23-25); and (4) no factual basis or genuine issue for trial, (id. , pp. 25-46).

a. Other Entities

Defendant argues that it is not liable for the acts taken by the Education Fund. (Id. , p. 11). The Education Fund is the apprenticeship program for Local 198. (Id. ). Defendant argues that the Education Fund is a separate entity "whose funds are held in trust" and which is run by its own Board of Trustees. (Id. , p. 12). After serving one year in the apprenticeship program, individuals are eligible to join Local 198. (Id. ). Defendant contends that any complaints about the apprenticeship program should be dismissed because Local 198 is not responsible for those complaints, only the Education Fund is. (Id. , pp. 12-13). The Education Fund is not a named Defendant.

Next, Defendant argues that it is not liable for the "unauthorized acts" of its individual union members. (Id. , p. 13). For example, "some" of the members of Local 198 are trustees for or are employed by the Education Fund. Defendant argues that Local 198 is not liable for any actions taken by these members in those capacities because these acts are separate and apart from Local 198. (Id. ).

Defendant also argues that it is not liable for the actions of "other employers". (Id. ). Many Plaintiffs complain of discriminatory treatment or adverse working conditions on work sites. Defendant contends that only the particular contractor or employer has control of its work site, and it is that employer's actions about which Plaintiffs complain, not Local 198. Therefore, Defendant cannot be found liable for those complaints, if proven. (Id. , pp. 14-17).

b. No Evidentiary Support or Legal Basis

Defendant argues that Local 198 is not liable for the "call-out", "recall" or "call-back" process. (Id. , p. 17). This process is set out in the collective bargaining agreements, and it allows the contractor or employer to "call for" a specific worker by name. (Id. ). Plaintiffs claim that this process was applied in a discriminatory manner. (Id. , citing Doc. 648, p. 2). Defendant argues that there is no evidence or sufficient factual allegations to support this claim, only "baseless conjectures". (Id. , pp. 19, 20).

Next, when any union is unable to fill a job with workers from its own union, it may reach out to other jurisdictions to fill the job with other workers. (Id. , p. 22). Local 198 kept an informal list of members who expressed an interest in out-of-town work. Those members were contacted when...